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Abstract
Defining sustainable development as non-declining utility, the relationship between sustainable
development and optimal growth is examined critically in Part 1. The operation of the
Hartwick rule for an exhaustible resource is explored under different values of the elasticity of
substitution between capital and resources. The Hartwick rule is then extended to the case of
fossil fuels, where carbon dioxide emissions arise as an externality. Optimal growth paths with
exhaustible resources are shown to be non-sustainable for positive pure rates of time
preference or if produced capital depreciates. For linked environment-economy models where
pollution stocks dissipate, the optimal steady state is characterized and feasibility conditions
for the steady state derived. When resources are renewable and production leads to emissions
that damage the resource, the restrictions on the feasible resource stock size in the steady state
are determined. Part 2 considers the problem of measuring sustainable development, deriving
'green NNP' as a transformation of the Hamiltonian function for an optimal control problem.
Two problems in accounting for exhaustible resources are developed: resource discoveries and
heterogeneous resource deposits. The key issue of the treatment of pollution and pollution
abatement in green national accounts is explored through a series of six models: flow
pollutants, stock pollutants, impairment of pollution dissipation, fossil fuels and carbon
dioxide, living resources and acid rain, and household defensive expenditures. The models of
flow accounts are extended to green wealth accounting, where it is shown that stocks of
pollution can be treated as liabilities in the national balance sheet. Empirical measures of
sustainable development are presented in Part 3, with a discussion of the policy implications of
green national accounting. Estimates of the value of pollution and 'genuine' savings rates are
presented for the UK and selected European countries. The genuine savings analysis is
extended to resource depletion and carbon emission damages for over 50 developing
countries, revealing significant dissaving in Subsaharan Africa.
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1. Introduction
Economics has been concerned with sustainable development, in the sense of sustainable
income, at least since Hicks' (1946) famous definition of income. Hicks' notion of
sustainability was limited, however, since it considered only produced assets in the
determination of the maximum amount that could be consumed while leaving future prospects
for income unchanged. The contributions of environmental economics to thinldng about
sustainable development have been twofold: (i) the asset base has been expanded beyond
produced capital to include natural resources and the environment; and (ii) the environment
has been recognized as an explicit source of welfare. Both of these ideas will be exploited in
this study.
Sustainable development as defined by Pearce et al. (1989) has two forms, strong and weak.
Strong sustainability assumes that there are some environmental assets for which there are
effectively no substitutes, and so these assets, or at least some portions of them, must be
maintained intact if welfare is to be maintained over the indefinite future. Weak sustainability
assumes that environmental assets are substitutable for produced assets and therefore that
maintaining a non-decreasing total value of assets, both produced and natural, will ensure non-
declining welfare over time. Weak sustainability should be viewed as a precondition for
sustainable development: where it is possible, substitution must occur in order for
sustainability to be achieved. It is therefore weak sustainability that will be the underlying
paradigm in what follows.
Adopting sustainability as a goal is, of course, an ethical position rather than 'positive
economics' - sustainability is not the logical outcome of the precepts of neo-classical
economics. At the level of ethics it is possible to argue about whether non-declining utility
could entail lower levels of per capita utility spread over more individuals or whether it should
entail non-declining per capita utility; most governments, faced with the choice, would opt for
the latter. The effect, within economics, of aiming for sustainable development is either to turn
the classical problem of maximizing the present value of utility into a constrained maximization
problem, or to lead to formal rules that characterize paths with constant utility.
Expanding the theoretical underpinnings of sustainable development is an important objective
of this study. However, if government commitments to the goal of sustainable development
are to be more than mere words, significant advances need to be made as well on the
measurement of progress towards sustainable development. The second objective in what
follows is therefore to extend both the theory and the practice of measuring sustainable
development, with 'green' national accounting as the pre-eminent means of measuring
progress. Of particular concern in this regard is the treatment of pollution emissions and
abatement expenditures in the national accounts.
These motivations provide the plan of the study. Part 1 is concerned with the theory of
sustainable development. Part 2 develops the theory of green national accounting. Part 3
presents empirical applications of green national accounting in order to measure whether, and
to what extent, countries are behaving sustainably.
2Outline and Linkage to the Literature
The exposition of the theory of sustainable development begins with a proof of the classic
result in Dasgupta and Heal (1979, ch. 10), that in an economy with an exhaustible resource
that is essential for production, positive rates of pure time preference lead to declining
consumption along the optimal programme that maximizes the present value of utility. This
result is extended in one important way by considering what happens if produced assets
depreciate. By deriving the Hotelling rule for this model, it is shown that depreciation of
produced capital generally leads either to non-sustainability or to the infeasibility of the
Hotelling rule. Depreciation is therefore fatal both to sustainabiity along the optimal path,
even if the pure rate of time preference is 0, and to the operation of the Hartwick (1977) rule,
since the latter depends on the Hotelling rule. In a world where capital depreciates, therefore,
technological change is necessary for the achievement of sustainability.
Setting aside the question of depreciation, the next stage in the analysis is the exploration of
the Hartwick rule under different assumptions about the elasticity of substitution between
capital and resources. While the degree of substitutability is obviously a key issue, the
literature does not contain a full exposition of the role that it plays. It is proved that a
'generalized Hartwick rule,' analogous to that of Dixit, Hammond and Hoel (1980), that
investment must equal resource rents times resource extraction plus a constant, is necessary
and sufficient for constant consumption if the Hoteiling rule holds. It is then shown that non-
zero values of the constant lead to infeasibility of the Hartwick-Hotelling programme for
constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production functions.
Hartwick (1978) begins but does not complete the analysis of the Hartwick-Hotelling
programme for different values of the elasticity of substitution. This gap is filled when it is
shown that constant consumption is infeasible if the elasticity is less than 1, and that the
programme does not produce maximal consumption for values of the elasticity that are greater
than and near to 1. The existence of a maximal constant consumption path requires that the
elasticity of substitution be precisely 1. Linking this result back to the sustainability debate, it
is clear that constant consumption, a type of 'minimal sustainabiity,' is impossible if one holds
to a 'stronger' sustainability position, that the elasticity of substitution between resources and
capital is less than 1.
The operation of the Hartwick rule is then extended to the case of fossil fuels, where the
exhaustible resource in question is also the source of a global externality. The extended
Hartwick rule that results requires that investment equal the diminution in the resource stock
plus the change in the CO2 stock, each valued at their shadow prices: unit resource rents net of
an optimal carbon tax in the case of the fossil fuel, and the marginal social cost of carbon
dioxide. While such a result is implicit in Dixit, Hammond and Hoel (1980), several new
features are highlighted in this model: (i) the effect of the carbon externality on net resource
rents; (ii) the operation of the Hartwick rule when carbon emissions are assumed to lead to
catastrophic outcomes at some stock level; and (iii) the condition for the feasibility of the
Hartwick programme, namely that marginal dissipation rates of the carbon stock must
approach 0 as the total stock approaches its 'pre-industrial' level.
The question of sustainability is next extended to additional models with pollution
externalities. A model of a pollutant with cumulative effects is shown not to have an optimal
path that is sustainable. For a model of a stock pollutant that dissipates, the feasibility
3conditions for a long-run steady state are, jointly, that the willingness of consumers to pay for
environmental services not be too high and that the pure rate of time preference not be too
low. For the acid ram problem, the pollution externality leads to a smaller range of feasible
stock sizes for a living resource than in the absence of acid emissions. Sufficient conditions for
the optimal paths of these models to be sustainable are established.
Turning to the measurement of sustainable development, the 'traditional' literature on green
national accounting, which eschews formal models, is shown to be inconsistent and
unpersuasive - this covers the work in volumes edited by Ahmad et aL (1989) and Lutz
(1993), as well as work by Repetto et aL (1989), Bartelmus ef al. (1989), Hueting and Bosch
(1990), Juster (1973) and Herfindahl and Kneese (1973).
The green national accounting work of Hartwick (1990, 1993) and Mäier (1991), building on
the seminal work of Weitzman (1976), is extended in many directions. These studies all
interpret some transformation of the current value Hamiltonian function for the optimal
growth programme of a simple economy to be a measure of NNP. The result of extending
these models is interpreted, initially, as a guide to optimal growth policy - a model with
exhaustible resources is developed, to show that green NNP is a good indicator of the
direction of movement of the Hamiltonian along the optimal path. Interpretations with regard
to sustainable development are taken up later in the study.
With regard to exhaustible natural resources, a model is presented, developed independently
by Hartwick (1993), of the treatment of resource discoveries in a deterministic framework. By
making resource discoveries a function both of cumulative discoveries and of exploration
effort - an approach similar to that of Pindyck (1978) - it follows that resource discoveries are
properly added to green NNP valued at their marginal discovery cost, which is necessarily less
than the unit rental rate. This contradicts the non-intuitive conclusion in Hartwick (1990) and
Repetto et a!. (1989) that resource discoveries, valued at the full rental rate, should be treated
as income in the year of discovery. Treating resource exploration expenditures as investment,
as is done in the standard national accounts (United Nations 1993a), is therefore roughly
correct.
Another issue in accounting for exhaustible resources is the phenomenon of heterogeneous
resource deposits. The models of Hartwick (1990) and Hartwick and Lindsey (1989) assume
that the resource (oil) is, in effect, in one big pooi, which suggests that frontier oil production
costs represent the marginal cost of extraction. A model is developed in which simultaneous
production takes place from heterogeneous resource deposits, each having its own extraction
cost function (production is efficient as long as each specific unit rent follows the Hotelling
rule). Green NNP for such a model deducts the rents from each individual deposit, giving a
result differing from the 'one big pool' assumption.
The area with the greatest need for development in green national accounting is the treatment
of pollution emissions and abatement expenditures. Hartwick (1990,1993) and Maler (1991)
both explicitly extend Weitzman's approach to look at maximizing the present value of utility
under different presumptions about the depletion of natural resources and damage to the
environment from pollution. Maler constructs one large model that contains, in addition to
consumption and investment goods, a flow resource that is damaged by pollution emissions, a
living resource that is harvested and whose growth is affected by inputs of goods and labour,
and a household production function through which, by inputting goods and labour,
4households can increase their benefits from the environment (i.e., the flow resource). The key
result in Maler (1991) is that deductions for defensive expenditures should not be made in the
measure of national welfare derived from the modeL
Hartwick (1990) presents two pollution-related models, one in which there is a stock pollutant
that accumulates emissions and is subject to a natural dissipation process - this pollutant
appears (negatively) in the production function - and a second in which the rate of change of
the stock pollutant appears in the utility function as well. In these models pollution is
mitigated by expenditures that affect the rate of the natural dissipation process, an unlikely
form of mitigation. Hartwick (1993) offers a more intuitive model in which utility is related to
the accumulated stock of pollutant and abatement expenditures limit the quantity of pollution
emissions.
This study builds on and extends the Hartwick and Mäler models in several directions: (i) an
explicit approach is taken to pollution abatement expenditures, and these are related to
marginal social costs and optimal emission taxes; (ii) a series of models are constructed to
examine individually the effects of flow pollutants, stock pollutants and pollutants with
cumulative effects, degradation of natural dissipation processes, stock pollutants linked
directly to exhaustible resources (the CO2 problem), and flow pollutants that damage living
resources (the acid rain problem); and (iii) the treatment of household defensive expenditures
is re-examined.
A key conclusion of the pollution models is that pollution emissions in NNP should be valued
at their marginal social costs (which equal marginal abatement costs and the level of a Pigovian
tax on emissions at the optimum), which is in clear contrast to the suggestion of using
'restoration costs' in the UN System of Integrated Environmental and Economic Accounts
(United Nations 1993b). Other general conclusions are that abatement expenditures should be
treated as intermediate consumption, that adjustments need to be made for both pollution
emissions and natural pollution dissipation processes, and that the level of environmental
services must be valued in measuring welfare. Not only should household defensive
expenditures not be subtracted from welfare, under plausible assumptions the adjustment to
welfare includes a value greater than the level of household defensive expenditure. Because
the value of environmental services appears naturally in these models, the resulting measure is
best interpreted as a 'measure of economic welfare.'
These modeling approaches are extended to green wealth accounting, where it is shown that
the value of pollution stocks should be treated as a liability in the national balance sheet, but
that constant wealth at current prices is not synonymous with constant welfare. The wealth
analysis helps to sharpen the interpretation of the measure of economic welfare in the previous
models: taking the natural definition of green NNP as the sum of unconsumed output and the
change in the real value of assets and liabilities, this measures the maximum amount that can
be consumed while leaving utility instantaneously constant (this has similarities to the model
of Pemberton et al. 1995). The measure of economic welfare (MEW) adds the value that
consumers place on the flow of environmental services, a sort of expanded notion of
consumption, to this green NNP measure. Green NNP is shown to be an imperfect indicator to
guide policies for optimal growth, while the MEW is better, but under some restrictive
assumptions. While Pezzey (1994) and Asheim (1994) show that positive net savings rates at a
point in time are not sufficient to prove that the economy is on a sustainable path, it is proven
that persistent negative net savings rates must lead to declining welfare in the long run. This
5rate of 'genuine' saving is therefore a one-sided indicator of sustainability, and this indicator is
arguably the green national accounting aggregate with the greatest welfare significance.
The empirical portions of the study present new results on the measurement of genuine savings
based on the preceding theoretical work. It is shown that the marginal social costs of
pollution provide an upper-bound estimate of pollution damages that can be used in green
accounting exercises. Genuine savings rates, accounting for resource depletion and the social
costs of pollution emissions, are calculated for the UK over the decade of the 1980's, showing
it to be marginally non-sustainable over this period; similar but cruder calculations are carried
out for the other countries of OECD Europe. A new data set giving consistent estimates of the
value of resource depletion over the 1980's, including oil, minerals and tropical forests, is used
to estimate genuine saving rates for over 50 countries; Subsaharan African nations stand out
as persistent dissavers.
The study concludes with a discussion of the policy implications of green national accounting,
with particular emphasis on measures of genuine saving.
Parti
Theory of Sustainable Development
= (2.2)
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2. Sustainability, Exhaustible Resources and Depreciation
One of the less satistying aspects of the notion of weak sustainabilily (Pearce et aL 1989), that
produced assets can substitute for natural resources, is the fact that produced assets depreciate
and wear out. Intuitively, it would seem that the combination of a finite non-renewable
resource base and depreciable capital should lead to unsustainabiity: consumption will decline
in the long run. This intuition turns out to be correct under fairly general conditions.
Dasgupta and Heal (1979, ch. 7 endnote) state that exponential decay of capital is 'a positive
embarrassment' to their model of maximal constant consumption in the face of exhaustible
resources. They then simply claim that exponential decay is not veiy realistic and carry on.
The discussion of the depreciation of capital is not continued in their presentation of the
optimal growth model with exhaustible resources. The purpose of this note is to develop this
model, and to draw conclusions for the sustainability of economic development.
To keep the argument to its essentials we assume no external trade and fixed technology. The
optimal growth model involves utility function U(C), consumption C, Cobb-Douglas
production function F(KR,L), capital stock K, resource useR, labour L, resource stocks S,
and capital depreciation dK,). Resource extraction is costless. Given constant pure rate of
time preference r (all other variables are implicitly functions of time), we wish to,
maxfU(C)edt such that:
K=F-C-d
Here there are two state variables, K and S, and two control variables, C, and R. The current
value Hamiltonian for this problem is,
H= U+1(F-C-d)-y2R
and the first order conditions for maximization are,
y1=U,and	 (2.1)
-5 = o = Uc-r1
1I
-;- 
=0= yF 72
It is the dynamic first order conditions that are of primary interest:
Uc
—=r-FK -i-dK ,and	 (2.3)
Uc
8(2.4)6ff	 r2r2 =rr2--- ='
Substituting (2.2) and (2.3) into (2.4) we get our analogue to the Hotelling rule,
(2.5)
The assumption of finite total resources implies that R - 0 as t - oo. For Cobb-Douglas
production technology, and assuming stable population and therefore employed labour, L, we
have
F = KaR ?TJ , a+fi^5=1, JJJJR
Now, R—*0 impliesthat 1>0 because F <0.As R-^Otheneither:(i) K-0 aswell,
in which case both production F and consumption C approach 0; or (ii) F -+0, in which
case, from expression (2.5), FR <0, a contradiction. The latter contradiction arises if dK is
constant (d(K) = SK, exponential decay of capital) or decreases at a lower rate than FK
(there is no inherent reason for this to hold in the model). Development is not sustainable in
this model, by Pezzey's (1989) definition, under most reasonable assumptions about the
marginal rate of depreciation.
The elasticity of marginal utility of consumption is,
so that expression (2.3) reduces to,
(2.6)
The preceding expression is the Ramsey (1928) rule: the social rate of return on investment
must equal the return on capital. If there is no depreciation and a positive pure rate of time
preference then, by the arguments presented for expression (2.5), either development is
unsustainable because K ^0 or it is unsustainable because eventually F <r as F - 0.
This puts a 'sustainability' interpretation on this result from Dasgupta and Heal (1979, ch. 10).
If both the pure rate of time preference and depreciation of capital are zero then expression
(2.6) implies that the optimal path is sustainable, under some non-intuitive restrictions on the
integrability of the utility function that are derived in Dasgupta and Heal. Under these
conditions resource rents will increase as the resource depletes, as governed by expression
(2.5).
9Both positive rates of pure time preference and depreciation of capital lead to optimal paths
that are not sustainable. While this result is derived in the context of Cobb-Douglas production
technology, it is clear that it should generalize to any technology where resources are essential
and there are decreasing returns to their use.
If we reject the assumption of exponential decay of capital, although it is not obviously a bad
assumption, is the alternative any more palatable? The alternative is declining marginal
depreciation of capital, such that dr <1 as F - 0. First, this seems an arbitrary
constraint on what is, at least partly, a physical process: the wearing out of buildings and
machines. Secondly, it seems difficult to construct a plausible model of a process by which the
marginal amount of depreciation decreases when the capital stock increases. One possibility
would be if each additional unit of capital were more durable than its predecessor, which
implies a specific form of technological change: asset lives would approach infinity in the limit
rather than at the outset as in the standard model with zero depreciation.
Not only does depreciation of produced capital imply that the optimal path is not sustainable,
it also implies, since the Hartwick rule relies on the Hotelling rule (expression (2.5)), that the
Hartwick programme is infeasible as well.
If the pure rate of time preference is constant, produced assets depreciate and there are
exhaustible natural resources that are essential for production, it seems clear that some form of
technological change will be required if sustainability is to be possible. While this is the last
time that we will discuss technological change or depreciation of capital in this study, this is a
point that should be borne in mind in what follows.
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3. Sustainability and the Elasticity of Substitution1
Concern about damage to the environment and depletion of resources has made sustainable
economic development a concept with both wide currency and wide interpretation, as Pezzey's
(1989) exposition demonstrates. Although various criticisms have been levelled at the notion
of sustainable development (see, for instance, Nordhaus (1992a)), it is the goall of this chapter
to explore a particularly simple definition, that per capita utility be non-declining, owing to
Pezzey. Given that the sustainability criterion is, in effect, an ethical constraint on the classic
economic problem of intertemporal optimization, the key question to be answered is whether,
or under what conditions, sustainable development so defined is consistent with optimal
growth and finite resources.
The problem to be examined in this chapter is that of finding a development path with maximal
consumption that is minimally sustainable in the face of finite resources. Stated this way, it is
clear that this is equivalent to a maximin programme, which has been widely studied in the
literature. The starting ethical position in the preceding work was different, essentially a
Rawisian framework in which welfare across time is equal to that of the least well-off
generation, but the end goal was the same: maximal constant consumption.
Solow (1974) proved the existence of a path with maximal constant consumption and finite
resources, and this was elaborated in Dasgupta and Heal (1979, ch. 7). Both of these results
required a Cobb-Douglas production function with the elasticity of output with respect to
produced capital being greater than that of natural resources. The famous result in this
literature is Hartwick (1977), who showed that the 'Hartwick rule', to invest resource rents, is
a sufficient condition for a maximin programme for general production functions. Hartwick
(1978) explored the Hartwick rule for several resources and raised unanswered questions
about the existence of a maximin path for different values of the elasticity of substitution
between capital and resources in a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production
function. Finally Dixit, Hammond and Hoel (hereafter DHH) (1980) showed in a very general
framework that an extended Hartwick rule, in which capital accumulation equals unit resource
rent times the quantity of resources used plus an arbitrary constant, was necessary and
sufficient for the existence of a maximin path2.
The substitution possibilities between capital and resources are clearly important in
determining whether a maximin path exists. A substantial portion of this chapter therefore
deals with characterizing the behaviour of both the standard and generalized Hartwick rules
under varying values of the elasticity of substitution in a CES production function; this has not
been resolved in the literature to date. The first section begins with a simple proof, for general
production functions, that the generalized Hartwick rule combined with the Hotelling rule is
necessary and sufficient for maximal constant consumption. It ends by tying together the
various approaches to the maxirnin problem in the literature, including the derivation of a
weaker condition for maximal consumption under the generalized Hartwick rule than that in
DHH (1980) for CES production functions.
This chapter was originally published in Hamilton (1995).
2 Dasgupta and Mitra (1983) showed that in a discrete time formulation constant maximal consumption
requires that investment be less than resource rents. However, the standard Hartwick result is approached
asymptotically as the time step nears 0.
11
The behaviour of a Hartwick-Hotelling programme under varying values of the elasticity of
substitution, c, is related to the debate concerning 'strong versus 'weak' sustainability (Pearce eL
a!. 1989). The proponents of weak sustainability argue that capital and resources are substitutable,
and so identif' sustainable development with maintaining total assets (produced capital and natural
resources) constant or increasing. The strong sustainability position is that there is a critical
quantity of at least some natural resources that must be maintained intact if utility is not to decline
in the future - in the limit this would imply a zero elasticity of substitution for these resources.
Without doing too much violence to the basic elements of this debate, it is possible to equate
'weaker' sustainability with substitution possibilities that are elastic (o >1), and 'stronger'
sustainability with inelastic substitution possibilities (o <1). The result derived below, that
constant consumption is not attainable for o <1, therefore implies that the Hartwick rule will not
yield constant consumption if you subscribe to the 'stronger' sustainability position.
Maximal Constant Consumption Paths
While this section is primarily concerned with the behaviour of the Hartwick rule under
different assumptions about the elasticity of substitution of capital and resources, the starting
point is a simple proof that a generalized Hartwick rule, to use the terminology of DHH
(1980), combined with the Hoteiling rule, is necessary and sufficient for constant
consumption.
We assume that there is constant population (so that labour can be treated implicitly in the
production function), and no disembodied technological growth. The initial endowment is a
stock S0 of resources and K0 of capital. Output Fis produced from capitalK and resourcesR
according to the production function,
F = F(X 1?) such that FK, FR > 0, Frjc, FPR < 0.
Consumption C is defined by the following set of differential equations:
(3.1)
C=F-K
Any efficient programme of production, investment and consumption must satisfy two criteria:
(3.2)
FR
and
urn St = 0ast—*c.	 (3.3)
The first of these is the familiar Hotelling rule; in the economy postulated, holders of natural
resource stocks must be indifferent between holding resources or the alternative asset, capital,
which yields F. Any programme that left unexploited natural resources would clearly be
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inefficient, hence expression (3.3) which says that the programme must exhaust the initial resource
stock
The generalized Hartwick rule is given by:
K = FR (R + v), V constant,	 (3.4)
where the return to resources, FR, is the resource rental rate.
Sufficiency of the generalized Hartwick-Hotelling programme for constant consumption is
proved as follows. Applying expressions (3.2) and (3.4) we have:
C=
=
= F-PR(R+v)-FRE
= F-FKFR(R+V)-FRl
= F-FKIC-FRE
= 0.
Necessity of the programme for constant consumption is shown by assuming C = 0. We
have,
K=F-C
= FRR+FKK
= FRR+—K
FR
= FRR+FRR+(K-FRR).
FR
Now define Z = K - FR R, so that Z = K - FR R - FR R, and therefore the preceding expression
fort canbewrittenas ± =	 Z Thisequationhas solution Z = VFR forconstantv, and
FR
thereforeK= FR(R+V).
Having established that the Hotelling rule and the generalized Hartwick rule are together
necessary and sufficient for constant consumption, the next question to be examined is the
behaviour of the system under different assumptions about v. For v ^ 0 we will explore the
generalized Hartwick rule, while the case v =0 will be explored in a sub-section on the standard
Hartwick rule.
(3.5)
(3.6)
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The Generalized Hartwick Rule
We wish to derive the path for output and consumption under the generalized Hartwick rule.
It is clear from the foregoing derivation that the parameter v is simply a constant of integration
- it has no obvious economic interpretation, and it would be disturbing if constant
consumption were feasible for any programme that added an arbitrary amount to the quantity
of resource extracted.
The first case to be considered is v < 0. The efficiency condition that S -+ 0 implies that
R -* 0. If v <0, eventually K <0, and therefore, assuming capital can be consumed and given
the fixed initial endowment Ko, both R and K will tend to 0; assuming that no output is produced
purely by labour, constant consumption is impossible.
To take the argument further requires more structure for the production function. Since it is
clearly the degree of substitutability between capital and resources that is of key importance in
models with exhaustible resources, the important functional form to consider is the class of
constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production functions. Defining, as before, a to be
the elasticity of substitution, we have, assuming constant labour force and normalizing per unit of
labour,
a.
a'-!	 -F 
= 
(aK+/3R^1-a-/3)°" a,/3>0, a+/3<1, o>O, cr^1.
Note that F, K, and R are all functions of time, while a, fi and a are fixed parameters. For
the case a =1 this reduces to the familiar Cobb-Douglas form.
It will be convenient in what follows to define the following expressions:
a-I	 a-I
x= (ajc+flR+1-a-I3),
and
r=	 <1.
With these definitions we can derive,
'	 '	 F 1	 (F'
FR =	 =	 =	 -
The examination of the behaviour of the system for v >0 will be divided into three parts,
according to the assumptions about the elasticity of substitution. For the Cobb-Douglas function
(a =1)we have,
(3.7)
(3.8)
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C = F-FRR-FRV
=
Therefore C becomes negative as R - 0, contradicting C = 0.
If o <1 then,
C = F - FRR - FRV
= F-rF-vflR
v/i
=	 fiR +(1-a-fi)R)
Again, C becomes negative as R —^ 0 (note that r - V), contradicting C = 0.
If a- >1 then resources are not essential for production. For large a-, i.e. as a —^ oo, FR —^ /3
and FK — a, so that the Hotelling rule is violated. Efficient production is therefore impossible
when capital and resources are perfect substitutes. As derived in the Appendix to this chapter, the
rate of change of output for general a- can be shown to be given by:
F=K_k (R(o-1)-v
R+vR(c-)-yv
This expression reduces to the following for the case v = 0:
F 
= 1 R (cr-i)
R(cr-y)
As a- -+ t, y -4/3 and, from expression (3.7),
F—.ic__ 	 -v
R+v R(l-/i)-/ivJ
We distinguish two cases according to the initial conditions in the preceding expression. If in
the initial period p (1-fl) - /3v >0, then for some time beyond this period,
R=
1-13
at which point output is infinite (since the growth rate is positive and infinite - recall that
J <0 because of efficiency condition (3.3)). The programme is not feasible.
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Alternatively, if p47 - fi) - /3v <0 inthe initial period, then F <0. Note that
F (	 a-I	 c-I
a
K	 _____a
=1a(_ ++ a-iRi
is unbounded as R -^ 0. Consumption is given by,
C = F - FR(R+v)
= (1r)F(.
Therefore if (1 - 8) - /3v <0, consumption becomes negative as R —* 0 -
These results for the generalized Hartwick rule are summarized in Table 3.1. Any non-zero
choice of v, roughly speaking, leads to declining consumption, infinite output or a violation of
the Hotelling rule, depending on the value of the elasticity of substitution o- -
Table 3.1 Results for the Generalized Hartwick Rule
K= FR(TR+v)
0<1	 0=1	 cr>1
o1
v <0	 F — 0	 F - 0	 F -^ 0	 Hotelling
C-^0	 C-0	 C-0	 Rule
as t -^ cx	 as t -^	 as t -^	 violated
v> 0	 Cr <0	 C <0	 Either	 Hotelling
for T <	 for T <	 F(K , Rr) =	 Rule
forT<	 violated
or
CT<0
for T<rx
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The Standard Hartwick Rule
Having shown the generalized Hartwick rule to be infeasible, at least for CES production
functions, in what follows we employ the widely known form of the Hartwick rule,
K= FR R
	 (3.9)
i.e., that investment equal resource rents. Now the question to be explored is the behaviour of
output, consumption and investment, under the standard Hartwick-Hotelling programme, for
different values of the elasticity of substitution. We proceed by considering three cases,
according to whether this elasticity is less than, equal to, or greater than 1.
We first consider the case o• <1. In this instance the marginal product of resources is bounded
since,
(3.10)
I
/	 ti-I	 0-i
FR = fia+fiR+1-a-fi)K
=	 ____
Thus, since K is non-decreasing under the Hartwick rule,
FR —*/Ji asR—>O.
This in turn implies that K is bounded because
K =KO +JFRRdt and fRdt=S0.
Consumption is given by,
C = F-FRR
!
= Xi—fiXiK0-R
= Xi(X—fiRti)
=
(3.11)
Therefore, since K is bounded, consumption tends to 0 as R tends to 0 when a <1.
17
This derivation can be compared with Dasgupta and Heal (1979, ch. 7), who show that if the
elasticity of substitution is less than 1, then F / R is bounded, implying total output is bounded,
and therefore that constant consumption is impossible.
The preceding derivation and the result from Dasgupta and Heal (1979) contradict Theorem 3
from Hartwick (1978). One component of this theorem implies that E> 0 if a <1.
Recalling expression (3.8), note that r - 1 as R -+0, so that, while Fmay initially be increasing
(i e. for y <a<i), eventually it must decrease. In fact, sinceKis bounded, eventually K -+0,
so that E -+ o, contradicting the first part of the above theorem. Because total output is
bounded, we know that F - o in the long run.
Next we consider the case a >1. Since resources are not essential in this instance, both Solow
(1974) and Dasgupta and Heal (1979) dismiss this case. The behaviour of the Hartwick-Hotelling
programme under these conditions needs to be clarified.
Since a >1 and y <1, expression (3.8) implies that P < 0.. Because consumption is constant,
this in turn implies that FR R -0 as R - 0, since
a
(	 a-IF -* La K 1 - a -fi	 as R - 0.
A further conclusion from the preceding expression is that K must be bounded since P < 0.
This is in spite of FR being unbounded as R - 0, as is obvious from expression (3.10).
How does consumptionvarywith a? Because F-3 czTC+/3R+J-a-/3 as a-+oo,the
Hotelling rule is violated as capital and resources become peifect substitutes. For finite values of
the elasticity of substitution we have, following from expression (3.11):
ac	 1	 (-1)	 a-I	 a-I	 a-I	 1
- 
= Xi In(	 (a K +1- a - /3) +	 a K ln(X) -i(cr-if
	
a
1	 f'lnK)	 ln(	 '	 ln(i '
= Xi aK,.I 2 (f)(1a13)(fJ.
The critical issue is therefore the behaviour of 1n((cr-if
Using VHôpital's rules, we take the derivatives of numerator and denominator with respect to a,
ón(X)
8cr	 8cr
2(a -1) = 2X(cr - i)
	
a-I	 a-I
8X aK° ln(K) /3R a ln(R) ln(K CRfi)
 as a -+1k+	 2Now—=	 28cr	 a
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Consumption is therefore a declining function of a >1. Constant consumption under the
Hartwick rule consequently increases as cr -+ t. As Solow (1974) and Dasgupta and Heal
(1979) show, the Cobb-Douglas production function yields maximal consumption.
Because resources are not essential for elasticities of substitution greater than 1, one strategy
for achieving maximal consumption might be to consume all of the resource in the initial
period. The derivation in the Appendix to this chapter shows, however, that such a strategy
will not yield constant consumption under the Hartwick rule.
The operation of the standard Hartwick-Hotelling programme, where investment is precisely
equal to current resource rents, is summarized for CES production functions in Table 3.2.
Only the Cobb-Douglas production function, for which the elasticity of substitution is equal to
1, yields minimal sustainability at the maximum rate of consumption.
Table 3.2 Results for the Standard Hartwick Rule
K= FRR
a<1	 cr=1	 a>1
o1
F—O	 P=o	 F<o	 Hoteffing
C-^O	 c=o	 Rule
as t -3	 C is	 <0	 violated
maximal
Links to the Literature
As noted in the introduction to this chapter, the literature on the Hartwick rule has several
strands to it. This section identifies the common threads in the literature and provides a
generalization of one result in DHH (1980).
The solution of the system for a Hartwick-Hotelling programme is remarkably simple in the
Cobb-Douglas case, for constant consumption C0:
F = Ka p! , a,fi> 0, a+fi < 1,
K= FRR'13F,
implying,
C0 = (1-f3)F constant	 F constant =>	 = -F from Appendix (A3.1),
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so that K = K0 +	 t, and therefore,
1	 a
R = (c'5 (Ko + PCO
1-13)
The condition for the existence of a solution to the system is therefore a >13, i.e. the elasticity
of output with respect to capital must be greater than that with respect to resources, since R must
have a finite integral equalling S0. Performing the integration yields the value for maximal
consumption,
L
Co = (1-fl) (a - /3)6 S 1 48 T' 1.48o (3.12)
To tie the literature together, it is worth describing the solutions of Solow (1974) and
Dasgupta and Heal (1979) to the maximin problem, which did not use the Hartwick rule
explicitly. Both choose the Cobb-Douglas production function after rejecting CES functions
where total output is bounded (o <1) and where resources are not essential (o >1). For this
production function maintaining constant consumption C0 implies that,
K = K0+mt
	 (3.13)
1	 a
R = (C0+mfi(Ko+mtTi
where m = t is a constant. Both point out that efficiency requires that the integral of the above
expression for R exist and be equal to S0, so that the condition a >8 is required. Performing this
integration yields:
Co = m(13S)IC'
Dasgupta and Heal then maximize this expression with respect to m to yield the optimal
constant consumption,
(a136 
ft
48	 1	 -	
-	 1.48C0=(I3ii-/3T.i)	 ) S0 K0
which simplifies to expression (3.12).
Solow (1974) takes a different approach to deriving the optimum. By constructing phase
diagrams for the problem, the following expression for the parameter m in the system of
equations (3.13) is arrived at directly,
m=K= tiC0	 (3.14)
1-13
aav	 1-y-o'
(3.15)
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for some fixed C0. The equation for R in expression (3.13) is then integrated, and set equal to So
to arrive at the maximal level of consumption, as given by expression (3.12).
Hartwick's (1977) key insight, that expression (3.14) embodies the rule "invest resource
rents", is not derived explicitly in the paper. Instead the sufficiency of this rule for a
programme of constant consumption is proved for a general production function.
It is also worth linking what has been presented so far to the much more general framework
employed by Dliii (1980)'. If we assume the existence of a competitive output price pathp
and a positive constant exhaustion rent u (i.e. assuming efficient resource extraction), then
expression (3.4) may be re-written as,
plC = PFR(R+V)
= p(R+v)
=
where iiv is constant. Rearranging terms then gives the analog of the 'generalized Hartwick rule'
of Dliii:
pK+	 = tiv.
The authors prove that this rule is necessary and sufficient for constant utility in their general
framework. They go on to show that any path with v <0 is infeasible.
A point of particular interest in the Dixit, Hammond and Hod paper is their proof that, given
any efficient path such that v =0, any other path with v> 0 and a larger capital stock for all
t> 0 will yield a lower level of utility under the generalized Hartwick rule. Expressing their
proposition in terms of the CES production function analysis presented so far, we can say that
F1 (7?+v)> FRORO for v>O,
is a necessary condition for C <CO3 where the 'unprimed' variables represent their values for
v =0 (this is a necessary condition because the capital stock can only be greater than its previous
value for all t> 0 if its rate of change in the initial period is greater).
Changes in v will clearly affect	 because the capital stock level will be altered under the
generalized Hartwick rule, and the efficient path must both exhaust the resource and satisir the
Hotelling rule. For infinitesimal changes in v it is shown in the Appendix to this chapter that the
Dliii condition for maximal utility is equivalent to
1 
am grateful to David Ulph for pointing out this connection.
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while a more direct derivation of this condition, using the machinery of CES production
fi.rnctions presented so far, yields
i3v
	 (3.16)
Recalling that the case o >1 was the most problematic in terms of analyzing its behaviour with
respect to changes in v, and noting that r <1, we can conclude that the DHH condition is stronger
than necessary for this case, since expression (3.15) is negative and expression (3.16) is positive.
At least for infinitesimal changes in v the weaker condition (3.16) yields maximal consumption
under the Hartwick-Hotelling programme when the elasticity of substitution is greater than 1.
Conclusions
If for reasons of intergenerational equity the desired goal is minimal sustainabiity with
maximum consumption, then the Hartwick rule, to invest resource rents, is the keystone.
Solow (1986) refers to it as a "rule of thumb" for growth policy.
This study has drawn together several strands from a diverse literature on the Hartwick rule.
The analysis has shown that, given virtually unrestricted production functions, the generalized
Hartwick rule in combination with the Hotelling rule is both necessary and sufficient for
consumption to be constant. The Cobb-Douglas production function (out of the class of CES
production functions), in which the elasticity of substitution between capital and resources is
exactly 1, yields consumption that is constant, positive and maximal when a standard Hartwick
programme is followed in combination with two efficiency conditions, the Hotelling rule and
complete resource exhaustion.
The generalized Hartwick rule, K = FR (R + v) for non-zero v, yields either declining
consumption or infinite output for finite values of the elasticity of substitution. The standard
Hartwick rule, where v = 0, yields either declining consumption or consumption less than that
obtained under a Cobb-Douglas production function for finite elasticities of substitution that
are not equal to 1. The derivations in this chapter therefore emphasize the "knife edge" role of
the Cobb-Douglas production function. Although the generalized Hartwick rule promises
constant consumption for general production functions, the requirement that a maximal
constant consumption path exist places severe limits on the substitution possibilities inherent in
the production function.
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Appendix to Chapter 3
We begin with a basic result for the rate of change of output under the generalized Hartwick
rule:
E=K+C= F('R--v)+ FRR
	 (A3.1)
= KI Fr R+v
=(^_k
FR R+v
Recalling the definitions of X (expression (5)) and (expression (6)), a few results follow
directly from the definition of the CES production function:
FR = fi Xi R = P	 = /5)
'	 '	 F 1	 IF'	 (A3.2)
I
Fpj =	 - -	 F =a/3	
1 1 - ifiK;	 ly
0	 crX	 oR
	 (A3.3)
F 
=	
< 0.iF
	
(A3.4)
0
Note as well that y <1 and that y —* /3 as o — 1.
The first item to be derived is the expression for F. We begin with FR = F R + F K
Therefore,
=
FR	 crR
JR -
= --fr J)+
crR
-
= --fr J)+
oR	 crR	 FR
so that,
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= (_E ('y-1)(R+v)
FR LR+v)Ra-r(R+v)
From expression (A3.1) we therefore derive,
F=K_ ((y-1)(R+v)1
R+vRa-y+v) )
=K_E (R(a-1)-v'
R+ vLR(cr-y)-yiJ
and thus,
k (-vF—*K
	
	
las cT—+t.
R+v R(1-/3)-fiv))
The next issue to be considered is the behaviour of the Hartwick-Hotelling system when
cr >1 and, since resources are not essential for this value of the elasticity of substitution, when all
of the resource is extracted in the base period. C = 0 if and only it; given F = F(KR),
(A3.5)F(K0 + FR(KO,SO), O) = F(K0,S0) -FR(KOJ So)So.
It will simplify the algebra considerably, without unduly affecting the generality of the
argument, if we assume for this derivation that a + /3=1, so that
a-I	 a-i
x= aK+fiR.
Expression (A3.5) may now be re-written as,
a
a-A (	 a-I
[aKo+PxsoJ 
J 
= XX/3S0aJ.
which implies that,
I	 a-i
aai(Ko+I3XiSo a = xiczK0 aJ,
and therefore that,
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7-1	 a-I'
aiKo =
For consumption to be constant this latter expression should be an identity. However, there
are clearly choices of K0 and S0 for which the right hand side is less than or equal to 0, so the
identity does not hold.
Finally, we consider how the level of consumption varies with v in the generalized Hartwick
rule. The analysis will be based on infinitesimal positive changes dv, to examine the transition
from the standard to the generalized Hartwick rule - negative values have already been ruled out
because they lead to declining consumption. In order for the capital stock to be greater for all time
(after the initial period) in the transition to the generalized rule, as D}{H (1980) hypothesize, a
necessary condition is that be greater under the generalized rule. This may be written as,
C < C0 if dv> 0 and F,,4(R+dv)> FR,Ro.
However, for infinitesimal dv we may write,
F1, = FR, +
	 dv, and R, = Ro +
	
dv.
Therefore,
F (R + dv) = (FR. +	 dv) (RD +
	 + ) dv)
= FR. Ro + 
ÔFR, 
dv + F	 + i) dv,R.L av
where terms in dv2 have been dropped because they will go to zero in the limit. The question is
therefore reduced to whether the sum of the second two terms in the preceding expression is
greater than 0. Note that, since we are dealing with the initial period, Ko is independent of v, and
therefore the relationship we wish to test for these terms may be written as,
F,, RD dv + FR, ( +i) dv> 0.
Recalling expression (A3.4), this may be written for CES production functions as,
Y1 .&dv + -'? +J' dv> o,
cray	ôv)
so that, after dividing by dv, the Dixit, Hammond and Hoel condition reduces to
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0•
Ow	 1-y-cr
Because Ko is given and independent of v, both Co and R are functions of v under the
generalized Hartwick rule. A more direct attack on this problem is therefore to evaluate
0c0
	
a
-- 
=	 (FO-FR.(P?+dv))
= - F,	 (i + dv) - FR,.
(A3.6)
In order for C0 to vary negatively with v we require the latter expression to be less than 0, or,
again employing expression (A3.4) and dividing by FR.,
_zL ( ^ < 1.
cTR0OV
Taking the limit as dv tends to 0, this reduces to the condition
Ow	 1-y
	 (A3.7)
For the case o > 1, expression (A3.7) is less restrictive than (A3.6) because its right-hand side is
positive, while that of(A3.6) is negative.
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4. The Hartwick Rule in a Greenhouse World1
Different times, different problems. The origins of the Hartwick rule (Hartwick (1977)) lie in
the 'energy crisis' of the early 1970's, when the depletion of resources seemed to present limits
to economic development. This chapter looks at a problem for the 1990's: how economic
well-being can be maintained when an exhaustible resource, fossil fuel, is also the direct source
of a pollutant that reduces welfare. This, in essence, is the CO2 problem.
There is a consensus in the scientific community that continued emissions of carbon dioxide
will lead to greenhouse warming of the earth's atmosphere (IPCC (1992)). Economic
approaches to the problem, attempting to measure the costs versus the benefits of limiting CO2
emissions, include Nordhaus (1991, 1992b) and Cline (1992), with carbon taxes being the
favoured means of achieving abatement of emissions. Dean and Hoeller (1992) summarize
several studies of the level of carbon tax required to cap emission levels. Ulph and Ulph
(1994) are interested in the time path of a carbon tax, rather than simply the level, while taking
account of the exhaustibility of fossil fuels. Fankhauser (1994) estimates the level of global
social costs associated with carbon emissions using a stochastic greenhouse damage model.
Given the current concern about the sustainability of economic development, the Hartwick
rule occupies a central position: if resource rents are invested in produced capital, then
constant consumption is possible even if resources are both exhaustible and essential for
production. We wish to derive the analogue of the Hartwick rule when resource use leads to
greenhouse warming. The standard rule has been widely studied, including Hartwick (1977,
1978), Dixit, Hammond and Hod (1980), Dasgupta and Mltra (1983), as well as in Chapter 3.
Recognizing the greenhouse effect associated with fossil fuel consumption extends the
standard analysis in three ways: (i) the usual efficiency condition, the Hotelling (1931) rule,
has to be augmented by another describing the optimal time path of a carbon tax; (ii) keeping
consumption constant will no longer keep utility constant, so sustainability has to be defined as
constant utility (in keeping with Pezzey (1989)); and (iii) the notion of keeping total capital
intact, which is Solow's (1986) interpretation of the standard Hartwick rule, has to be
extended to include not only the depletion of the exhaustible resource but the changes in the
stock of CO2 as well.
We begin with the derivation of the efficiency conditions for the exploitation of fossil fuels
when account is taken of the accumulation of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere.
1 This chapter is based on a paper of the same name co-written with David Ulph of University College London
- see Hamilton and Ulph (1994).
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Efficiency Conditions
We wish to derive the dynamics of optimal growth with exhaustible fossil fuel resources and
carbon dioxide emissions linked to fuel use. To limit the problem to its essentials, several
simplifying assumptions are made: (i) population is constant, so that labour can be factored
out of the calculations; (ii) technology is assumed to be unchanging; (iii) the production
function F is Cobb-Douglas and uses inputs of capital K and resources R; (iv) the discount
rate r is constant; and (v) resources are costly to extract, as expressed by function f(R). U
refers to the utility function, and C consumption; utility is assumed to be an increasing
function of both consumption and the flow of environmental services B, measured in
appropriate (but not necessarily monetaly) units. The choice of a Cobb-Douglas production
function is not merely for convenience: Chapter 3 showed that it is precisely the unitary
elasticity of substitution between capital and resources characterizing this fimction that leads
to the existence of a maximal constant consumption path under the Hartwick rule.
Uncontrolled CO2 emissions are assumed to be stoichiometrically related to the quantity of
resource consumed, an accurate assumption for carbon-based fossil fuels. Actual emissions
are assumed to be controlled (i.e. reduced) as a result of abatement expenditures a, and to be
described by an emission function e(Ra) such that eR > 0 and ea <0.
The model of CO2 accumulation is a simplified version of that ofNordhaus (1991). In that
paper M represents the ratio of carbon dioxide concentration in the atmosphere to the
assumed concentration in pre-industrial times, E emissions, /3 the marginal atmospheric
retention ratio, and SM the transfer rate to the deep ocean, to yield the following relationship:
= 13E-SMM.
In the Nordhaus model emissions increase the atmospheric concentration ratio while mixing
with the deep oceans reduces it. SM is equal to 1 over the mean atmospheric retention time,
120 years; since this parameter is constant, reducing emissions to zero would reduce the
atmospheric concentration ratio to zero in the long run, which lacks plausibility since the
natural carbon cycle will eventually lead to an equilibrium concentration.
The model we wish to explore for carbon dioxide accumulation involves a simple stock-flow
relationship. We assume M to be the stock of CO2 in the atmosphere, rather than a
concentration ratio as inNordhaus (1991). Emissions e are assumed to be stoichiometrically
related to the quantity of resource consumed, as above. The stock of CO 2 dissipates, through
natural processes such as deep ocean mixing, as defined by function d(M) - this formulation
allows for the possibility of the stock stabilizing, with d approaching 0 as M approaches
M0, the pre-industrial stock. The stock-flow model is therefore,
M=e(R,a)-dq'M).	 (4.1)
We assume that the natural environment is a source of utility in the form of environmental
services B, which are considered to be inversely related to the stock of CO2 in the
atmosphere. Greenhouse damages therefore appear as reduced environmental service flows
according to,
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B =
where B0 is the flow of services associated with the pre-industrial stock of carbon dioxide. /3
is a constant, the reduction in services associated with a unit of CO 2 in excess of pre-industrial
levels. This formulation implies that E = —fiM.
The natural resources we are concerned with are fossil fuels, whose stock S is depleted as
quantities R are extracted. Given the usual assumption that we wish to maximize the present
value of utility, the greenhouse model is therefore:
(4.2)
max f'U(C,B)j't dt subject to:
K = F—C—a—f
M= e—d
E= —fiM
S=—R
S—^ 0 as t -* .
The final part of expression (4.2) just says that resources must be exhausted over the program;
this is an efficiency condition. In this model .K M B and S are the state variables and C,
a and R are the control variables. This optimal control problem has the current value
Hamiltonian function,
H = U+r(F-C-a-j)+r2(e-d)r,fl(ed)r4R.
where r11 r2 ' r3 and r4 are the co-state variables corresponding to capital, carbon dioxide
stocks, environmental services and resource stocks respectively. If we define b = -1 'ea (i.e.,
the marginal cost of abatement), then derivation of the first-order conditions for this problem
yields,
Yj = Uc, Y2 - T313 = -Uc b, r4 = UC(FR - fR - b eR).
The Hamiltonian is measured in utils and is maximized at each point in time under the optimal
program - it is therefore a current measure of welfare. We may define a measure of economic
welfare in consumption units as MEW = H / Uc . Substitution of the above expressions for
the co-state variables into the Hamiltonian therefore gives,
MEW=
	
	
(4.3)
Uc
This expression says that emissions decrease welfare while regeneration of the environment,
through the dissipation of CO2, increases it (i.e., the environment is productive); in both cases
the appropriate unit of valuation is the marginal cost of abatement, b. Assuming profit-
maximizing producers, FR is the market price of the resource and fR its marginal cost of
extraction. The final term in expression (4.3) therefore relates to the value of resource
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depletion2, being of the form "price minus marginal cost". However, the unit resource rent
FR - JR is reduced by a Pigovian tax, at rate b e,. This is a carbon tax, a specific tax required
to achieve both the maximization of the present value of utility and, as will be seen below, the
efficient extraction of the resource when its use leads to CO2 emissions. The net rental value
of fossil fuels decreases when account is taken of their environmental externalities.
For a general utility function the dynamic efficiency conditions for this problem yield further
insights. The first of these conditions takes the form,
=	 = ri (r-Fx) = - = r-Fr .	(4.4)
In general we can say that Uc = Ucc C + Uca E. We will assume that as resource extraction
declines exponentially (this results from the Cobb-Douglas production function, where
resources are essential for production, and the efficiency condition that resources must be
exhausted over the infinite time horizon), the stock of CO2 will return to its pre-industrial
level, implying that P —*0. Thus, if there is declining marginal utility of consumption (a
standard assumption), we can define the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption in the
long run to be,
-C
Uc
and therefore expression (4.4) becomes,
= Fr.	 (4.5)
This expression is an optimality condition, the Ramsey rule (after Ramsey (1928)). The left-
hand side is the social rate of return on investment; at the optimum it must equal the rate of
return on capital. For Cobb-Douglas production technology it is shown in Dasgupta and Heal
(1979, ch. 10) and in Chapter 2 that any positive choice of discount rate r leads to declining
consumption, essentially because Fr must approach 0 as resources deplete. Consumption is
not sustainable in this model. Note that r is the pure rate of time preference - if this is 0 then
consumption will increase continually, although some non-intuitive restrictions are needed on
the model to ensure the integrability of the utility function.
The next dynamic efficiency condition is derived by combining those for the second and third
co-state variables, so that,
r2-flr, =	 ÔB)
= r(y2 - fl y,) + (y2 - flg) dM + PUB.
Recalling that 72 PT, = -Uc b and expression (4.4), we therefore have,
2 This is comparable to the value of depletion, based on resource rentals, that appears in Hartwick (1990) and in
Chapter 7.
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(4.6)= (FK+dM)b-fi.
Uc
This defines the dynamic relationship between the marginal cost of abatement (and the
emission tax rate, since the two are equal) and the price consumers would be willing to pay to
avoid another unit of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere (PUB lUc). This is the relationship
derived in Ulph and Ulph (1994).
If we define n FR - fR - b e, (the net rent per unit of resource), then the next dynamic
efficiency condition is,
n
=Fx.	 (4.7)
n
This expression says that the percentage rate of change in the difference between resource
rents and carbon royalties must equal the rate of return on capital. This is a variant of the
Hotelling rule (Hotelling (1931)), that the percentage rate of change in resource rents in an
efficient extraction program will equal the rate of interest. Expression (4.7) implies that unit
resource rents as traditionally measured may increase at a percentage rate less or greater than
the rate of return on capital, but that net unit rents increase at a percentage rate precisely equal
to this rate.
It may be argued that there are few viable options for abating carbon dioxide emissions, and
therefore the model posits an unrealistic situation. We would hold that it is more general to
assume some abatement effort in any model of pollution emissions. In practice the difference
this makes to the model is small. It is straightforward to show that in the absence of
abatement expenditures the model leads to precisely the same welfare measures and efficiency
conditions, with a Pigovian tax on emissions (based on the shadow price of the stock of
carbon dioxide in the atmosphere) required to achieve an optimum. In the model just
presented the marginal cost of abatement is necessarily equal to the rate of tax on emissions.
This formulation of the optimal control programme is quite general. In particular, if it is
assumed that some level of carbon accumulation in the atmosphere will lead to catastrophic
results then the following analysis applies. Denote this critical stockkf and note that there is a
corresponding critical level of environmental services BC. We can then assume a particular
form of the utility function Uas shown in Figure 4.1 (for constant consumption level C).
>1
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Figure 4.1. Utility function with a ciitical level.
The manifestation of catastrophic effects associated with critical levels of carbon is that the
marginal utility of environmental services approaches infinity as the critical level of service is
approached. The effect on marginal abatement costs (and optimal tax levels) can be seen by re-
arranging expression (4.6) as follows:
b 
=FK+dM.
As UB -3 cx, therefore, b —^ , so that the emission tax rate becomes arbitrarily large. This
has the effect of maintaining the stock of carbon below its critical level - eventually the amount
of fossil fuel used will decline to the point where the total carbon stock begins to diminish as a
result of natural dissipation.
Dixit, Hammond and Hod (1980) show that the general Hartwick rule requires maintaining
the total value of the various stocks (produced assets, fossil fuel and carbon dioxide in our
case) constant, with stocks valued at their shadow prices - we can posit, therefore, the result
desired. But it is of some analytical interest to explore other investment rules as well.
Variations on the Hartwick Rule
In a useful exploration of the various economic interpretations of sustainable development,
Pezzey (1989) provides a simple definition that we will adopt here: U ^ 0. The standard
Hartwick model is one in which it is assumed implicitly that consumption is the sole source of
utility, and so the rule 'invest resource rents' yields both constant consumption and utility - the
Introduction termed this minimal sustainability. Since the models we wish to develop include
environmental services as a source of utility, we are seeking a variant of the Hartwick rule that
will yield constant utility rather than constant consumption. It will be important to examine
the path for consumption, however, if it is assumed that it is infeasible to derive welfare from
environmental services alone.
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Throughout what follows we assume that it is efficient to exhaust the finite stock of fuel
resources, so that,
S—>O as t—*oo.	 (4.8)
Assuming resources are essential for production, this implies that R must decline to 0, along
with its rate of change, as the resource is exhausted. We assume that there is a stoichiometric
relationship between uncontrolled emissions and resource use, and in addition that,
eR=—.	 (4.9)
As R declines to 0 then so must uncontrolled emissions, and, since controlled emissions must
be less than uncontrolled, therefore e must decline to 0 as well.
We also introduce the Cobb-Douglas functional form at this point, although many of the
results below apply to general production functions,
F(K,R) = KR°, ic+p<1, ic,p>O.	 (4.10)
Finally, it will be convenient to make some assumptions about the path of carbon dioxide
stocks in the atmosphere. Given that resource use and emissions decline to 0, it is certainly
possible that, if dissipation of the stock is greater than emissions from the outset, then the
carbon stock will decline monotonically to its pre-industrial level. A more realistic
assumption, for initially abundant fossil fuels and low rates of CO2 dissipation, is that carbon
stocks will rise at the beginning of the programme and then decline monotonically to pre-
industrial levels as dissipation eventually exceeds emissions. If there are catastrophic effects
associated with critical levels of carbon in the atmosphere, then the utility function of Figure
4.1 can be assumed in what follows.
The variations on the Hartwick rule we wish to examine are (i) investing resource rents - the
standard Hartwick rule; (ii) investing rents net of carbon taxes; and (iii) investing net rents plus
the rate of change in the carbon dioxide stock, valued at the marginal cost of abatement (or
the emission tax rate) - an extended Hartwick rule.
Investing Resource Rents
The essential elements of this model are, for n = FR - - beR,
= (FR - fR)1,
	
= F1, = (F1 + dM)b 
- 
/3
n	 C
We determine the rate of change of consumption as follows:
C = FKK+FRR-FRR+fRR-FRR+JRR-f-à
= (F1 (FR - fR) - (FR - I R) -
But FR - fR = ' + b eR	 FR - JR = + eR + b e, so tli.at, using expression (4.6),
(4.11)
= (f3!LbdM)e
Uc
(4.12)
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C = (FrbeR.beRbèR)Râ
= (b eR-dM b eR + /3 — eR- b eR- b eR)R -a
Uc
= (pLb(dM+e))e..á.
Uc	 eR
This can be simplified if we assume no abatement. In this case both R and a are equal to 0,
so that,
(this result also holds if the emission function is of the form e = qRg(a), where çS is the
uncontrolled rate of emissions and g(a) is the abatement function). In general, therefore, it is
difficult to draw conclusions about the rate of change of consumption. If the marginal rate of
dissipation of the carbon stock, dM, is less than the ratio of the price consumers are willing to
pay for a unit of diminution of the carbon stock to the marginal cost of abating one unit, then
the rate of change of consumption will be positive. This clearly depends on the nature of the
dissipation process as well as the time path of the price and marginal abatement costs.
Applying expression (4.6) in expression (4.12) yields the following:
.(	 1	 (C= ,F +dM - . -dM)be=Fl _-.Jbe.
The direction of change of consumption is therefore determined by the difference between the
marginal return on capital and the percentage rate of change of marginal abatement
expenditures (i.e., the emissions tax). For resource extraction to be feasible we require K ^ 0
which, for Cobb-Douglas production technolog implies that F -+ 0 as R -^ 0.
The rate of change of utility, from expression (4.12), is given by,
(4.13)
U UcCI3UaM
=
Uc	 Uc
= Uc(fid-bdMe).
Uc
If consumption is increasing then utility will be increasing as long as d> e, i.e. as long as the
carbon stock in the atmosphere is decreasing.
Investing Net Rents
What happens if only rents net of carbon taxes are invested? The basic elements of this model
are, for n=FRIRbeR,
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F1, i(Fr+dM)b—fi.
n	 C
The combined extended Hotelling and "invest net rent" rules imply that F1 K = ñR. Given
that f = fR R and C = F - nR - f - a, we therefore have,
C = FKK±FRR-ñR-nR-à-f
= izR+FRR-ñR-nR-á-f
FRR-FRRbeRR+fRR-â-f
= beRR-ã.
Since è = eRR + e4á, we see that O = be. Consumption falls because emissions must decline
along with resource extraction.
The path for utility is uncertain in this model. Clearly, if carbon dioxide stocks are increasing
at the beginning of the programme, then utility is falling. If utility is rising later in the
programme, consumption is still decreasing. Unless consumption approaches some positive
asymptote, the long-run situation when utility is rising would be that environmental services B
become the sole source of utility as the carbon stock stabilizes in the atmosphere. This is
infeasible.
The Extended Hartwick Rule
If investing resource rents leads to an indeterminate path for consumption, and investing rents
net of carbon taxes yields declining consumption, the obvious question is what level of
investment will yield constant utility. It turns out that for n FR - JR - b e, we require the
following three conditions:
K=nR+bAf, ! =F1 , 1=(FK+dM)b-fi!-.
n	 Uc
(4.14)
The first of these is the extended Hartwick rule, which says that investment equals net
resource rents plus the rate of change of the carbon dioxide stock in the atmosphere, valued at
the marginal cost of abatement
We first derive the rate of change of consumption as follows:
C = FRR+FKK-K-f-à
= FRR+FKbM-nR-bM-bM-f-á
beRR+FKbM-bM-bè+bd-á.
Now, be = b e, R - a and bd = b dM M, so that, using the third equation in expression (4.14),
= (Fr + dM)bM - bAf = fi AL
Uc
(4.15)
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Therefore U = Uc C + U2 B = Uc (C -
	
= 0.
Uc
Since the assumed pattern would be for carbon stocks in the atmosphere to rise and then fall,
expression (4.15) implies that consumption must also do the same, even though utility is
constant. The question of feasibility, i.e., positive consumption in the long run, therefore
arises.
The next thing to note is that investment is less than the resource rent in this model. To see
this, recall that eR = e / R. Therefore,
K = (FR - fR -beR)R+b(e-d) = (FR-f R)Rd.
Investment is equal to resource rent less CO 2 dissipation valued at the marginal cost of
abatement.
There is nothing in principle to prevent investment becoming negative in this model, but this is
key to the question of feasibility. If K ^ 0, then output falls to 0 because R - 0 (this is a
consequence of resources being essential for production in the Cobb-Douglas production
function). If F .-^ 0 then so must consumption. This would imply that utility is derived only
from environmental services, which is infeasible. K> 0 is therefore a necessary (but not a
sufficient) condition for feasibility.
Because consumption falls at a rate proportional to the rate of decline of carbon stocks in the
atmosphere, feasible programmes are those for which consumption approaches a positive
asymptote as carbon stocks stabilize. This is only possible if l'.f - 0 as R -^0, which is a
necessary condition for the stabilization of carbon stocks at pre-industrial levels. Our choice
of this behaviour for the dissipation of carbon stocks as a 'realistic' feature of the model turns
out to be essential for feasibility. Clearly, of the set of feasible paths for the model, the best
path is the one yielding maximal constant utility.
Conclusions
The original work leading to the derivation of the Hartwick rule was concerned with a
particular problem, how to achieve intergenerational equity in the form of constant
consumption when resources are exhaustible - see, for instance, Solow (1974). In this chapter
we eschew constant consumption as a goal, but seek a constant utility analogue to the
Hartwick rule when resource use leads to greenhouse warming.
The model of optimal growth leads to the efficiency conditions necessary for the Hartwick rule
with greenhouse gas emissions. A number of conclusions follow from this model. The first is
that the externality from fuel consumption must be corrected by a Pigovian tax if an optimum
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is to be achieved, and the tax on emissions equals the marginal cost of abatement - this is as
one would expect. The extended Hotelling rule that results from this model equates the
percentage rate of change of resource rents net of carbon taxes to the marginal product of
capital. The path of the emission tax is related to the marginal product of capital, the marginal
rate of dissipation of the carbon stock, and the price consumers would be willing to pay for
one less unit of carbon in the atmosphere. In the measure of economic welfare related to the
optimal growth programme, the deleterious effects of carbon emissions are precisely balanced
by the carbon tax, and the value dissipation of the carbon dioxide stock is added to welfare
along with the value of the level of environmental services. And finally, consumption declines
to 0 if the pure rate of time preference is positive, as in the standard model of exhaustible
resources.
Three variants of investment rules were explored in this chapter. The standard Hartwick rule,
to invest resource rents, yields the result that consumption will increase if marginal abatement
costs (and abatement taxes, therefore) are decreasing or if their percentage rate of increase is
less than the marginal product of capital - if consumption is increasing in the long run then so
is utility. If, instead, resource rents net of carbon taxes are invested, consumption declines as
resource extraction declines - irrespective of whether utility is increasing in the long run, this
model is feasible only if consumption approaches a positive asymptote. Only the extended
Hartwick rule unequivocally yields constant utility.
There are several points to note about the extended Hartwick rule. First, consumption
typically rises then falls, in step with the change in the carbon stock in the atmosphere.
Second, investment is always less than resource rents (in clear contrast with the standard
Hartwick rule). And finally, a necessaly condition for feasibility (consumption that is positive
in the long run) is that dissipation of the carbon stock drop to 0 as the stock declines to its
equilibrium at pre-industrial levels. These results hold in general and for specific assumptions
about the catastrophic effects associated with given levels of carbon stocks.
Solow (1986) called the Hartwick rule a 'rule of thumb' for growth policy in a world of
exhaustible resources. In a greenhouse world with finite fossil thel resources the 'green' rule
of thumb is to invest resource rents net of carbon taxes plus the value of the rate of change of
the carbon stock.
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5. Feasible Steady States for Environment-Economy Systems
While sustainable development emphatically does not imply a steady state economy, there are
models where welfare may increase over time as the steady state is approached asymptotically.
This chapter is concerned with the feasibility of such steady states.
There is one well-known example of an optimal programme, one that maximizes the present
value of welfare, that is not sustainable: for non-renewable resources, Dasgupta and Heal
(1979, ch. 10) show that a positive pure rate of time preference leads to declining utility along
the optimal path. Chapter 2 showed that if produced assets depreciate then, even for a zero
pure rate of time preference, an economy where non-renewable resources are essential for
production will not be sustainable.
A second example of an unsustainable programme is provided by the model of Hamilton and
Atkinson (1995), in which the goal is to maximize the present value of utility when there is a
cumulative pollutant and the size of the stock of pollution emitted determines the level of
welfare that may be drawn from the natural environment. The proof that this economy is not
sustainable is shown in the Appendix. Both of these examples are characterized by the lack of
a steady state solution, on the one hand because an essential input is depleted, on the other
because a necessary byproduct of production, the pollutant, has cumulative effects that do not
dissipate.
The 'answer' to the sustainability problem for these models is to eschew maximizing the
present value of utility in favour of a programme in which welfare is held constant over time.
Such a programme is logically equivalent to the Hartwick (1977) rule in the case of non-
renewable resources and its extension in Hamilton and Atkinson (1995) to the case of
cumulative pollutants. Under a Hartwick programme the essential idea is to ensure that the
change in the volume of assets and liabilities, valued at current prices that are dynamically
efficient, is zero.
This chapter constructs two models where the environment and the economy are linked and
where a steady state is possible. One model involves pollutants that accumulate and dissipate,
the other a living resource that is damaged by current emissions of a flow pollutant (i.e., the
acid rain problem). Because a steady state is possible, both models may produce sustainable
outcomes; the key results in what follows relate to the feasibility of the steady state.
The Models
We wish to portray the steady state of linked environmental and economic systems by deriving
the steady state solutions of optimal growth models of these systems. Two such models will be
explored: a general model with a stock pollutant that dissipates, in which both current and
capital expenditures may reduce pollution emissions; and a model in which a living resource is
damaged by the flow of pollution emissions (the acid rain problem).
The general model
We assume a simple economy, closed to trade, in which a single good is produced with fixed
technology. That good can be consumed, invested in productive capital, invested in pollution
abatement capital, or used as a current input to pollution abatement. A single stock pollutant
is emitted as a result of production in the economy. Environmental services (e.g., the services
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provided by clean air) are negatively related to the level of stock pollutant; these services
provide utility to consumers and are also productive. For productive capital K, labour L, and
environmental services B, the production relationship is therefore,
F(K,L,B)= C+IC+iç +a,
where C is consumption, K4 is abatement capital, and a is current abatement expenditures.
We will assume that investment in abatement capital is simply equal to the quantity m, so that
K4 = m.
Pollution emissions are given by,
e = e(F, K4 , a), with e4 <0 and e <0,	 (5.1)
while the pollution stockXis assumed to dissipate as a result of natural processes, as
represented by the dissipation function d(. The stock-flow relationship for the pollutant is
therefore,
X=e—d,
while environmental services are given by a linear relationship,
B =B0 -p(x- x0),
for some assumed level of services B0 derived from the environment in its pristine state X0.
Note that this implies that B -pi.
The problem we wish to characterize is that of maximizing the present value of utility U,
which is assumed to be a function of consumption and the level of environmental services.
This is expressed formally as the following optimal control problem:
maxf° U(C,B)edt subject to:
K=F—C—m—a
K4 = m
X=e—d
Here r is the fixed discount rate (all other variables are functions of time), and C, m, and a, are
the control variables.
This constitutes our linked environment-economy system. Current production leads to the
accumulation of pollution which affects both production levels and the well-being of
consumers. Natural processes dissipate the pollutant, while households can give up some
consumption in order for pollution emissions to be abated. Determining the optimal path for
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the system requires, in addition to the control variables, a set of shadow prices as expressed in
the following current value Hamiltonian function:
(5.2)
=U+y1(F—C—m—a)^2m+y3(e—d).
Here the , are the shadow prices of productive capital, abatement capital, the pollution stock
and environmental services respectively. The solution to the optimal control problem requires
a set of first order conditions on the Hamiltonian with respect to the control variables, as well
as a set of dynamic conditions on the shadow prices.
As derived in the Appendix, the first order conditions yield the following relationships,
Ti = T2 = U, and r3 = —Ub,	 (5.3)
where b —1 / ea is the marginal cost of abatement; as shown in the Appendix, increasing
marginal abatement costs are a necessary condition for a maximum. The measure of economic
welfare (MEW) with a consumption numéraire is therefore,
MEW=C^ 2 B+K+K +--Eap
	
(5.4)
=C^B+K+& _b(e—d).
This is derived by valuing each flow underlying the current value Hamiltonian by its shadow
price, yielding welfare measured in utils, and dividing the resulting expression by U to
convert to consumption units. If the term in environmental services B is dropped (i.e., a more
restricted notion of consumption is employed) then the resulting expression is 'green' NNP.
Noting that U5 / U is the price a utility-maximizing consumer would be willing to pay for
another unit of environmental service, expression (5.4) has a natural interpretation: economic
welfare in this model consists of the proximate sources of welfare, consumption and the value
of environmental services, plus a series of terms required to maximize welfare over time. The
latter terms are of course investment in productive capital, investment in abatement, and the
change in environmental services valued at the marginal cost of abatement (if emissions exceed
natural dissipation of the pollution stock then this term will be negative). Expression (5.4)
also yields the first result for the steady state: if a steady state is reached for this system, then
economic welfare will consist solely of the proximate sources of utility, consumption and
environmental services.
Determining the optimal path for the system also requires dynamic conditions on the shadow
prices; these are derived in the Appendix. The first of these conditions is for the shadow price
of productive capital, which yields the following expression:
(5.5)
Uc
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If we assume that the utility function is additively separable, so that U(C,B) = U1 (C)^ U2(B),
then we can derive a variant on the Ramsey (1928) rule by defining,
= Jft:c.
This is the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption. As shown in the Appendix, we
must have U <0 (i.e., declining marginal utility of consumption) in order to maximize the
Hamiltonian. Expression (5.5) then reduces to,
r+7,(C).=(l—be,)1&.	 (5.6)
The left-hand side of this expression is the 'consumption rate of interest', the social rate of
return on investment. In the classic Ramsey rule the right-hand side is just the marginal
product of capital, FK. Here the social rate of return on investment is equated to the marginal
product of capital net of pollution taxes - it is straightforward to show (see, for instance,
Chapter 8) that the marginal cost of pollution abatement b is exactly equal to the level of an
optimal emissions tax required to maximize utility, so that beF is the effective tax rate on
output.
The second dynamic optimality condition derived in the Appendix is as follows,
= r + be,.	 (5.7)
This yields another variant on the Ramsey rule,
r+i,(C).=—bex =
This expression links the environment and the economy with a vengeance: in order to
maximize the present value of utility, the social rate of return on investment must be equal to
the ratio of the reduction in pollution emissions associated with a marginal unit of abatement
capital to the reduction in pollution emissions associated with a marginal unit of current
abatement expenditure.
The third and final dynamic condition derived in the Appendix concerns the rate of change of
marginal abatement costs,
YS..+.=r+dx+fieFFJ-{FB ^-).
U	 b
	 (5.8)
Here d1 is the marginal rate of dissipation of the pollution stoclç it must be less than 1. FB
the marginal product of environmental services, and so PeFFD is a feedback term, the amount
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by which pollution emissions are increased as a result of a marginal increase in the level of
environmental services (roughly speaking); this must be less than 1 for production to be
feasible. The discount rate for utility is r and, as before, U8 / U is the price utility-
maximizing consumers would be willing to pay for another unit of environmental service.
These conditions (along with certain transversality conditions concerning the limits
approached as time t tends to infinity) completely characterize the optimal path for the linked
environment-economy system. The optimal steady state is characterized setting all time rates
of change to 0 in expressions (5.5), (5.7) and (5.8). Of the several possible ways to
summarize what results from setting the rates to 0, perhaps the most intuitive is to examine the
determinants of the level of marginal abatement costs in the steady state. As shown in the
Appendix, a necessary condition for the Hamiltonian ftrnction to be maximized is that there be
increasing marginal abatement costs; higher levels of abatement expenditure therefore entail
higher marginal abatement costs.
From expression (5.5) the steady state level of marginal abatement costs is,
b= -r
eFFK
From expression (5.7) we obtain,
b=	 (5.10)
-e
(5.9)
From expression (5.8) we derive,
fi1F+
C
- r + d1 + I3eFFB
Finally, expressions (5.5) and (5.6) together imply that,
b=
e,FK -
(5.11)
(5.12)
The direction of change of marginal abatement costs with the various model parameters is
obvious in most cases from expressions (5.9)-(5. 12). Expressions (5.9) and (5.12) can each be
differentiated with respect to FK to show that the relationship is positive, and expression
(5.11) can be differentiated with respect to F to show that this relationship is also positive (it
is necessary to use expression (5.14), shown below, in this derivation). The overall picture is
therefore as appears in the following table.
e,
F =
ea
(5.13)
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Table 5.1. Dependence of Marginal Abatement Costs on Model Parameters
F	 leg	 F,	 U, / U
Direction	 +	 ?	 -	 +	 +
of change
In this table a '+' indicates that marginal abatement costs increase when the parameter in
question increases. The question mark for the pure rate of time preference is a result of the
combination of expressions (5.9) and (5.10), which give different indications. In a model in
which there is no abatement capital the variation of marginal abatement costs with r is
unequivocally negative. Higher marginal emission rates e will in general lead to lower steady
state levels of productive capital K, which in turn lead to a higher marginal product of capital
FK (given the usual assumption of declining marginal product of capital) - the direction of
change with regard to marginal emission rates is therefore uncertain in Table 5.1.
The results in this table are intuitive to varying degrees. Clearly increasing the marginal
product of environmental services, F3 , and the price consumers are willing to pay for these
environmental services, U3 / U, will increase the steady state level of marginal pollution
abatement costs. The positive effect of the marginal product of capital is less obvious: for a
given capital stock a higher marginal product of capital implies more production, more
pollution emitted and therefore higher marginal abatement costs. It is clear that the higher the
marginal rate of dissipation of the pollution stock, d1 , the lower the marginal abatement cost
will be, and that the more effective in reducing emissions the marginal unit of abatement
capital is, again, the lower will be marginal abatement costs in terms of current expenditures.
This is a rich array of results and requires some discussion. The first point to note is that
expression (5.12) holds whether there is a steady state or not. Secondly, expressions (5.10)
through (5.12) all imply b> 0. This implies, from expression (5.9), that FK > r, which is in
clear contrast to standard models (without environmental linkages) in which the marginal
product of capital must be precisely equal to the discount rate for the steady state to be
attained. For very large endowments of capital which, other things being equal, will produce a
small marginal product of capital, the steady state may be infeasible.
Expression (5.10) can also be expressed as,
This implies that the steady state requires a particular balance of current and capital
environmental protection expenditures: the emission reduction associated with a marginal unit
of abatement capital as a proportion of the emission reduction associated with a marginal unit
of current abatement expenditures must equal the discount rate for utility.
Expressions (5.9) and (5.11) can be combined as follows:
U8
—r <d1.
Uc
(5.14)
0
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r=(l—be,)F
=11 - /3(F3 + UB /Uc)e,')F
'...	 r+dx+fJe,zF3	 K
Since be, <1 is a necessary condition for production to be feasible (i.e., the optimal pollution
tax rate on production must be less than 100%), this expression implies that,
Note that fie, is the change in environmental services resulting from a marginal unit of
production, so that /3(U8 / U)e, is the value of pollution disbenefits resulting from a
marginal unit of production. This term should therefore be less or equal to 1 at the optimum.
We can take e,, a technological parameter, and d1 , a physical parameter, as given.
Expression (5.14) then has a striking interpretation: if the price consumers are willing to pay
for environmental services (UB / (Jr) is too high, or their impatience too low (as measured by
r, the rate of discount of utility, or pure rate of time preference), then the steady state is not
feasible - this is explored in Figure 5.1 below. Both the price consumers are willing to pay for
environmental services and the pure rate of time preference are behavioural variables.
Figure 5.1. Feasible range for steady state
Figure 5.1 clarifies the question of feasibility. The line plotted is r = /3e,p8 - d1 , where
PB U3 I U. If we assume 0 ^ r ^ 1, then the feasible set for willingness to pay and the pure
rate of time preference, assuming fixed e, and d, is given by the shaded polygon.
The usual constraints on achieving a steady state, essentially that investment in productive
capital must have an appropriate initial value relative to the initial capital stock, hold for this
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model. What the foregoing analysis has shown is that there are a variety of additional
constraints to be satisfied if the steady state is to be feasible.
If the steady state is feasible, there remains the question of whether the asymptotic approach
to the steady state is sustainable - i.e., is utility non-decreasing along the optimal path? Given
that there is an assumed initial stock of pollutant X0 , this may be less or greater than the
steady state level of the pollution stock (we can therefore speak, loosely, of the initial state
being 'under-polluted' or 'over-polluted'). The rate of change of utility is given by,
U=uc+uBE=uc(_4-x).
This can be combined with expression (5.6) to yield:
–ri–fl-U=Uc[7,)[(l_be4FK	 UB(dIl
	
U	 'I
	
C	 J
(5.15)
From expression (5.15) we can conclude that the economy is unsustainable if there is a large
initial capital stock (and therefore small F) or a high pure rate of time preference r, and the
initial state is under-polluted. The economy is sustainable in the long run if there is a small
initial capital stock or low rate of time preference and the initial state is over-polluted (the
proviso 'in the long run' is required because it is possible that the initial level of emissions,
while on a downward trend, may be higher than the initial value of dissipation, in which case
the stock of pollution rises then falls asymptotically to its steady state value). Other
combinations of initial conditions produce uncertain signs for the rate of change of utility.
The acid rain problem
In this model we assume a flow pollutant that does not accumulate is emitted as a byproduct
of production'. This pollutant causes dieback of a living resource that is a productive input.
The pollutant is assumed to have no direct effect on the utility of consumers. The relationships
for production and utility are therefore,
F=F(K,L,R) and U=U(C),
for resource harvest R; harvesting is assumed to be costless. The total resource stock S grows
by an amount g(S) and dies back by an amount w(S,e) as a result of pollution emissions, such
that,
w >0 and w >0.
As in the previous model, emissions are given by e(F,a), for abatement expenditures a. The
optimal programme is therefore the solution to,
The green national accounting aspects of this model are presented in Hamilton (1994) and in Chapter 8.
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maxiU(C)edt subject to:
K=F—C—a
=—R—w+g.
Here the control variables are C, a, and R, and the current value Hamiltonian function to be
maximized is,
H = U + y 1 (F - C - a) + 7 2 (—R - w + g).
As derived in the Appendix, the first order conditions for a maximum are,
r 1 = Uc and r2=-=UCFR.
w.
The dynamic conditions that the shadow prices on capital and resources must satisfy are
shown in the Appendix to lead to the following conditions:
(5.16)
C
FR 
= i + ws - g•	 (5.17)
The first of these expressions implies the standard form of the Ramsey rule, and in the steady
state we have the usual condition that the pure rate of time preference must precisely equal the
marginal product of capital. The second expression is a modified Hotelling rule for the
efficient harvest of the resource. The steady state for conditions (5.16) and (5.17) combined
therefore implies that,
r =	 = g3 - w5 .	 (5.18)
We see the steady state is feasible only if g > w:. The optimal steady state is best
characterized using Figure 5.2.
Growth,
Dieback
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Figure 5.2. Optimal stock size with acid rain.
S* So	 MSY	 S
Here the growth curve g(S) has the usual shape as a function of stock size, and MSY is the
stock size at which the maximum sustainable yield is attained. The dieback function w(S,e) is
plotted for a fixed value of emissions e; it is assumed that dieback is linearly related to the
stock size, which is a reasonable presumption for fixed emissions of a well-mixed pollutant.
Stock size S° is the point at which g = w5. S K is the optimal steady state stock for an
assumed value of r.
The model yields the expected result from standard models of living resources, that increasing
values of r decrease the optimal stock size. Expression (5.18) implies three new properties for
the acid rain model: (i) for a given value of r the optimum stock size is less than in the
standard model; (ii) stock sizes greater than S° are infeasible (in the standard model stock sizes
up to MSY are attainable as the pure rate of time preference approaches 0); and (iii) the
feasible range of stock sizes decreases as emissions increase, since it is reasonable to assume
that higher pollution emissions at the optimum will increase the slope of w (i.e., w > 0); in
the limit, very high emissions of pollution will render the steady state infeasible.
Further to the latter point, we know from the first order conditions for a maximum that
b = w,F. Sufficient second order conditions for a maximum of the Hamiltonian are U <0
and e >0, so that there are increasing marginal costs of abatement. For a fixed stock size
and constant w, increases in F imply increases in b, increases in abatement expenditures and
therefore decreases in emissions. The optimum level of acid emissions will thus be inversely
related to the marginal product of the living resource. For constant w and w >0, therefore,
the larger the marginal product of the living resource, the larger the optimal steady state stock
will be, and the greater the range of feasible stock sizes.
•	 .	 .	 CSmce U = UC and	 = FK - r (the Ramsey rule), we can conclude that the optimal
path that approaches the steady state asymptotically will be sustainable if the pure rate of time
preference is low or if the initial endowment of capital is low. The obverse of these conditions
would imply that the optimal path is unsustainable, so the usual intuition that high discount
rates are inimical to sustainable development is borne out in this model.
47
Conclusions
To repeat a basic point from the beginning of this chapter, sustainable development does not
imply a steady state economy. For the models examined here, where a stock pollutant
dissipates or a living resource is damaged by acid emissions, the path to the optimal steady
state may or may not be sustainable and the steady state itself may not be feasible.
The conditions governing the feasibility of the steady state are therefore particularly important.
Three of the results of the models have a bearing on feasibility:
If environmental services are productive and/or a source of utility, the steady state is
feasible only if the marginal product of capital is greater than the pure rate of time
preference. Other things being equal, this implies that the steady state stock of productive
capital will be lower for linked environment-economy systems than for systems that
optimize over time without considering the effects of environmental services on
production or utility.
• For a given technological parameter, the marginal pollution emissions associated with a
unit of production, and a given physical parameter, the marginal rate of dissipation of the
pollution stock, the steady state will not be feasible if, in combination, the price consumers
are willing to pay for environmental services is too high or their rate of impatience (i.e.,
pure rate of time preference) is too low.
• For the acid rain problem, the range of stock sizes of the living resource that is infeasible is
larger than in the absence of acid rain. Sufficiently large acid emissions will render the
steady state infeasible. The optimal steady state stock is smaller than in the absence of acid
rain, but it increases with the marginal product of the living resource.
There are two determinants of the steady state level of marginal pollution abatement costs that
are of interest. If there are only current expenditures to abate pollution (i.e., no abatement
capital) then the higher the pure rate of time preference the lower is the marginal cost of
abatement (MCA). And the higher the marginal product of capital the higher is the optimal
steady state MCA.
Given the feasibility of the steady state, there is no guarantee the optimal path that approaches
the steady state asymptotically will be sustainable. For the stock pollutant the optimal path will
be sustainable in the long run if an appropriate combination of low initial capital stock and low
pure rate of time preference is combined with an initial state that is 'over-polluted.' The acid
rain economy is sustainable if there is the appropriate combination of low initial capital stock
and low pure rate of time preference.
48
Appendix to Chapter 5
The model of Hamilton and Atkinson (1995).
For a pollutant with cumulative effects, or equivalently a stock pollutant that does not
dissipate, we wish to establish that the optimal path is not sustainable. This corresponds to
dropping both investment in pollution abatement capital (so that current expenditures only are
used to abate emissions) and the dissipation function from the first model presented above. In
addition, we assume that production is a function of capital and labour only, and that labour
inputs are fixed.
Under these conditions the key relationships are the Ramsey rule,
r(C) . = (i— be,)FK —r,	 (A5.1)
and the rate of change of utility along the optimal path,
O= Uc(_fie).	 (AS .2)
Under the usual assumption of decreasing returns to factors, C> o in the long run implies that
K -^ r (j.e., a fixed limit) such that (1— beF )FK > r, from expression (AS. 1). This implies
that F - F, since labour is fixed, and therefore that e .-+ e.
Because there is declining marginal utility of consumption, C> 0 implies that U is declining.
Since e> 0, it follows that (13 is increasing, under the assumption of declining marginal utility
of environmental services. It is reasonable to assume that U3 - co as B - 0 (this would
hold, for instance, if a sufficient accumulation of pollution were life-threatening).
Therefore fi--e increases without bound and, by expression (A5.2), we conclude that
U> 0 if C> 0, which is inconsistent with the fact that F -^ F. We know that U =0 holds
only under the Hartwick rule (investment equals emissions valued at marginal social costs in
this instance), which is inconsistent with the optimal programme under the Ramsey rule. The
conclusion is that utility must decline in the long run under the optimal programme. Optimal
growth with a pollutant with cumulative effects is not sustainable.
The general modeL
For the general model the current value Hamiltonian function is given by,
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H=U+y1(F—C—m—a)+y2m+y3(e—d).
The static first order conditions for a maximum of this function are therefore,
-:j = O = Uc — Y i = r I = Uc	 (AS.3)
Ti 72
73__
	 (A5 .4)
Expression (A5.3) implies that U <0 is a sufficient condition for the Hamiltonian to be
maximized, i.e., that there must be decreasing marginal utility of consumption. Expression
(A5.4) implies that e, > 0 is a sufficient condition for the Hamiltonian to be maximized, i.e.,
that there must be increasing marginal costs of abatement.
The dynamic first order conditions for the shadow prices are as follows:
811
Ti = Ti - - = - y 1 1 - y3eJ.F,,
so that,
(A5.5)
Uc
next,
811T2=T72	
_ry2y3eKg,8Ka
so that, for b-1/e4
U
—=r—be
TI	 a
'-'C
and
8H
73 =	 = ry3—(—/3UB —/JUcFB +UC bPeFFB +Ubd1),
(A5.6)
so that,
(\sv	 J
\,
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The acid rain modeL
The current value Hamiltonian for this model is,
H=U+y1(F_C_a)+r2(-R_w+g).
Therefore the first order conditions for a maximum are:
OH
-=0=U-y1=y1=U;
OH	 Ub
Oa	 w
OH
—=O=T1FR-y2=72=UCFR.
(A5.8)
(A5.9)
(A5.10)
Expression (A5.8) implies that a sufficient condition for the Hamiltonian to be maximized is
<0, i.e., declining marginal utility of consumption. Similarly, expression (A5.9) implies
that increasing marginal abatement costs, e, > 0, is a sufficient condition for a maximum if
w,, ^ 0, i.e., if damage to the living resource is a constant or increasing function of emissions.
The dynamic first order conditions for the shadow prices are derived as,
OH
ri=rri--jj=rri-riFx.
so that,
(A5.11)
C
and,
OH
72 rr2_rr2+r2(ws_gs),
so that
51
= + w - g8 .	 (AS. 12)
52
Part 2
Theory of Green National Accounting
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6. Synopsis of Proposals for Green National Accounts1
We now turn from the theory of sustainable development to 'green' national accounting. The
traditional national accounts present the most comprehensive and integrated information
concerning the state and operation of national economies. Many of the standard national
accounting aggregates are explicitly concerned with measuring income, product, savings,
investment and wealth net of the depreciation of produced assets. If produced capital were the
only asset influencing human welfare, then it could be argued that the traditional national
accounts are well suited to measuring progress towards, or away from, sustainable
development. This is particularly so because market prices permit the aggregation of many
types of assets in a consistent manner: one dollar's worth of housing stock yields, in principle
at least, the equivalent stream of benefits as a dollar's worth of factory or production
machinery.
It is on this basis that greener national accounts are, at least potentially, the most powerful
indicators of sustainable development. The critical issue, to be considered in subsequent
chapters, is the expansion of the asset base to include natural resources and other
environmental assets.
There are several standard criticisms that environmental analysts make of the standard System
of National Accounts (SNA): (1) the accounts measure the goods but not the 'bads' (in the
form of pollution) associated with production activities; (ii) some environmental protection
expenditures are measured as final output (the defensive expenditures issue); (iii) the
depreciation of environmental assets and depletion of natural resources is not reflected in
national income; (iv) environmental assets and natural resources are not measured in national
wealth (although commercial resources, at least, do appear in the wealth accounts in the
revised SNA - see United Nations 1993 a); and (v) environmental liabilities, in the form of
accumulations of pollutants, also do not appear anywhere in the accounts. However, the
overriding concern with the standard SNA is that there is no means to determine if an
economy is on a sustainable path.
Before describing the different approaches to green accounting in the literature, it is valuable
to examine the ways in which natural resources and the environment are reflected in the
existing national accounts. This breaks into two parts: commercial natural resources, where
there is a market price, and environmental resources such as clean air or wildlife that lie
outside the market system.
While commercial natural resources are measured directly in the accounts, in the sense that the
value added associated with their exploitation is measured in national income, the economic
value of these resources as assets appears only implicitly. The value of a subsoil resource
deposit or standing forest as an asset is related to the flow of economic rent that results from
its exploitation; for a given resource deposit this rent is measured as the difference between
the market price of the resource and the thU marginal cost of its extraction/harvest, including
normal returns to capital. So resource rents show up as a portion of operating surplus for the
resource sectors, but are not explicitly measured. Consequently the value of economic
depreciation of a resource deposit as a result of exploitation is not measured either, which
means that resource depletion does not enter into the calculation of net product, NNP or
Some of this material is published in Hamilton (1994)
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NDP. While the guidelines for the balance sheet accounts in the SNA2 call for the valuation of
subsoil or standing natural resources, the change in value of these assets from year to year is
recorded as a reconciliation item, and so again does not alter net product estimates.
Environmental resources are measured more indirectly in the accounts. To the extent that
there is a commercial activity associated with an environmental asset, such as tourism or
hunting, then the value added in this activity appears as part of national product. But the
underlying asset, the pristine lake or wilderness, is not valued explicitly. When environmental
quality deteriorates the effects show up indirectly in a variety of forms: loss of tourism
industry income (as the lake is polluted, for instance); lost productivity of agriculture and
living natural resources; increased repair and maintenance costs for buildings and other assets
damaged by pollution; increased costs of inputs when water, for instance, must be cleaned
prior to use in productive activities; increased health expenditures and lost productivity as a
result of increasing morbidity and mortality; and diversion of resources from other valuable
employment when accidents, such as oil spills, need to be cleaned up. All these effects are
there in the accounts, but not directly and identifiably.
One aspect of government resource policy does show up directly in the accounts: since
commercial resources are frequently government-owned, with the right to exploitation being
leased, governments attempt to capture resource rents through royalty schemes, and these
royalties are measured explicitly in the accounts. But broader environmental policies appear
only indirectly. Whether through regulation or market-based instruments, policies aimed at
abating pollution and preserving ecosystems affect the level of intermediate expenditures and
the mix of investment between environmental protection facilities and conventional productive
assets. The values associated with market-based instruments will show up in the accounts, as
indirect taxes in the case of pollution taxes, or as investments (and corresponding assets in the
balance sheet accounts) in the case of emissions permits3. Growth rates in national product
are affected implicitly by environmental policies.
If there is a common thread running through the literature on green accounting, it is that use of
the environment and natural resources represents asset consumption, and that one of the key
problems with standard national accounts is that this is not reflected in the measures of income
and product. Moreover, this literature is concerned with making explicit what is currently
only implicit in the accounts with respect to natural resources and the environment.
With this as background, some notation is required in order to describe the various approaches
to constructing green national accounts aggregates:
ES	 - environmental services
ED - environmental damages
DE	 - defensive expenditures
IR	 - invested resource rents
RD - resource discoveries
DEP - depletion of resources
2 The key elements of the System of National Accounts in what follows are the income and expenditure accounts,
measuring current flows of economic activity (e.g., GDP), and the national balance sheet accounts measuring opening
and closing stocks of assets (both financial arid tangible) over the accounting period.
Because they are assets with market values, tradable emission permits would be measured as intangible assets in the
balance sheet accounts.
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NIFA - net financial assets
TA	 - tangible assets
What follows is a brief description and assessment of the main lines of thought on
environmental national accounting. Three basic identities are presented below, followed by
notes explaining and evaluating the key points. It is Liseftul to summarize the approaches
according to whether they are intended to alter GDP (gross domestic product as
conventionally defined), NDP (conventional net domestic product), or national wealth
(denoted NW) as measured in the National Balance Sheet Accounts, including a measure of
natural wealth. gGDP, gNDP and gNW are the new green aggregates:
gGDP=GDP+ES±ED1-DE-IR
gNDP=NDP+RD-DEP-ED2
gNW = NFA + TAR
 + TAN
Here ED 1 and ED2 represent different approaches to valuing environmental damage. We
consider the component parts of these expressions in sequence:
ES	 Peskin (1989) advocates augmenting GDP by a measure of environmental services.
viewed chiefly as waste disposal services, whith are provided free of cost by the
environment. However, to the extent that producers use these services without paying
for them, then it is arguable that their value already shows up in profits and therefore in
GDP.
ED 1 Environmental damages can be either added or subtracted. Peskin views the negative
externalities associated with producers availing themselves of the services of the
environment as a deduction from GDP4. Harrison (1989) takes the opposite tack:
since gross product includes the consumption of assets by definition, conventional
GDP is understated because it does not measure the consumption of environmental
assets. Note that this would require the estimation of a dollar value for total
environmental deterioration, including that which was prevented as a result of current
abatement expenditures.
DE Defensive expenditures are expenditures on environmental protection undertaken by
households (Juster 1973) and governments (Herfindahl and Kneese 1973). It is argued
that environmental expenditures by households do not increase welfare but merely
preserve the status quo (e.g. not getting sick from environmental deterioration) and
that government environmental protection expenditures (e.g. on waste management)
are essentially intermediate in character.
IR El Seraf' (1989) calls for the deduction of hypothetically invested resource rents from
GDP, arguing that true income from a non-renewable natural resource is that constant
stream of income that can be obtained from investing a portion of the rents from
Environmental services are, in effect, positive externalities provided by nature. Peskin is not explicit concerning
whether environmental damage would appear subsequently as a decline in environmental services.
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exploitation in a ftind (a suitable program will ensure that rents in excess of the portion
invested will be identically equal to interest on the fund at the point of exhaustion).
Hartwick and Hageman (1993) show that this is equivalent to valuing the change in the
present value of the resource stock as a result of its exploitation - i.e. it is a true user
cost.
RD	 Turning to the measurement of net domestic product, Repetto eta!. (1989) reason that
in order to maintain consistency between product and wealth accounts, augmented to
include natural resources, the flu value of natural resource discoveries should be added
to net product in the period in which they are made. Hartwick (1990) developed a
model in which discoveries are similarly added to net product. Weitzman (1976)
showed formally that an unanticipated resource discovery does indeed increase the
amount of sustainable product and income, but by less than the full value of the
discovery in the period it was made.
DEP Depletion of natural resources is the major adjustment to net product suggested by
Repetto eta!. (1989). Depletion is valued as the total of resource rents taken in the
accounting period (the "net price" approach) or, in the case of soil erosion, as the
present value of foregone production. Repetto notes that the Hotelling rule, that
resource rents in an efficient market will increase at a percentage rate of change equal
to the interest rate, will yield this valuation of resource depletion. The United Nations
(1993b) suggests valuing depletion using either the user cost or net price approaches.
ED2 As an alternative to deducting environmental damage from gross product, Bartelmus et
a!. (1989) suggest deducting it from net product as asset consumption. This asset
consumption is valued as the cost of returning the environmental asset to its state at
the beginning of the accounting period. Hueting and Bosch (1990) offer an alternative
methodology in which environmental deterioration is valued as the costs that would be
incurred to achieve sustainable use of the environment (rather than merely preserving
its state, as in Bartelmus eta!.). UN guidelines (United Nations 1993b) suggest
contingent valuation as an alternative basis for valuing environmental degradation, but
without discussing how, or whether, this can be applied to the environment as a whole.
NFA Turning finally to measures of national wealth, net financial assets are an important
component of total wealth. For an open economy the difference between financial
assets and liabilities is equal to either net claims on foreign assets or net foreign
indebtedness. The scale of investment of resource rents by OPEC producers in Europe
and North America indicates the significance of this type of wealth where domestic
investment opportunities are limited.
TAH Human-made tangible assets are the familiar elements of reproducible capital:
machinery, equipment, buildings and infrastructure. The Hartwick rule (Hartwick
1977) states that, under suitable conditions of substitutability, investing resource rents
in reproducible capital will permit a non-declining stream of consumption into the
indefinite future. Building up human-made assets to match the drawing down of
natural resources, thereby preserving wealth, fits the criterion for weak sustainability
described by Pearce et a!. (1989).
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TAN Natural tangible assets are measured by the dollar value of commercial resources
(minerals, energy, forests and fish) and environmental resources (natural environments
providing non-market services including waste disposal and amenity value). Scott
(1956) first suggested expanding the national balance sheet account to include
commercial resources. The problems in doing this include defining the appropriate
measure of extent (proven reserves, i.e. those that can be produced profitably at
current prices and costs, would be the correct measure) and, in the absence of markets
for publicly held resource deposits, deriving values for these deposits. Hamilton
(1991) argued that total national wealth per capita is a useful measure of sustainability.
Pearce et al. (1989) point out that there is limited substitutability between certain
critical natural assets and human-made assets, which argues for maintaining the value
of at least some natural assets constant or increasing as a condition for sustainabiity.
This broad range of approaches to green national accounting is reflected in the activities of
national statistical offices as well. Hamilton et a!. (1993) review the efforts of Brazil, Canada,
France, Germany, the Netherlands and Norway to develop new green accounts. The US
Bureau of Economic Analysis has opted to concentrate on expanding the national balance
sheet through an 'Integrated Economic and Environmental Satellite Account' - in addition,
this account breaks out expenditures on environmental protection (Bureau of Economic
Analysis 1994).
There is little unanimity, therefore, in the literature on green accounting. This is the prime
motivation for taking a more formal approach to the problem. This in turn will permit an
assessment of the main ideas in the foregoing literature.
Formal Models of NationalAccounts
By asking a simple question, why we measure both consumption and investment in national
product when the economic goal is to maximize consumption, Weitzman (1976) provided the
theoretical framework for a fruitful line of inquiry into the relationship between resources, the
environment and national product, the prime examples being Solow (1986), Hartwick (1990,
1992, 1993), Maler (1991) and Hamilton (1994).
Weitzman's answer to the question was that, if we assume we are on the optimal path of a
dynamic competitive economy, then national product measured as the sum of consumption and
investment in the current period is, if held constant and the present value taken, just equal to
the present value of consumption along the optimal path - he calls it the stationary equivalent
of future consumption. In an equally appealing interpretation of this framework, Solow (1986)
showed that increases in national product from some assumed initial value are equal to the
discount rate times the accumulation of capital from the initial period to the present - national
product can thus be conceived as the interest on total accumulated wealth.
There is perhaps a simpler welfare interpretation of national product: as Weitzman (1976)
noted, the current value Hamiltonian of an optimal control representation of the economy,
max JCedt subject to
F= C+p!
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is just H = C + pK, i.e., it is equal to national product (in this formulation, F is production, C
consumption, K capital and p the relative price of capital and consumption goods; r is the
constant discount rate). From Pontryagin's Maximum Principle we know that the Hamiltonian
is maximized at eveiy point in time along the optimal path. Therefore, national product is
simply that quantity that a social planner would choose to maximize in each period in order to
maximize the present value of consumption.
The present value of future consumption is a wealth measure, and Usher (1994) shows that the
Hamiltonian is the return to this wealth under assumptions of fixed technology and
endogenous consumption and capital formation. Usher demonstrates that the Hamiltonian is
not equal to the return on wealth so defined if: (i) consumption can increase autonomously; (ii)
there is autonomous technological change; or (iii) there are tax distortions in the economy.
For a model with exhaustible resources we wish to compare the rate of change of NNP to that
of the Hamiltonian function for an optimal growth problem with exhaustible resources. If the
rate of change of NNP has the same sign as the rate of change of the Hamiltonian along the
optimal path, then NNP can serve as a useful indicator to guide policies for optimal growth, in
the sense that policies that increase the Hamiltonian along the optimal path also increase NNP.
For a simple economy where F(K,R) = C+iC and resources are costless to extract, the
current value Hamiltonian function,
H= u(c)+U(Ic—.FR)
is maximized at each point in time along the path that maximizes the present value of utility,
using a constant utility discount factor r. The optimal path is determined by the initial
conditions and the following dynamic efficiency conditions,
tJc
= F the Hotelling rule, and - = r - F, the Ramsey rule.K,
FR 	 U
NNP for this economy is given by,
NNP= C+K—FR=F—FR.
This corresponds to valuing each flow at the price that supports the optimum, and then
converting to a consumption numeraire. The definition of NNP is derived more formally in
Chapter 9.
Note that - FRR is the change in real wealth in this model. We first derive the expression
for the rate of change of the Hamiltonian:
=
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This results from applying the Ramsey rule. Applying the Hotelling rule gives the following
expression for the rate of change of NNP:
NNP=F—RR—FR
= ^FE—PR—FE
=1(K-1R)
The rate of change of the Hamiltonian therefore simplifies to:
H=
We conclude that both NNP and the Hamiltonian peak at the same time (when the change in
real wealth is 0), and that their rates of change have the same sign at each point in time. NNP
is a useful welfare indicator. Moreover,
1VNP=1H.
r U
The rate of change of NNP is a simple scaling of that of the Hamiltonian, with the scale factor
declining once consumption begins its decline along the optimal path.
For the next two chapters this will be the primary welfare interpretation that will be attributed
to 'NNP-like' aggregates derived from the current value Hamiltonian. The relationship
between these aggregates and sustainable development is explicitly considered in Chapter 9,
which deals with wealth accounting.
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7. Exhaustible Resources and Net National Product
As argued in Chapter 6, the recent enthusiasm for 'green' national accounting is aimed at
better reflecting resource depletion and environmental damage in measures of economic
development. A key issue in the treatment of exhaustible resources in the National Accounts
is the source of much confusion: the method of valuing resource discoveries, with El Serafy
(1989), Repetto et aL (1989) and Hartwick (1990) offering the chief variants. El Seraf', in
common with United Nations (1993b), opts to add discoveries to the stock of resources, while
Repetto et al. and Hartwick add discoveries to current Net National Product (NNP).
The lack of consensus on these varying methodologies has practical consequences. In studies
employing both the El Serafy and Repetto valuation methods, for Australia (Young (1993)),
and Brazil (Serôa da Motta and Young (1991)), widely divergent valuations of adjusted NNP
based on the treatment of resource discoveries have led to discouragement concerning the
usefulness and applicability of alternative national accounting aggregates. This chapter
presents a further development of the model of Hartwick (1990) to clarif' the approach to
resource discoveries in extending the national accounts. The issue is clearly one of extending
the accounts, since the recent revision to the System of National Accounts (United Nations
(1993a)) recommends that resource discoveries appear in the 'other volume changes'
component of the balance sheet accounts, so that there is no consequent effect on the measure
of standard NNP.
Another matter of practical consequence for the development of extended national accounts
concerns the valuation of resource depletion. Theoretical models such as Hartwick (1990) and
Maler (1991) suggest valuing depletion at the current rental rate, price minus marginal cost.
However these models assume, in effect, a single pooi of resource that is exhausted, with a
well-defined cost function for this pooi. In practice even homogeneous resources are found in
deposits of varying quality and therefore cost of extraction. The effects of heterogeneous
resource deposits on depletion-adjusted NNP are derived in the second part of this chapter.
Resource Discoveries
Weitzman (1976) was the first to show that the current value Hamiltonian of an optimal
growth representation of the economy is, expressed in suitable units, the NNP of the economy.
To be precise, Weitzman showed that to maximize the present value of consumption over an
infinite time horizon, the current value Hamiltonian is given by H = C + p1, where p is the
relative price of capital and consumer goods and C and K are the amount of consumption and
capital on the optimal path. This is clearly the measure of net national product, consumption
plus net investment.
NNP so defined can be given several different welfare interpretations. Weitzman called it the
'stationary equivalent' of future consumption, since the value of NNP at any given point in
time, if held constant and present value taken over an infinite horizon, can be shown to be
equal to the present value of (optimal) consumption over the same horizon. Solow (1986)
offered a more satisfying rendering, by showing that NNP is equal to the interest on net capital
accumulation along an optimal path from some assumed initial year. As noted in the previous
(7.1)
(7.2)
(7.3)
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chapter, the Maximum Principle offers a more natural interpretation still: NNP is that quantity
that a planner would choose to maximize at each point in time in order to maximize the
present value of consumption.
Hartwick (1990) and Mäler (1991) extend the Weitzman approach to examine economies that
include the depletion of natural resources and the environment. The Hamiltonian functions
they derive embody conventional NNP and adjustments that reflect the changes in resource
stocks - by the reasoning just given, the results should be viewed as the proper value of NNP
since it is this quantity whose maximization leads to the maximization of the present value of
consumption. It is to Hartwick's treatment of resource discoveries that we now turn.
For utility function U(C), consumption C, production function F(KR,L), capital stock K,
resource use R, labour L, resource discoveries D, and resource stocks S, Hartwick (1990)
assumes a cost function for resource extractionj(R,S), and a discovery cost function g(D,S),
so that both extraction and discoveries exhibit a stock effect. Given constant pure rate of
time preference r (all other variables are implicitly functions of time), the model is,
max 
f0 
U(C)e' tdt such that:
K=F—C—f—g
S=—R+D.
Here there are two state variables, K and S, and three control variables, C, R, and D. While
the relationship between exploration effort and discoveries is in general stochastic, Hartwick
has chosen a deterministic form: the present and future benefits of discoveries D are traded off
against the current cost of discovery g. The fact that the model is closed to trade does not
affect the principal results of the model, at least for small open economies - Gomez-Lobo, in
Gomez-Lobo eta!. (1993), shows that accounting for external trade simply adds a term of the
form iA to the resulting measure of NNP, where i is an international interest rate and A is the
net accumulation of foreign assets.
The current value Hamiltonian for this problem is,
H=U+y1(F—C—f—g)+r2(—R+D)
and the first order conditions for maximization are,
dl
= 0= U -
	 TI = UC
= 72=Uc(FR—fR)
dl
5JJOr1D+r2
	
y2=Ug.
A consequence of expressions (7.2) and (7.3), one that Hartwick does not draw, is that
gD = (1 - fR). This is the result of having two control variables, R and D, associated with
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one state variable, S. The current value Hamiltonian resulting from expressions (7. 1)-(7.3) is
therefore,
H=U+UcK—Uc(F—fR)(R—D).
The dynamic efficiency condition for U is given by,
= Uc	 (7.4)
It is natural, given that the Hamiltonian is measured in utils, to define NNP as H / U, as
Hartwick does. Mäler (1991) uses the linear support of the Hamiltonian function, which
approximates the function at any point by its tangent hyperplane. The expedient used in
Chapter 6 is simply to value each flow in the Hamiltonian at its shadow price and then to
normalize by the marginal utility of consumption. This normalization preserves relative prices
at each point in time and, as shown in Chapter 6, the NNP so derived is a valid indicator for
the guidance of policies for optimal growth. In the present model NNP can therefore be
defined as,
NNP= C+IC—(F—fR)(R--D).
This is the formula for NNP that Hartwick (1990) derives. It says that adjusted net national
product is equal to traditional NNP less resource depletion plus resource discoveries, valued at
the unit rental rate. As a guide to practical national accounting it is the latter term that is
disturbing - it suggests that even very large discoveries should be valued at the full rental rate
as an addition to national product even though no production has taken place. As noted in the
introduction, this is also the approach taken by Repetto et a!. (1989), which has the effect of
dramatically reducing the growth rate of adjusted NNP that they derive for Indonesia.
Because expressions (7.2) and (7.3) imply that marginal discovery costs must equal unit
resource rents in this model, Hartwick could as easily have written NNP as,
NNP = C+k—g(R—D).
This would imply that resource depletion should be valued at the marginal discovery cost.
Using marginal discovery costs as an approximation to resource rents was suggested by
Devarajan and Fisher (1982).
The final point to note about the Hartwick model, before developing an alternative, is that
althoughf and g are both functions of the remaining stock S, this has no effect on the
derivation of NNP. In fact, making discovery costs a function of the remaining stock seems
implausible. Where the stock effects do show up is in the second dynamic efficiency
condition,
= (7.5)
r2
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•	 dl
T2	 Y2
Defining n F — JR' and using expression (7.4), we therefore derive,
•—F +K
This is a Hotelling-type rule for resource rents. Stock effects therefore influence the time path
of resource rents in this model.
This completes our dissection of Hartwick (1990). There are several points to note. First, the
choice of a linear utility function has more expository value than inherent justification.
Second, the fact that both R and D are control variables for the state variable S results in
marginal discovery costs that must equal resource rental rates. Thus, although Hartwick uses
resource rents as the basis of valuing both resource depletion and discoveries, an alternative
would have been to value both at the marginal discovery cost in the formula for NNP. Finally,
making resource discovery costs a function of the remaining stock of resource lacks intuitive
appeal, although the effects of this assumption show up only indirectly in the time path of
resource rents.
An alternative model1
A more appealing treatment of resource discoveries would be to consider the cost of discoveries to
be an increasing function of both the amount discovered in the current period and cumulative
discoveries to date2
 - i.e., the more resource that is discovered, the more expensive it is to discover
the next marginal unit. This is related to the formulation of exploration given in Pindyck (1978).
Representing cumulative discoveries as M, the definition of the cost of resource discoveries is
therefore g(D, Al), where g >0 and g1 > 0. For simplicity we drop stock effects in resource
extraction, so that f = f(R). The optimal growth model, where K, S, and M are the state
variables, and C, R, and D are the control variables, therefore becomes,
max 
f0 
U(C)e'dt subject to:
K=F—C—f—g
S=—R+D
M=D.
We assume that there is a finite amount of resource known to exist in the initial period, S0,
and a finite amount remaining to be discovered,
	 Assuming resources are essential for
production, efficiency requires that M - V, and S —+ 0 as t +
This model was developed independently by Hartwick and published in Hartwick (1993).
2 am indebted to John Livernois for suggesting this.
(7.6)
(7.7)
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For this problem the current value Hamiltonian is,
H= U+y,(F—C—f—g)+y2(—R+D)+y,D.
The first-order conditions for utility to be maximized are as follows:
au
= 0 = U 
— 7,	 7, = Uc
= 0 = 7, (FR - fR) 72	 72 = Uc (FR - fR)
aR
au
_5 
= 0 = —r,g,-r2-'-r,	 73 = uC(gD — (FR_f,j) .	( 7.8)
Collecting terms from expressions (7.6)-(7.8), the current value Hamiltonian becomes,
H= U+ U(F—C—f—g)+ Uc(FR—fR)(—R+D)+ UC(g—(FR—f))D.
We therefore derive the following expressions for NNP,
NNP = C+t+gD 
-(FR - fR)P-
In both Hartwick (1990) and the present derivation, resource depletion appears as a deduction
from NNP, calculated as the value of current resource rents. Whereas Hartwick values all
resource discoveries as unit rent times the amount discovered, the new expression includes
only gD , the marginal cost of discovering resources times the amount discovered, as an addition
to NNP. This term may be conceived to be a measure of investment in resource discoveries.
One effect of introducing cumulative discoveries into the model is to decouple marginal discoveiy
costs and unit resource rents. In fact we can conclude more. Note that y is the shadow price of
cumulative discoveries. Since we have assumed that g, > 0, this implies that y <0. From
expression (7.8) we therefore conclude that g,, <J - fR' i.e., marginal discoveiy costs must be
less than resource rents.
This result may be compared with Hartwick (1991), where for a resourcefinn a component of
resource rent is shown to be the marginal change in surplus associated with discoveiy (this is
related in an obvious way to the marginal cost of discovery) times the amount discovered. It
should also be compared with Lasserre (1985), who employed a stochastic model of exploration to
show that marginal discovery costs must be less than current resource rents by the amount of the
rent on resource prospects. In Lasserre's model resource prospects are exhausted by new
discoveries i.e., the amount of resource that can be found is finite) - this has at least the same
flavour as the present model, where it is assumed that the greater the quantity of cumulative
resource discoveries, the greater the cost of discovery.
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The dynamic efficiency conditions for this model are also of interest. The first (corresponding
to y) is the same as that for the Hartwick (1990) model, expression (7.4). For a general
utility function with declining marginal utility of consumption we can define the elasticity of
the marginal utility of consumption to be,
Expression (7.4) then reduces to,
r+7(C)=FK.	 (7.9)
As shown in Chapter 2, development is not sustainable in this model, by Pezzey's (1989)
definition, as long as the pure rate of time preference is positive.
Because we have assumed no stock effects on resource extraction and consumption, the
second efficiency condition is derived from expression (7.5) to yield, for unit resource rents n,
This is a standard form of the Hotelling (1931) rule, that unit resource rents must increase at a
percentage rate of change equal to the return on capital.
The third dynamic efficiency condition is,
= rv3
Since expressions (7.6) - (7.8) imply that y 
= rlgD - y 2 , the preceding expression reduces
to,
gD =Fg+g.
But g = gD + gAI =	 + gD, so that,
13= L(Fg0 
+ - gD).
DD
Resource discoveries eventually decline if either (i) Fg -^ 0, and suitable convexity
conditions hold, DD >0, gD> g, or (ii) suitable concavity conditions hold, DD <0,
gD <g. Of course we know that the finiteness of total resources also implies that
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discoveries must eventually decline, so these assumptions are necessary components of this
model.
In terms of practical national accounting, the key results of this model are that resource
depletion valued at the unit rental rate should be deducted from NNP, while resource
discoveries, valued at the marginal discovery cost, should be added. Assuming resource
discovery costs increase with cumulative discoveries, then marginal discovery costs will be less
than unit resource rents.
Resource Extraction with Heterogeneous Deposits
If exhaustible resources are to be treated in extended or 'green' national accounts, there is
another vexing question concerning precisely which unit rent to use in valuing depletion when
there are several heterogeneous resource deposits. As noted earlier, the Hartwick (1990)
model and the one presented in the previous section assume, in effect, one homogeneous pool
of resource and so this question does not arise in these models. In a combined theoretical and
empirical study Hartwick and Lindsey (1989) argue that the scarcity rent on US oil reserves is
represented by price minus the marginal cost of frontier reserves, and so derive very small
adjustments to NNP when account is taken of oil depletion. This would seem to be contrary
to normal national accounting practice, where it is customary to value assets at their market
price - extending this notion to heterogeneous resource deposits, where extraction costs and
therefore unit rents vary from deposit to deposit, one would expect the market price of
resource deposits of similar physical extent to vary according to the unit rents available. Given
that the US has widely disparate oil resources - comparing production costs between
continental and North Slope deposits for instance - standard national accounting would
suggest that the value of depletion should reflect these varying unit rents.
We will formalize these ideas in a model of heterogeneous deposits of a homogeneous
resource. Ignoring, for the sake of simplicity, discoveries and stock effects in the extraction
cost ftinction, assume that extraction R, takes place in m deposits. Then, since the resource is
itself homogeneous, we can write,
F = F(K,RL), where R =
Heterogeneous resource deposits are reflected in the extraction cost functions,
f =f,(R).
The dynamic constraints for the optimal control problem become,
= F—C—sf,,
and, for the m resource deposits,
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= —R1,i=1..m.
Again, the objective is to maximize the present value of utility over an infinite horizon, given a
fixed pure rate of time preference r. The current value Hamiltonian for the problem is,
H=U+ri(F—C—J)-2aRi
where C and R are the control variables and y 1 and 2, are the corresponding co-state
variables. The first order conditions for a maximum are,
dl
-=O=U---r 1	 y1=U,and
dl
—2,, i=L.m.=0= y1
 -
Because - = F = FR, the latter conditions reduce to,
2,=UC(FR—-j.
We therefore arrive at the following expression for net national product,
NNP =
Net national product is therefore the standard measure, consumption plus investment, less the sum
of the resource rents on the individual resource deposits. This result therefore brings the treatment
of heterogeneous resources into line with other assets in the national accounts.
One question that arises is why production should take place from deposits that yield less rent than
the deposit with the maximum unit rent - why doesn't production proceed through merit order?
The answer to this can be seen by examining the dynamic efficiency conditions. The condition for
is precisely that of expression (7.4). To examine those for the 2, we first define the unit rent on
the i-th deposit to be,
7?, (1_-),andso 2,=Un,.
The dynamic efficiency conditions therefore become, for each i =
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k, =r.t, --=r2,,
9S,
so that we have, using expression (7.4),
ni
- =1 ;, i=1..m.
'Ii
This says that the Hotelling rule must apply to each individual resource deposit. Resource
rents may have different levels for different deposits, but each must increase with a percentage
rate of change equal to the rate of return on capital. Under these conditions extraction will be
efficient for each resource deposit, and the owners of the deposits will be indifferent between
holding them and holding other assets yielding the market rate of return.
Rather than valuing depletion using the unit rent on the most marginal deposit, as in Hartwick
and Lindsey (1989), this model says that depletion must be calculated for each distinct deposit
and summed to arrive at the depletion adjustment to NNP. While this may mean more work
for the national accountants, it does bring the treatment of resource deposits into congruence
with the practice for other assets in the accounts.
Conclusions
Hartwick's (1990) specification of discovery costs depending on the amount of remaining
stock S. it has been argued, lacks plausibility. It turns out, however, that this assumption
affects only the dynamics of resource rents and not the derived NNP. Because both
discoveries and extraction are control variables for S, the resulting shadow prices for these
quantities are equal, so that Hartwick's result for NNP could also be expressed with
discoveries and extraction valued at the marginal discovery cost rather than the unit rent.
Introducing a new state variable, cumulative discoveries, into the model provides a touch of
realism (the notion that the more resource you find the more costly it is to find the next unit)
and effectively decouples marginal discovery costs from unit rents - in fact marginal discovery
costs must be less than unit rents. The result is a more satisfactory treatment of discoveries
and depletion in adjusted NNP, with the former valued at the marginal discovery cost and the
latter at the unit rental rate.
The dynamics of the model developed above have two points of interest. First, because total
resources (discovered and undiscovered) are assumed to be fixed, the model shares with the
standard model of exhaustible resources the characteristic that consumption must decline for
positive rates of pure time preference. Positive time preference is inimical to sustainability
when resources are finite. Secondly, the assumption of fixed total resources implies that
discoveries must also decline over time, with the consequence that the discovery cost function
must obey specified convexity conditions.
The model of heterogeneous resource deposits is also offered in the spirit of introducing some
realism into the discussion of adjusted NNP. This is a matter of some practical consequence
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as well, as the valuation of US oil depletion at the rental rate for North Slope oil in Hartwick
and Lindsey (1989) indicates. The key result is that resource rents calculated deposit by
deposit must be deducted from NNP to measure true net product. In terms of the dynamics of
the model, it was shown that the unit resource rents on each individual deposit must obey the
Hotelling rule if extraction is to be efficient.
How much of this will 'green' national accountants take up? With regard to resource
discoveries, the standard national accounts treat most exploration costs as investment. Where
the model suggests using marginal discovery costs times the amount discovered, the standard
accounts are, in effect, using average discovery costs times the amount discovered. Over a
typical accounting period, one year, the divergence between the two measures may not be that
great. This suggests that 'green' accounts need not be adjusted for resource discoveries.
With regard to heterogeneous resource deposits, the practitioners are already working
towards measuring different resource rental rates for different grades of deposits, as the work
of Born (1992) indicates in the case of Canadian oil and gas. The practice in measuring
depletion is to measure average rental rates (price minus average cost) for individual deposits,
multiplied by the amount extracted. Again, for individual deposits and accounting periods of
one year, the divergence between this measure and that suggested by theory, based on price
minus marginal cost, may be small.
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8. Pollution and Pollution Abatement in the National Accounts1
As discussed in Chapter 6, there is a pervasive sense that the conventional national accounts
overstate the measurement of 'true' income and product because they do not account for the
damage to the environment from pollution emissions. The basic notions are that the value of
environmental damage should be deducted from domestic product and that at least some final
expenditures on environmental protection, 'defensive expenditures', should not be considered
to be final demand. This chapter develops a series of models to examine these claims and to
suggest extensions to the standard accounts to account for environmental change.
As noted in the Introduction, Hartwick (1990,1993) and Maler (1991) both explicitly extend
Weitzman's (1976) approach to national accounting by maximizing the present value of utility
under different presumptions about the depletion of natural resources and damage to the
environment from pollution. Maler constructs one large model that contains, in addition to
consumption and investment goods, a flow resource that is damaged by pollution emissions, a
living resource that is harvested and whose growth is affected by inputs of goods and labour,
and a household production function through which, by inputting goods and labour,
households can increase their benefits from the environment (i.e., the flow resource). The key
result in Maler (1991) is that deductions for defensive expenditures should not be made in the
measure of national welfare derived from the model.
Hartwick (1990) presents two pollution-related models, one in which there is a stock pollutant
that accumulates emissions and is subject to a natural dissipation process - this pollutant
appears (negatively) in the production function - and a second in which the rate of change of
the stock pollutant appears in the utility function as well. In these models pollution is
mitigated by expenditures that affect the rate of the natural dissipation process, an unlikely
form of mitigation. Hartwick (1993) offers a more intuitive model in which utility is related to
the accumulated stock of pollutant and abatement expenditures limit the quantity of pollution
emissions.
This chapter builds on and extends the Hartwick and Maler models in several directions: (i) an
explicit approach is taken to pollution abatement expenditures, and these are related to optimal
emission taxes; (ii) a series of models are constructed to examine individually the effects of
flow pollutants, stock pollutants, degradation of natural dissipation processes, stock pollutants
linked directly to exhaustible resources (the CO 2 problem), and flow pollutants that damage
living resources (the acid rain problem); and (iii) the treatment of household defensive
expenditures is re-examined to yield a variation on Maler's interpretation.
Chapter 6 evaluated how the traditional 'green national accounting' literature has approached
pollution issues. As a brief summary of this literature, the general contention is that some
measure of the cost of environmental protection should be deducted from GNP (or net
product) to reflect damage to the environment, and that defensive expenditures should be
deducted as well. In this view conventional national product is an overstatement of 'true'
product. This chapter aims to provide a more rigorous basis for adjusting the accounts to
This material is published in Hamilton (forthcoming).
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reflect a wide variety of pollution issues and to test the extent to which theory supports the
conclusions of this literature.
Models of Green NationalAccounts
Each of the models presented below is designed to examine a particular facet of the treatment
of pollution in the national accounts. A number of simplifying assumptions are made: i)
technology is assumed to be unchanging; (ii) the production function F exhibits declining
returns to factors; (iii) there is a single product that may be consumed, invested or used in
abatin.g pollution; (iv) labour markets are assumed be in equilibrium, so that the welfare effects
of labour do not figure in what follows (as was derived in Mäler (1991)); and (v) the discount
rate r is constant. U is the utility function, and C consumption; in most of the models utility is
assumed to be an increasing function of both consumption and the flow of environmental
services B, measured in appropriate (but not necessarily monetary) units. B is assumed to
measure pure non-market environmental services, so that there is no duplication with the
indirect effects of environmental quality on production or asset values. With the exception of
r, all variables are functions of time. Additional assumptions will be added as required.
The general ideas developed in the following models are that the natural environment provides
a flow of non-market services that can be diminished by pollution emissions, that this flow of
services yields utility, and that produced goods can be employed to abate pollution emissions.
Model 1: flow pollutant related to production.
A flow pollutant is a pollutant whose current level of emissions can be assumed to affect the
level of services derived from the environment. Any pollutant with noxious effects that are not
cumulative, such as a toxin, could serve as an example. The simple economy for the model of
green national accounts is therefore one where emissions are assumed to be related to the level
of production, e = e(F), production is a function of produced capital and labour, F = F(XL),
and output of the composite good can either be consumed or invested, so that,
F=C+K.
The objective of the social planner for this economy is to maximize the present value of utility
over an infinite time horizon, where utility Uis a function of both consumption C and the level
of environmental services B. Utility is assumed to be discounted at a fixed rate r.
Environmental services are negatively related to pollution emissions as,
B(e)=B0—ae.
Here B0 is the level of environmental services that flow from a pristine environment, while a is
the amount by which services decline when a unit of pollution is emitted. While it is not
essential to specify a linear relationship between emissions and environmental services, it
simplifies the exposition. The problem therefore is,
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max iU(C, B)edt subject to:
K=F—C
For r1 as the shadow price of capital, the current value Hamiltonian function for this
programme is,
H= U+y 1K= U+y1(F—C).
The only control variable is consumption C, and therefore the first order condition for a
maximum is,
=r1 =U.
The second order condition for the Hamiltonian to be maximized is U <0 (i.e., declining
marginal utility of consumption).
The Hamiltonian function is measured in utils, and so must be transformed into consumption
units in order to yield an expression that conforms more closely to conventional national
accounting aggregates. As in Chapter 6, this is done in two steps: (i) each flow in the
Hamiltonian - consumption, environmental services and investment - is valued at its shadow
price in utils; and (ii) the resulting expression is divided by the marginal utility of consumption
Uc to give a measure of economic welfare (MEW) in consumption units - again, this will be
derived formally in Chapter 9. Scaling by the marginal utility of consumption yields the correct
relative prices between flows at each point in time. The resulting expression is,
MEW=C+K^YiB.
Uc
Here economic welfare is measured as the sum of GNP (C + K) and the value of the flow of
environmental services. Note that U8/U is the price that utility-maximizing consumers would
be willing to pay for a marginal unit of environmental service. Pollution flows can be brought
explicitly into the picture by substituting the expression for B,
Uc	 Uc°
	 (8.1)
Here aU,/Uc is the marginal social cost of a unit of emissions, yielding the correct valuation
of pollution in the aggregate welfare measure. This is also clearly the level of a Pigovian
emissions tax sufficient to maximize welfare in each period. The last term in this expression is
the (constant) environmental service flow from a pristine environment valued at (varying)
current prices.
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This model can be made more realistic and more general if we assume that the composite good
can both be invested in pollution abatement capital K and spent on current abatement
expenditures a in order to reduce pollution emissions to welfare-maximizing levels. The
emission function therefore becomes,
e=e(F,Ka ,a),with ea <0 and e <0.
Introducing a new control variable m for investment in pollution abatement capital, the
maximization problem becomes,
max f U(C,B)edt subject to:
K=F—C—a—m
Ka = m
The current value Hamiltonian for this programme is,
H= U+y1K+y2K4
=U+y1(F—C—a—m)+y2m
and the first order conditions for a maximum are:
=Uc
aH
-= 0=—y +y 2 =r2 =U
am
= 0= —aU3e0 -
	
- aU8e =
The additional second order condition for a maximum is therefore e, > 0. Defining b -l/ea
as the marginal cost ofpollution abatement, this condition amounts to increasing marginal
abatement costs. This marginal cost, from the first order condition on a, is equal to the
marginal social cost of emissions,
Uc
Transforming the Hamiltonian as in the model without abatement expenditures yields,
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MEW= C+K^K4 —be+-B0 .	 (8.2)
There are several points to note about this expression. First, all investment, whether in
productive capital or in abatement capital, is counted in the aggregate welfare measure.
Second, current abatement expenditure a is not measured in welfare - these expenditures are
essentially intermediate in character. Third, current pollution emissions are represented as a
deduction from welfare, valued either at marginal abatement costs or marginal social costs,
both of which in turn are equal to the level of a Pigovian emissions Itax. The equivalence of
these marginal costs is, of course, a consequence ofMEW being measured on the optimum
path.
Model 2: a cumulative pollutant and a stock pollutant.
We next wish to model a pollutant whose effects are cumulative2. The level of the flow of
environmental services is therefore related negatively to the cumulative amount of pollution
emitted, X, so that
E=B0-/3X.
We first assume no abatement expenditures, so that e = e(F). The model is therefore,
maxFU(C,B)edt subject to:
K=F—C
X=e.
Here C is the only control variable. The current value Hamiltonian for this problem is,
H=U+71(F— c)+r2e,
for co-state variables y and r2 and the first order condition for a maximum (ignoring the
dynamic conditions for the moment) is,
- = O = U — y 1
 Y1 U.
For the first order condition to yield a maximum, a necessary condition is that
	 <0, i.e.,
that there be declining marginal utility of consumption.
2 As a simplification in this and all subsequent models, investment in pollution abatement will be ignored,
since its effects on the welfare measure have been explained in Model 1.
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Note that r2 <0, since increases in the accumulation of the pollutant decrease welfare. The
measure of economic welfare is obtained by transforming the Hamiltonian as in Model 1, to
yield,
MEW= C+±--e+-B.
Uc Uc
There are several things to note about this expression, beginning with why it should be
interpreted as a welfare measure rather than net national product. The terms in emissions e
and environmental services B provide the answer: as purely external phenomena they reflect
adjustments to utility rather than to market production. This expression should be interpreted
as what a planner should maximize at each point in time in order to maximize the present value
of utility, in keeping with our earlier interpretation of the Weitzman model. The expression
U8 I U is the price that utility-maximizing consumers would be willing to pay for a unit of
environmental service, and so a key component of welfare in this model, as with the flow
pollutant, is the monetized value of the level of environmental services.
Since 72 is the shadow price of the accumulation of the pollutant measured in utils, it is
natural to define o 72 / U, as the marginal social cost of a unit of the pollutant, and, as in
Model 1, this will equal the Pigovian tax required to maximize utility. If p3 U3 / U, then
the expression for economic welfare becomes,
MEW= C+IC—ae+p3B. 	(8.3)
Economic welfare is therefore measured as consumption plus investment less the value of an
optimal emissions tax plus the value of the level of environmental services.
Abatement expenditures, a, are introduced into this model as the use of current production to
reduce the level of emissions, so that the emission function is re-defined as follows:
e = eFa), ep > 0, ea < 0.
The maximization problem is now specified as:
max J'U(C,B)edt subject to:
K=F—C—a
X=e.
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The control variables are C and a and the current value Hamiltonian is as specified above. The
first order condition for 7 is again that it should equal the marginal utility of consumption. For
72 we now have,
-;--= Oy,+y2eay2r..
(1	 e4
Uc	 (8.4)
It will be useftil in what follows to define b	 -1/ e; this is just the marginal cost of
pollution abatement. Transforming the Hamiltonian into consumption units, we therefore
derive,
MEW=C+IC—be+p2B.	 (8.5)
Expression (8.4) implies that b = 72 / U. The marginal cost of abatement is identically
equal to the marginal social costs of emissions and to the value of the optimal unit emissions
tax. Given that y >0 and 72 >0, a sufficient condition for the Hamiltonian to produce a
maximum of utility is
	 > 0, i.e., increasing marginal abatement costs.
Economic welfare, therefore, is measured as consumption plus investment, less the value of
pollution, plus the value of environmental services. Note the valuation of pollution in
expression (8.5). While this may appear similar to valuing environmental damage as the
current cost of abatement, a moment's reflection shows that this is not so: valuation is based
on the marginal cost of abatement, and emissions are implicitly held to their optimal value,
because welfare is being maximized.
If we consider the accumulation of pollutant Xto be a liability in the national balance sheet,
then K— be is equal to what Hamilton (1994) calls genuine saving - the change in the real
value of assets when all assets, including environmental ones, are taken into account. Net
national product is therefore derived as,
JVNP=C+K—be,
and it is the addition of value of environmental services, pER, that produces a welfare measure.
Expression (8.5) can also be written as,
MEW=	 (8.6)
so that economic welfare consists of the proximate sources of utility, C and p3B, plus the
adjustments required to ensure utility maximization over time, K and (b / ,8)E. Note that
E <0 for any non-zero production level because pollution accumulates.
Expression (8.5) yields another interpretation. First, GNP = F = C + K + a. This implies that
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MEW= GNF—a—be+p9B.
So we conclude that, in order to arrive at a welfare measure, abatement expenditures should
be subtracted from GNP - they become, in effect, intermediate consumption 3. This is
consistent with the notions of Juster (1973) and Leipert (1989). What goes beyond the
conclusions in these studies is the subtraction of emissions valued at the marginal cost of
abatement and the addition of the value of environmental services. This is not an argument for
changing NNP but rather a prescription for measuring welfare.
One unsatisfactory aspect of the previous model is that treats the environment as purely
exhaustible: the flow of environmental services can only decline for any non-zero level of
output. In the following model we assume a simple representation of a pollutant that both
accumulates and dissipates as follows:
X=e—d(Q
B=B0—/3(X—X0)
Here X0 is the initial stock of the pollutant and d(X) is the dissipation function for this stock,
representing physical processes that reduce and render harmless some amount of the
accumulation of the pollutant. Environmental services B are assumed to be negatively related
to the stock of pollutant, with fi being the fixed rate at which services decrease with
accumulation of the stock. As a consequence, B = -/3k. As in the preceding model,
e = e(F, a). The overall model therefore becomes 4, for control variables C and a,
max JU(C,B)edt subjectto:
K=F—C—a
X=e—d.
The current value Hamiltonian for this problem is given by,
H=U+y,(F—C—a)+y2(e—d).
As in the previous model, the first order conditions for a maximum give 71 = Uc. For
marginal abatement cost b —1 / e, the first order conditions then imply that 72 = —Ub.
Transforming the Hamiltonian into consumption units, the measure of economic welfare
therefore reduces to:
This is true for all the following models. The interpretation of household defensive expenditures will be derived in
Model 6.
This model is formally similar to one in Hartwick (1993). It is here given a more careful interpretation and is used to
set the stage for models that follow.
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MEW=C+K—be+bd^p8B.	 (8.7)
In this expression the term bd represents the dissipation of the pollutant stock valued at the
marginal cost of abatement. Emissions are a deduction from welfare in this model, while
dissipation of the stock of pollutant represents an increase in welfare
The value of the flow of environmental services is again included in economic welfare, owing
to the fact that environmental services are a direct source of utility. It is simple to show that if
environmental services enter the production function as well, so that F = F(KL,B), then the
expression for welfare that results is formally the same as expression (8.7) - however, NNP
will reflect the level of production associated with the optimal level of environmental services
B that is attained. The marginal product of environmental services, F8 , and the marginal
dissipation rate, d, affect the time path of the marginal cost of abatement, as will be briefly
explored in a later section on model dynamics.
Model 3: emissions impair dissipation.
An interesting variant on the previous model is to examine what happens when current
pollution emissions impair the ability of the environment to dissipate the pollution stock. We
assume therefore that d = d(X, e), d1 > 0, d, <0. This implies that d1 and d are
dimensionless (i.e., they are scalars), and both must be less than 1 in absolute value.
The optimization problem can be expressed precisely as in the previous model, and the current
value Hamiltonian is again given by,
H=U+y1(F—C—a)+y2(e—d).
The first order condition on consumption yields, as before, 7 = Ut.. For abatement
expenditures the condition is,
aa 
o=—y 1 +y 2 (e0 —d,ea)= —U
b
= d_l
The measure of economic welfare is therefore given by,
MEW=C+IC_ l bd (e_d)+pBB.	 (8.8)
This bears an obvious resemblance to expression (8.7) from the previous model, with the
exception that the value of the net change in the pollutant stock (e - d) is attenuated by the
factor 1 / (1— d,). Recalling that d <0, this leads to the mildly paradoxical conclusion that
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the greater is the marginal impairment of the dissipation of pollution associated with current
emissions, the smaller is the effect of pollution emissions on welfare (other things being equal).
Model 4: pollution is linked to exhaustible resource use.
This can be dubbed 'the CO2 problem' because we view the level of pollution emissions as
being linked directly to the quantity of resource use, much as carbon dioxide emissions are
related stoichiometrically to the carbon content of fossil fuels 5 . We will assume in what
follows that we are dealing with an exhaustible fossil fuel resource. As in Model 3, utility is a
function of both consumption and environmental services, and the environment regenerates as
a result of dissipation processes. The key differences are that e = e(R, a), eR > 0, R measures
the quantity of resource extracted and used, S is the resource stock, resources are inputs into
production, so that F = F(K, L, R), FR > 0, and resources are costly to produce, so that
f = fiR), fR > 0 specifies the cost of resource extraction. This treatment of exhaustible
resources follows Hartwick (1990) and Chapter 7.
The following stock-flow relationships for pollution stock and environmental services hold,
X = e(R, a) - d(X), and B = B0 - /3(X - X0).
The model is specified as:
max f' U(C, B) e dt subject to:
= F—C—a—f
X= e—d
S=—R
S— 0 as t —p 00.
The final part of this expression just says that resources must be exhausted over the program;
this is an efficiency condition. In this model K, X, and S are the state variables and C, a and R
are the control variables. This optimal control problem has the current value Hamiltonian
function,
H=U+,(F—C—a—j^y2('e—d)—y3R.
where y 1 , y and y, are the co-state variables corresponding to capital, carbon dioxide
stocks, resource stocks respectively. If we define b = -1 / e0 to be the marginal cost of
abatement as before, then derivation of the first-order conditions for this problem yields,
7, = Uc, 72 = Uc b, r= Uc(FR - fR - b eR).
'This model is similar to that developed in Chapter 4 and in Hamilton and Ulph (1994).
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The Hamiltonian is measured in utils and is maximized at each point in time under the optimal
program - it is therefore a current measure of welfare. The conditions for a maximum include
F <0, so resources have declining marginal product, and f ^ 0, i.e., constant or
increasing marginal extraction costs. As in previous models, we define the measure of
economic welfare by transforming the Hamiltonian into consumption units. Substitution of the
above expressions for the co-state variables into the Hamiltonian therefore gives,
MEW=Ci-K—b(e—d)—('FR —fR —beR)R +pBB.	 (8.9)
This expression says that emissions decrease welfare while regeneration of the environment,
through the dissipation of CO 2, increases it (i.e., the environment is productive); in both cases
the appropriate unit of valuation is the marginal cost of abatement, b. Assuming profit-
maximizing producers, FR is the market price of the resource and fR its marginal cost of
extraction. The next-to-last term in this expression therefore relates to the value of resource
depletion', being of the form 'price minus marginal cost'. However, the unit resource rent
FR - fR is reduced by a Pigovian tax, at rate beR. This is a carbon tax on resource use, a
specific tax required to achieve both the maximization of the present value of utility and, as
will be seen in the discussion of dynamics, the efficient extraction of the resource when its use
leads to CO2 emissions. The net rental value of fossil fuels decreases when account is taken of
their environmental externalities.
It might be argued that carbon emissions cannot be abated in any practical manner, calling the
dependence of expression (8.9) on marginal abatement costs into question. One response to
this is to argue that in any model of pollution emissions it is more general to assume some
level of abatement effort. The second response is that, as in Models 1 and 2, the same results
can be obtained by assuming no abatement effort - what results is an expression containing the
level of the marginal social costs of emissions or an optimal carbon emissions tax, a, in place
of the marginal abatement cost b in expression (8.9) (and the preceding expressions as well).
As a final note, this model assumes a single country dealing with the welfare effects of its own
carbon emissions. The situation in reality, of course, is much more complex, with multiple
emitting countries facing different marginal abatement cost schedules, so that finding a global
optimum would require, for example, some form of emission trading.
Model 5: living resources are damaged by pollution.
This model examines the 'acid rain' problem: it is assumed that living resources with economic
value are damaged by emissions resulting from production. To keep the analysis to its
essentials we will make a couple of simplifying assumptions. First, harvest of the living
resource is assumed to be costless. And secondly, utility is derived only from consumption
and not from the resource or the quality of the environment in general.
6 This is comparable to the value of depletion, based on resource rentals, that appears in Hartwick (1990) and Chapter
7.
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Production is characterized by the production function F = F(K,L,R), where R is the quantity
of resource harvested, and emissions (as in Models 1-3) are related to the level of production
and abatement expenditures a, so that e = e(F,a). The resource stock S is augmented by
natural growth g(S) and diminished by harvesting and the amount of damage resulting from
pollution emissions w, such that,
w = w(S, e), w3 >0 and w >0.
This formulation implies that acid emissions cause direct damage only, and have no cumulative
effect. This is obviously another simplification.
The model therefore becomes,
maxU(C)edt subject to:
F—C—a
S=—R—w+g.
Here C, a, and R are the control variables. The current value Hamiltonian for this problem is,
H=U+y1(F—C—a)+y2(—R—w+g).
As in previous models, the efficiency condition on consumption implies that = U(.
Optimality also requires, assuming marginal abatement costs b —1/ ea,
OH	 Ub
- = 0= —y 1
 - r 2w.e0 y 2 =	 , and
w.
OH
-=0=y 1F—y 2 =y 2 =UcFR.
These expressions imply the interdependence of abatement costs, marginal emission damages
and resource rents, so that 1 = b / w1 . This interdependence arises from having three control
variables but only two state variables, K and S, in the model. Assuming a linear homogeneous
utility function U = UC, the measure of economic welfare is,
MEW C+.t—F(R+w—g)
= C^k---(R+w—g).
we
(8.10)
Note that these expressions can be considered to be a measure of net national product, since
there are no terms representing household welfare. The first is similar to that of Hartwick
(1990) - when living resources are exploited, net national product is adjusted by deducting
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resource harvest and dieback and adding resource growth, all valued at the resource rental
rate. The second expression shares with Model 3 a mildly counter-intuitive result: other things
being equal, the greater the marginal damage associated with emissions, the smaller is the
adjustment (associated in this case with resource harvest, dieback and growth) to national
pro duct.
Model 6: household defensive expenditures.
This model explores the situation where households make expenditures that directly affect the
benefits obtained from the environment. We assume, therefore, that rather than deriving utility
from environmental services B directly, utility is obtained via some benefit ftinction Cl), that is
in turn a function of environmental services and household expenditures that enhance benefits
from the environment (or, equivalently, that can compensate for decreases in flows of
environmental services - e.g., as suggested earlier, purchasing a water filter to purify drinking
water that is declining in quality). The model is otherwise very similar to Model 2 for a
pollutant with cumulative effects.
We therefore have U= U(C,Cl), U0 >O, dl) = cl)('B,h), cI)B>O, and	 > 0 forhousehold
defensive expenditures h. As in the first models, emissions are given by e = e(F, a). For state
variables K and X (the stock of pollutant) and control variables C, a, and h, therefore, the
optimal control program is:
max f'U(C,cl))edt subject to:
K=F—C—a—h
X=e.
The current value Hamiltonian for the optimal control program is:
H=U+y,(F—C—a—h)^2e.
The first order conditions for the optimum yield y, = Uc = U l),,. At the optimum we
therefore have the following constraint,
1 =
l)h Uc'
where 1 / ci,,, is the marginal defensive cost. Note that this means that the price of
environmental benefits just equals the marginal defensive cost, which is to be expected for a
utility-maximizing consume?. Sufficient conditions for a maximum are U <0, so there is
declining marginal utility of environmental benefits, and Cl <0, which implies increasing
1 This is obviously related to the notion of using avertive expenditures to value environmental benefits as described in
Smith (1991).
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marginal defensive costs. As in Model 2, r2 = — Ub. As a result, the measure of economic
welfare is:
MEW= C+iC—be+---.	 (8.11)
Where households can compensate for changing environmental service flows, therefore,
economic welfare is measured as consumption plus investment, less the value of pollution
emissions (where pollution is priced at the marginal abatement cost), plus the value of
environmental benefits to households (where benefits are priced at the marginal defensive
cost). The term CI) / ' h is conceptually similar to pBB, the value of environmental services,
that appears in the other models.
This result requires careftil interpretation. The measure of economic welfare can also be
written as,
MEW=GNP—a—h—be+--.	 (8.12)
Because &, <0, i.e., increasing marginal defensive costs, is part of the sufficient condition
for a maximum, we can conclude that the welfare measure includes a value larger than
household defensive expenditures h.
This should be compared with Mäler's (1991) interpretation of household defensive
expenditures, which is basically that they should not be deducted in arriving at a 'green'
welfare measure. Rather than deducting defensive expenditures, this model suggests that the
welfare measure should include some value greater than defensive expenditures. In addition,
the model says that abatement expenditures and emissions valued at their marginal cost of
abatement (or, equivalently, the value of an optimal emissions tax) should be deducted from
GNP in arriving at welfare.
Dynamics
The optimal control problems presented above also require a set of dynamic first order
conditions in order to achieve an optimum. Further insight into the welfare measures derived
can be gained by examining these conditions.
Since productive capital is the only stock in the Model 1 without abatement, the dynamic
optimality condition is simple to derive as,
OH
Ti =Ti _E=rr1 Ti =j—=r—Fx.
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If we assume that the utility function is additively separable, so that U(C, B) = U1 (C) + U2(B),
then we can derive a variant on the Ramsey (1928) rule by defining,
= _!!4Q.0
This is the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption. The dynamic optimality condition
then reduces to the Ramsey rule,
r+ii(C)=F.
The second version of Model 1 has two stocks, productive capital and abatement capital. The
optimality condition for productive capital is as just derived. However, since U = aU8/b, this
can also be written as,
---=r—F
UB b
so that the dynamics of the marginal utility of environmental services and marginal abatement
costs are linked.
For abatement capital the dynamic first order condition is,
oh
72T72_ OK =rr2+aUBeK,
so that .- = r + beK and therefore,
r ^ ri(C) =—be =-.
These two variants on the Ramsey rule therefore imply that the ratio of the marginal emission
reduction associated with a unit of abatement capital to the marginal emission reduction
associated with a unit of current abatement expenditures must equal the marginal product of
capital,
eK4 -
A
Next we consider a generalization of Model 2, the stock pollutant. Here we assume that
environmental services B are a productive input, so that F = F(KL,B). The Hamiltonian
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remains the same as in Model 2, as do the values of the co-state variables: 	 = U and
72 = —Ub. The first dynamic condition is,
OH
I=rrI--=rr —T1F—T2e.F.OK
This implies that,
.c.. = r - (i - be,)F.	 (8.13)
Here beF is the effective rate of pollution tax on output - for the model to be feasible this
must be less than 1. If we assume that the utility ftinction is additively separable, so that
U(C,B) = U1 (C) + (12 (B), then expression (8.13) produces,
r +
	
= (i - be,)F.	 (8.14)
Other things being equal, therefore, the pollution externality reduces the consumption rate of
interest when compared with the standard Ramsey rule (as derived in Model 1 above) -
growth in consumption is slower and capital is, in effect, less productive. This fits with
intuition. The result follows in the absence of pollution abatement as well, with the marginal
social cost a replacing the marginal abatement cost b.
The second and third dynamic efficiency conditions for this model are derived as follows:
OH
72 =ry2—=ry2—(—/3UB—yII3A+ylbpeFFB+ylbdX),
so that, for p8 UB / U,
= ((1—be,.)Fx +d1 +/3eFFB)b—/3(FB -I-PB).	 (8.15)
This expression defines the time path for the optimal marginal abatement costs. Since the
marginal abatement cost must be positive for the model to be feasible, its rate of change of
varies positively with the net marginal product of capital, the marginal dissipation rate of the
pollution stock, and a term relating to the feedback of environmental services on emissions
(this term, ,CeFF, must less than 1 in order for production to be feasible); the rate of change
varies negatively with the sum of the marginal valuation of environmental services by
producers and consumers5.
'This suggests that environmental services have the character of public goods in this model.
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When environmental services are not productive the time path of marginal abatement costs is
given by setting the terms in F3 in expression (8.15) to 0; if it is assumed that the pollution
stock does not dissipate (the cumulative pollutant version of Model 2), then setting the term in
d1 to 0 in addition yields the optimal time path.
If current pollution emissions impair the dissipation of the pollutant stock (Model 3), it is
straightforward to show that under the assumptions employed above the Ramsey rule
becomes,
r+,(C)=1_lbdeFJFK.
This yields the mildly surprising result that, other things being equal, the larger is J. (the
marginal impairment of dissipation from emissions e), the higher is the growth rate of
consumption. This can be disentangled to some extent by examining the second dynamic
efficiency condition. Derivations similar to those above yield,
- 1—do
72	 b	 U'
so that,
+ d 
=	 b e.)Fx ^ d1 1 d, I3PB•b 1—do .. 1—do
This says that the time paths of marginal abatement costs and the marginal impairment of
dissipation are linked.
In Model 4, the CO2 problem, because emissions are linked to resource use rather than the
level of production, the regular Ramsey rule applies. The time path that the unit carbon tax
follows is governed by,
1 = (Fk +dX)b — J3pB.
The new element of this model concerns the behaviour of resource rents net of carbon taxes.
If we define n FR - JR - b eR, then the earlier first order conditions for this problem imply
that the co-state variable of the resource stock is given by y, = Uc n. The dynamic efficiency
condition for this variable is,
-(un) 
=+=r
Uc fl Uc fl
which in turn implies that,
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=Fx.
This is an extended Hotelling rule: the percentage rate of change of resource rental rates less
the pollution tax rate must equal the marginal product of capital.
In Model 5, the acid rain problem, the standard Ramsey rule again applies, iii this case because
there is no state variable corresponding to environmental services. Howevei, another variant
on the Hotelling rule results,
= + ws 
- 
g•
Here the rate of change of resource rents is increased by the marginal product Qf capital and
stock effects on resource dieback (we), and decreased by stock effects on resource growth.
Finally, the model of household defensive expenditures (Model 6) yields the modified Ramsey
rule of expression (8.14), because emissions affect the flow of environmental services and are
again a function of the level of production. The time path of marginal abatement costs is given
by,
=(l_beF)Fkb_a.!P_.
Here the term	 /	 plays the same role, that of a unit value for environmental services as
valued by households, that the termp 8 plays in the previous models.
This analysis leads to several general conclusions. First, in models where the rate of change of
environmental services is linked to pollution emissions, which are in turn linked to the level of
production, the rate of growth of consumption is lowered as a result of the pollution
externality, and the capital stock is, in effect, less productive. Second, in models with marginal
abatement costs or unit emission taxes, the rate of change of these abatement costs is generally
increased by the marginal product of capital and the marginal rate of dissipation of the
pollution stock, and decreased by the price consumers would be willing to pay for
environmental services. Third, if environmental services are productive then these effects only
show up in the dynamic equation for the rate of change of marginal abatement costs. Finally,
for models involving natural resources, pollution externalities affect the time path of resource
rents, yielding a modified Hotelling rule.
Conclusions
The analysis in this chapter has considered models where explicit current and capital
expenditures are made to abate pollution. In the real world, of course, many capital
investments jointly increase productivity and reduce the uncontrolled level of poflution
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emissions. Under these circumstances the notion of 'marginal cost of abatement' is not well
defined, but it is still possible to measure the marginal social costs of pollution emissions.
Introducing external trade in the composite good into the models has no major effect on the
results. Gomez-Lobo in Gomez-Lobo et al. (1993) shows that when there are exports and
imports of the produced good, a term of the form IA must be added to the derived welfare
measure, where i is a fixed international interest rate and A the net accumulation of foreign
assets resulting from external trade. Of course this assumes a small open economy, so that the
interest rate can be taken as given, and it does not deal with imports and exports of pollutants.
It should be obvious that these separate models could be combined to represent the more
realistic assumption of multiple pollutants and multiple control effort. Each pollutant would
have its own emissions function (including abatement, where appropriate), separate
accumulation of stock pollutant, with its own dissipation function, and distinct environmental
service flow that is associated with the level of emission (in the case of flow pollutants) or the
level of the pollutant stock. Alternatively, a single environmental service flow could be the
result of taking a weighted combination of the separate emissions and dissipation of the
various pollutants. Living resources, fossil fuels, and other exhaustible resources could be
added as well, including the effects of acid rain and CO2, as long as the cross-effects are
accounted for in the analysis (e.g., the reduction in the level of natural resource rents resulting
from pollution emissions associated with production).
The following is a brief summary of the model results, concentrating on the versions of the
models with abatement expenditures. In each model the starting point in measuring welfare is
GNP less abatement expenditures.
Model 1. For flow pollutants, deduct emissions valued at the marginal cost of abatement, and
add the level of environmental services that would flow from a pristine environment, valued at
consumers' marginal willingness to pay.
Model 2. For the cumulative pollutant, rather than adding the value of the service flow from a
pristine environment, add instead the value of the current level of environmental services. For
a stock pollutant that dissipates, in addition to the preceding adjustments you must add the
dissipation of the pollutant stock, valued at the marginal cost of abatement.
Model 3. When current emissions impair the dissipation of the pollution stock, the net
accumulation of pollutant is deducted valued at the marginal cost of abatement divided by one
plus the marginal rate of impairment of dissipation. This apparent attenuation of the deduction
for net pollutant accumulation is clarified by the analysis of the model dynamics, in which it is
shown that the time paths of marginal abatement costs and marginal impairment rates are
linked.
Model 4. For the CO2 problem, in addition to the adjustments in Model 2, you must subtract
the value of net fossil fuel rents - price minus marginal cost of extraction less the value of an
optimal carbon tax.
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Model 5. The acid rain problem yields the standard adjustment for living resources: from GNP
less abatement expenditures subtract net resource depletion (harvest minus growth) valued at
the resource rental rate. However, the resource rental rate must be equal to the marginal cost
of abatement divided by the marginal dieback rate for the living resource.
Model 6. For household defensive expenditures, the result is formally the same as for the
cumulative pollutant of Model 2, except that the flow of environmental services valued at
marginal willingness to pay is replaced by the flow of environmental benefits (i.e., service
levels as affected by defensive expenditures) valued at the marginal defensive cost. Assuming
increasing marginal defensive costs, this term is in fact greater than the level of household
defensive expenditures.
A key aspect of these results is that in each case some valuation of the level of environmental
services features in the measure of economic welfare. This is in contrast to most of the
traditional literature reviewed Chapter 6, with the exception of Peskin (1989). It therefore
needs to be asked whether, in adjusting national accounts for environmental effects, it makes
sense to deduct the value of current damage to the environment if you have not first added the
value of the flow of environmental services. For calculations of residuals, such as a 'green'
net savings rate (referred to as 'genuine' savings in Hamilton (1994)) this would not be a
problem. The result for household defensive expenditures is also at variance with the
traditional literature.
This chapter has presented a series of theoretical models. Since national accounting is a
practical exercise, built upon measurement and estimation as well as a core of theory, it is fair
to ask what practical consequences these results might have for 'green' national accounting.
One set of practical questions revolves around measurability, in particular how we should
measure the flow of environmental services. The appropriate measure of the services provided
by clean air, for instance, is not obvious. But one proxy might be to look at air quality indices
and to measure the willingness of consumers to pay for marginal changes in these indices.
Where such indices have been reported for a long period of time and consumers have
developed a sense of what subjective environmental quality they associate with given index
levels, this might be a practical approach. Alternatively, there is by now a substantial literature
on how to measure willingness to pay for environmental amenities (see, for instance, Cropper
and Oates (1992) for a review), including travel cost methods, hedonic pricing and contingent
valuation, that could be used in environmental national accounting. Much of this literature is
concerned with valuing individual sites or environmental assets, however - how to add up
across the myriad environmental assets within a country in a consistent, non-duplicating
manner is an unanswered question.
The models point to the need to value pollution emissions and the regeneration of the
environment (through dissipation of pollution stocks) at the marginal abatement cost or the
marginal social cost. Measuring pollution emissions is in principle a straightforward matter.
Measuring regeneration is more problematic - it might be necessary to handle this using
models of the physical processes involved. It would also be difficult to measure marginal, as
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opposed to average, abatement costs in the current period, but measuring marginal social costs
is increasingly viable - see, for instance, CECItJS (1993).
Measurement problems abound, therefore. There is the overriding fact that the models all
restrict the economy to be on the optimal path. But the models presented suggest the way to
think clearly and consistently about how conventional national accounts can be extended to
account for the welfare effects of environmental change.
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9. National Wealth and Sustainable Income
As noted in previous chapters, economic notions of sustainability have been with us for some
time, most obviously in the Hicksian definition of income. An important strand of
environmental and resource economics seeks to broaden the notion of sustainable
development to include changes in the natural environment. The traditional admonition to
'maintain capital intact' has been extended to maintaining the value of total capital, both
produced and natural, constant - see Pearce et aL (1989). Interest in the policy prescriptions
required to achieve sustainable development has led to a natural concern with the
measurements our statistical systems provide, and whether these systems, notably the System
of National Accounts (SNA), can indicate whether we are on a sustainable path.
Much of the recent work in this domain has been concerned with adjustments to GNP or
NNP, as suggested in the papers in Ahmad et al. (1989) and Lutz (1993). This work and some
of the outstanding issues are reviewed briefly in Chapter 6. There has been a parallel
development of theoretical approaches to the measurement of national product, work that
started with Weitzman (1976) and has been extended into the environmental domain by
Hartwick (1990), MAler (1991) and Hamilton (1994). Working within this theoretical domain,
Asheim (1994) and Pezzey (1994) have raised questions about whether current flow measures
can indicate whether an economy is on a sustainable path.
Since concerns about sustainability are primarily concerns about future flows of well-being,
this suggests that a fruitful line of inquiry would be to look at the measurement problem from
the point of view of total wealth rather than current income. This was the motivation in
Hamilton (1994) for the proposal that total wealth per capita would be a superior measure of
sustainability. Suggestions to expand the measure of national wealth to include natural
resources go back at least to Scott (1956). The latest revision to the SNA (United Nations
1993a) standardizes the inclusion of commercial natural resources in the balance sheet
accounts but does not prescribe adjustments to national income to reflect resource depletion.
This chapter aims to develop a theoretical approach to the measurement of national wealth,
where the notion of wealth is suitably expanded to include both natural resources and
environmental pollution. This provides the basis for the definition of an extended notion of net
national product, and proof of the critical role that measuring 'genuine savings' plays in
policies to achieve sustainable development. It is also shown under what conditions 'greener'
measures of net national product can serve as indicators to guide policies for optimal growth.
Modeling National Wealth
We assume a simple closed economy with a single resource producing a composite good that
may be consumed, invested or used to abate pollution, so that F(K,R) = C + K + a, where R
is resource use and a is pollution abatement expenditures. This defines GNP in our economy.
Labour is fixed and is therefore factored out of the production function.
Pollution emissions are a function of production and abatement, e = e(F,a), and pollutants
accumulate in a stock M such that A( = e - d(M), where d is the quantity of natural
dissipation of the pollution stock. The flow of environmental services B is negatively related to
(9.2)
(9.3)
(9.4)
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the size of the pollution stock, so that B = q(M), q <0. Resource stocks S grow by an
amount g and are depleted by extraction R, so that S = —R + g(S), and resources are assumed
to be costless to produce. The utility of consumers is assumed to be a function of consumption
and environmental services, U = U(C,B).
The stocks for a candidate measure of national wealth are clearly K, M, and S. The issue is the
choice of prices for each stock. Because wealth is inherently a measure of the potential for
income in the future, the obvious prices are the shadow prices of these stocks in a programme
to maximize the present value of welfare (utility) - the classic utilitarian maximand. To
calculate these prices we assume that there is a fixed pure rate of time preference r.
The maximization problem is therefore,
maxU(C,B)edt subject to:
K=F-C-a
M=e-d
S=-R+g
and the Hamiltonian function, which is maximized at each point in time, is given by,
H= U+TKK+TBB+TSS,	 (9.1)
where y is the shadow price of capital, in utils, YB the shadow price of environmental
services, and y is the shadow price of the resource. The first order conditions for
maximizing the Hamiltonian, setting the partial derivatives with respect to the control variables
C, a, and R to 0, yield the following:
OH 
=0=Uc -rK =1•
011 
=O=rx +rMc	 y=-Ub for b--.1
a
OH 
=0=YFR+yMe,FR-yS	 yS=UC(l—beF)FR.
OR
Because the optimization problem is expressed in terms of maximizing utility, these prices are
measured in utils. These prices can be transformed into consumption units by dividing through
by the marginal utility of consumption U in each of these expressions - this will always give
the correct relative prices for the stocks in each time period, but the scaling factor U will
vary over time.
Note that b is the marginal cost of pollution abatement. It was shown in Chapter 8 that this is
precisely equal to the marginal social costs of pollution emissions, and that this in turn is equal
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to the level of a tax - the Pigovian tax required to maximize welfare - on emissions. These
equalities hold because the economy is at the optimum.
The term be, is the effective tax rate on production. Therefore, although we have started
with an optimal control problem, the prices that result are those that would prevail in a
competitive economy with a Pigovian tax on pollution. In such a competitive economy the
measure of national wealth (NW) is,
NW=K— bM+(1— be,)FRS.	 (9.5)
There are at least two striking aspects to this expression. First, the correct treatment of the
pollutant is as a liability in the national balance sheet - the stock of pollution is valued at the
marginal social cost of a unit of pollutant. Secondly, although resources are fundamentally
valued at their rental rate (as other papers, e.g. Hartwick 1990, suggest), the unit rent is
attenuated to reflect the disbeneflts associated pollution emissions - resources are therefore
not as valuable as they might seem at first glance, because of pollution byproducts.
The link between this wealth measure and sustainable development is provided by defining the
change in real wealth (dW) to be:
dWEIC—bAf+(1—be,)FRS=K—b(e—d)—(1—  be,)F(R—g).	 (9.6)
This is not equal to the rate of change of national wealth, which would include capital gains
terms involving the rates of change of the various prices.
As will be shown below, if the prices satisfy the efficiency conditions for the optimal
programme then dWhas two key properties:
(P1) ifdW= Oat a point in time, then U= 0 at that time if and only if dW= 0;
(P2) if dW< 0 for all time, then eventually U <0.
The first property holds for a given point in time. Asheim (1994) and Pezzey (1994) show that
dW> 0 at a point in time is not a sufficient condition for sustainable development.' If the
change in real wealth is equal to 0 over all future time, then utility will be constant; this is an
extension of the Hartwick rule, implicit in the results of Dixit, Hammond and Hoel (1980).
The second property says that persistent declines in real wealth are not sustainable.
For the problem of maximizing the present value of utility, U is the shadow price of capital
(as well as consumption). The optimality condition is,
nc = TYr -
	 (9.7)
'Asheim and Pezzey both examine the important sub-case of an exhaustible resource and no pollution
emissions.
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This is the Ramsey rule: the social rate of return on investment (on the left-hand side) must be
equal to the interest rate, which is the net rate of return on capital allowing for the effects of
pollution, (1— be,.)F1 . More germane to the problem at hand are the efficiency conditions on
the other prices, derived as follows:
OH	 [(i - beF )F;] 
- (i - be,)F - gs,	 (9.8)OS	 (1—be4FR -
	
OH	 U8
	
YM = --	 b=(i_ be4Fk +d,.jb+ q_.	 (9.9)U
Expression (9.8) is an extended Hotelling rule: efficient resource pricing requires that the
percentage rate of change in net resource rents be equal to the interest rate less the marginal
effects of stock size on growth. Expression (9.9) is essentially the same as that derived in Ulph
and Ulph (1994).
The proof of property (P1) is as follows. First, denote environmental depletion, the rate of
change of in the real value of the total stock of natural assets, as N, so that,
N—(l—be,)F+bAf.	 (9.10)
Given that = -P + gS, S = è - dM)vI and be = beFF - a, substituting from expressions
(9.8) and (9.9) yields:
g = .(_(i - beF)F + bJtf)
=
= —(1— be,)F4(1— be)FS _E]+( - bdM)A[+ be,F—a
= —(1— be,)FR [(1 - be,)F - P1^ b[i_ be)F + .]Af+ be,E -a.
Since F = FKK + FRE and dW=0, this yields,
= F8)? —(1— be,)F8 (1 - beF)F, + b[(1 - beF)FK ^ L.LlA1 + beFF,1C - ab uj
=
=F+q—M—a
=C++q!!.
Therefore,
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C=N—K—qJ--M.	 (9.11)
The expression —qU3 / U is the price that a utility-maximizing consumer would be willing
to pay for a unit reduction in the pollution stock. The rate of change of consumption is
therefore this price times the rate of change of the pollution stock (which may be rising or
falling depending on whether the pollution stock was above or below the efficient level at the
outset of the programme) plus the difference between the rates of change of depletion and
investment.
The rate of change of utility is derived as follows:
u=uCc+uBB=uc (c+qMj M).	 (9.12)
Since dW = - N, property (P1) is proved. Again, it should be emphasized that this property
holds at a given point in time. Only policies that ensure that changes in real wealth are zero at
each point in time will ensure sustainable development (i.e., constant utility).
Property (P2), that persistent decreases in real wealth is sufficient for a negative rate of change
of utility, was proven by Pezzey (1994) for the case of an exhaustible resource with no
pollution. For the current problem, assume that
iC=_(1—be,)F+MI—e,for e,>O,
so that the change in real wealth is negative at each point in time. Then derivations along the
lines of the proof of property (P1) yield the result that,
U=Uc(.!_(1_beF)FK).	 (9.13)
Therefore, if ± <(1— beF)FX, so that the percentage rate of change of the decline in real
wealth is less than the interest rate (the marginal product of capital net of pollution emissions
taxes), then utility will be declining.
If I = (1— be,)F at each point in time then expression (9.13) appears to imply that utility
will be constant. However, the proof of property (P1) implies that utility can only be constant
if the change in real wealth is zero at each point in time (this is just the Hartwick rule). This
equality is therefore infeasible. The reason for this infeasibility is that lower levels of
investment entail both lower emissions, and therefore lower emission taxes, and higher
marginal product of capital. This implies that it is impossible for the percentage rate of change
of the decline in real wealth to converge to the interest rate from below, which implies that a
growth rate that is everywhere greater than the interest rate is also infeasible.
96
Property (P2) is therefore proved. While substituting consumption for investment in the short
run can lead to increasing utility, in the long run persistent negative changes in real wealth
must lead to decreasing utility.
Expression (9.13) also yields a useftil interpretation of property (P1): assume that dW = 0 at a
point in time but that dW = —e for constant e (here e can be either positive or negative). Then
expression (9.13) implies that utility is not constant at that instant. Zero change in real wealth
is therefore a necessary condition for utility to be instantaneously constant.
The next question of interest is whether the rate of change of national wealth is zero along a
constant utility path - are constant wealth and constant utility the same thing? Since dW = 0 at
each point in time is both necessary and sufficient for constant utility (this is generalized in
Dixit, Hammond and Hoe! 1980 and Hamilton 1995), we can take the derivative of expression
(9.5) for national wealth and substitute the expression for constant real wealth to yield,
NW=K—K— bM+((1—be,)F)S.
Suppose for the moment that national wealth is constant. This would imply that,
K=K+bM— . ((1—be,)13jS.	 (9.14)
If we turn to the rate of change of consumption, substituting expressions (9.14) and that for
zero change in real wealth successively yields,
C =F-K-a
=F+(i- beF)FRS — b)f+ bM_((1_ beF)FR)S—â
We know that utility is constant if and only if C = -q	 -A(. But this expression will only
hold in general if there is a term consisting of bM in the expression for the rate of change of
consumption. Assuming expression (9.14) has therefore led to a contradiction, and we
conclude that national wealth is generally not constant along a sustainable (constant utility)
path.
Net National Product
Having elucidated the relationship between total national wealth, the change m real wealth and
sustainable development, the next step is to draw conclusions about the measurement of net
national product (NNP). The natural definition of NNP is that it is the sum of(i) any
production that is not invested or spent on abatement and (ii) the change in real national
wealth. The logic of this definition follows from the previous section: if the change in real
wealth is positive, then the maximum amount that can be consumed and still have utility be
instantaneously constant is the sum of current consumption and the increment in real wealth; if
the change in real wealth is negative then current consumption would have to be reduced and
the residual invested in order to yield constant utility. Algebraically we have,
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iVNP=(F—IC--a)+dW
= GNP—a—b!(+(1—be,)FRS
= C^IC_b(e_d)_(1_be4F,(R—g).
The second of these expressions echoes one in Chapter 8: abatement expenditures are
essentially intermediate and should be deducted from GNP in aniving at an NNP figure. The
third expression yields further insights: dissipation of pollution stocks and growth of natural
resources are both productive and their value should be included in the measure of NNP; the
value of pollution emissions and resource depletion should both be deducted from NNP. This
measure of net national product corresponds to that developed, using a different approach, by
Pemberton etal. (1995).
There is also insight to be gained by extending this measure to include the level of
environmental service flows as valued by consumers (an extended notion of consumption) to
yield what is called the 'measure of economic welfare' (MEW) in Chapter 8:
MEW=C+iC_b(e_d)_(l_be)FR(R—g)+-B.	 (9.15)
This expression for welfare provides a link back to the literature deriving national income
measures from the Hamiltonian of an optimal control problem (see Weitzman 1976 and the
other articles referred to in the Introduction). The Hamiltonian function for the current
problem is:
H=U^UK_Ub(e_d)_U(1—be)FR(R—g).
Expression (9.15), the measure of economic welfare, can be derived from the Hamiltonian by:
(i) multiplying each flow by its shadow price in utils (so that, in particular, the shadow price of
environmental services is U3 ); and (ii) converting to consumption units by dividing each term
in the expression by the marginal utility of consumption U.
Thus there is a well-defined series of steps linking the Hamiltonian to the welfare measure in
consumption units and, by dropping the term measuring consumers' valuation of
environmental services, net national product. This is important because, by the Maximum
Principle, we know that the Hamiltonian is what a social planner would choose to maximize at
each point in time in order to maximize the present value of utility.
Taking this perspective, an interesting question is the extent to which changes in NNP or
MEW are good indicators of the direction of change in the Hamiltonian. Chapter 6 answered
this question in the affirmative for the case of an economy with an exhaustible resource and no
environmental externalities. Algebra very similar to that used in the proof ofproperty (P1) for
the change in real wealth yields the following results:
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H=rUdW;
NNP=(1— be,)FKdW—qM.f)if;
MEW= (1— be,)FW^*()B.
NNP, while having the relevance noted earlier in the context of sustainability, is less exact as
an indicator of the effectiveness of policies designed to keep the economy on the optimal path,
since, generally speaking, decreases in the pollution stock (M < 0) will lead to increases in
real wealth (dW> 0). For the measure of economic welfare, if the price consumers are willing
to pay for a unit of environmental service is constant (or at least constant along the optimal
path), then the direction of change ofMEWwill be the same as the Hamiltonian.
The economy modeled here can be simplified in many ways. If there is no living resource then
any terms in g above drop out. If pollution does not dissipate naturally then tenns in d and its
derivative disappear. If pollution externalities are ignored then, in addition to the
disappearance of the obvious terms, the effect of the Pigovian tax as expressed in the term
(1— be,) also disappears.
It is worth noting that the change in real wealth, dW is equal to what Hamilton (1994) and
World Bank (1995) refer to as 'genuine saving.' The model employed here assumes no
depreciation of produced assets or foreign trade, so that dWis equal to net savings less the
value of depletion of natural resources and the value of net increments to the pollution stock.
Finally, it is important to note that although NNP measures the maximum amount that could
be consumed at a point in time and still have utility be instantaneously constant, it does not
measure the maximum level of consumption attainable if the economy were actually on a
sustainable path, i.e., if the change in real wealth were zero at each point in time. The intuition
behind this is that the constant utility path is uniquely determined by the initial stocks of
capital, resources and pollution (and, in the case of a living resource, by the nature of the
growth curve). Although prices will follow the same trajectories as on the optimal (present
value of utility maximizing) path, their initial levels and the initial quantities of resource
extraction and pollution emission will in general be different than on the optimal path. A policy
choice to achieve sustainability by setting the change in real wealth to zero in all future years
will generally involve a jump, either upwards or downward, in the measured level of NNP 2. It
is for this reason that we have consistently referred to NNP rather than 'sustainable national
product' or 'sustainable national income.'
Conclusions
A strong conclusion from this model is that sustainable development, at least in the limited
form of constant utility, is not synonymous with constant national wealth, even when the
notion of wealth is expanded to include natural resources and stocks of pollution. This should
not be surprising, considering that there are both price effects associated with the efficient
2 This point is brought out neatly by Pezzey and Withagen (1994) for the case of exhaustible resources and no
pollution emissions.
99
price paths for resources and pollution and quantity effects corresponding to the growth and
diminution of the various stocks - produced assets, natural resources, and pollution.
The model does offer concrete guidance for compilers of national balance sheet accounts by
suggesting, first, that when there is a pollution externality the value of natural resources in the
balance sheet should be reduced by the effective emission tax rate on output and, secondly,
that stocks of pollutants should appear as liabilities in the accounts, valued at their marginal
social costs. Hamilton and Atkinson (1995) discuss how to measure these shadow prices when
the economy is not at the optimum.
The key measure resulting from this analysis is clearly dW the change in real wealth or
'genuine saving', measured as the changes in the three stocks valued at their current shadow
prices. This is linked to the question of sustainable development in the following sense: dW
being instantaneously zero is a necessary condition for utility to be instantaneously constant. It
needs to be asked, however, how useflul a guide to sustainability an NNP measured on this
basis would be, given that it does not measure what the maximum level of consumption would
be on a constant utility path. It can be questioned how usefl.il a guide to an optimal growth
policy such a measure would be as well, given the results for the rate of change of NNP along
the optimal path. The measure of economic welfare (MEW), which adds the value of
environmental services to NNP, is a useful guide to optimal growth policies under moderately
restrictive assumptions.
What is a useful indicator for sustainability policy is the measure of genuine saving. Persistent
negative changes in real wealth were shown above to lead to eventual declines in utility. The
welfare interpretation of this result is clear: genuine savings provide a one-sided measure of
sustainability. This is the crucial link between green national accounting and sustainable
development.
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Part 3
Measuring Sustainable Development
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10. Valuing Air Pollution in the National Accounts1
Attempts to develop 'green' national accounting aggregates fall into two distinct classes: those
valuing depletion of natural resources and those valuing degradation of the environment. The
strides that have been made in adjusting the accounts to reflect resource depletion2 are
beginning to have an effect on the policy debate concerning the sustainability of development
(see, for instance, World Bank (1995)). Given the dependence of developing economies on
natural resources, the greatest impact from valuing resource depletion will be felt there.
Valuing pollution emissions in the accounts will be important both for developed countries and
the most rapidly urbanizing and industrializing developing countries. This study presents a
theoretical approach to the treatment of pollution and pollution abatement in the national
accounts, and a first attempt to apply this approach for the countries of OECD Europe. The
empirical results are presented in the context of savings rules (Pearce and Atkinson 1993)
designed to measure whether economies are on a path of sustainable economic development.
Placing a dollar value on emissions has proven to be the most difficult and contentious aspect
of greening the national accounts. A number of issues can be identified: (i) should the value of
environmental services be added to national income (Peskin 1989)? (ii) should the value of
damages to the environment be subtracted from national income (Peskin 1989) or added
(Harrison 1989)? and (iii) should all defensive expenditures, in the form of abatement and
protection costs, be subtracted from national income (Juster 1973; Leipert 1989)? Theoretical
papers by Mäler (1991) and Chapter 8 of this study answer the final question in the negative
where household defensive expenditures are concerned.
Beyond the structural aspects of what should be added to or subtracted from national income
to reflect pollution emissions, there are difficult questions concerning the valuation of
pollution emissions. The UN guidelines for the System of Integrated Environmental and
Economic Accounts (SEEA; United Nations 1993b) favour maintenance costs as the basis for
valuing environmental degradation - this implies a valuation of the cost of returning the
environment to its state at the beginning of the accounting period. Hueting and Bosch (1990)
set a more ambitious goal: to value the cost of achieving environmental goals that are
consistent with the sustainable use of the environment and natural resources.
Environmental degradation can take many forms, with complex causes. In this paper we wish
to concentrate on the narrower question of treating pollution emissions within the national
accounts. To do this we develop a theoretical model extending those of Hartwick (1993) and
Chapter 8. The results of this model are then applied to valuing air pollution in a number of
European OECD countries.
Modeling Multiple Pollutants with Cumulative Effects
In the spirit of the models developed in Chapter 8, we construct an optimal control model of
an economy where the object is to maximize the present value of utility. Utility is assumed to
'Much of this material is published inHaxnilton and Atkinson (1995).
2 Papers by El Seraf' (1989), Hartwick (1990, 1993), Hartwick and Hageman (1993), Hamilton (1994), and Hill and
Harrison (1994) have largely settled both the theoretical approach and the practicalities of adjusting national accounts
for the discovesy, depletion and groh of commercial natural resources.
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be a function of both consumption and the services provided by the environment. The solution
to the optimal control problem is characterized by the Hamiltonian function, involving both
utility and the rate of change of the state variables of the system that are affected by the path
of evolution of the economy.
Weitzman (1976) showed that the Hamiltonian function of a simple economy without
environmental externalities is equal to GNP, i.e., consumption plus investment. Because the
Hamiltonian is maximized at each point in time along the optimal path, this means that GNP is
what a planner would choose to maximize if the goal was to maximize the present value of
utility. As we will see below, a transformation of the Hamiltonian when environmental
externalities are present consists of a GNP adjusted to reflect the effects of these externalities.
Thus a seemingly abstruse problem in optimal control yields both a satisf'ing welfare
interpretation of GNP and a consistent way to think about the welfare effects of environmental
change. While the model is expressed formally as an optimal control problem, the results are
equivalent to those attained in a competitive equilibrium with an environmental externality -
factors are priced at their marginal product and Pigovian taxes are required to achieve an
optimum.
We assume an economy that is closed to trade, with fixed technology and where the discount
rate for utility r (i.e., the pure rate of time preference) is fixed. Gross national product is given
by a production function F(KL), where K denotes the capital stock and L the input of labour.
Labour supply is assumed to be unconstrained in the model. GNP may either be consumed or
invested, so that,
F=C+K,
where C denotes consumption.
The extension of the model of a cumulative pollutant presented in Chapter 8 to multiple
pollutants is straightforward if two key simplifications are made: that there are no cross-effects
on welfare associated with the interaction of several different pollutants, and that there are no
cross-effects on emission reductions associated with different abatement expenditures (the
model can encompass these things without difficulty, but at the cost of expositional clarity).
We therefore assume that there are N distinct pollutants, generated by N emission/abatement
functions e,(F,a3. Each pollutant diminishes an individual flow of environmental services
according to the equations,
= e, and B, = B0, - a,M
This is not as unrealistic as it might seem: particulates degrade lung function, photochemical
smog reduces visibility, and so on. So there are at least some instances in which distinct
environmental services are affected by individual pollutants.
The optimal control model is now,
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max JU(C,B,...,BN)e"dt subject to:
K=F–C–a,
M1 =e,.
The current value Hamiltonian is given by,
where again the r, are the shadow prices. The first-order conditions for a maximum are,
Oil
-- 
=0=	
- =. To =
OH
rg =-J'
U
If we define b, _-LJ as the marginal abatement cost for pollutant i and p —i-, then
0a1	 U
the measure of economic welfare at shadow prices with a consumption numeraire is,
1W=C+K–b1e,+pB1 .	 (10.1)
This fits nicely with intuition: economic welfare in the multiple pollutant case consists of
consumption plus investment, minus the sum of pollution emissions valued at their marginal
abatement costs (or marginal social costs), plus the sum of environmental services valued at
consumers' willingness to pay.
As in the model of a single cumulative pollutant developed in Chapter 8, the marginal cost of
abatement of each pollutant equals its marginal social cost.
Measurement
Having derived a theoretically correct approach to measuring economic welfare, it is important
to consider how these expressions for economic welfare might actually be measured. This
breaks down into two sets of questions: (i) how to measure the value of the level of
environmental services; and (ii) whether to use marginal social costs or marginal abatement
costs as the basis of valuing pollution emissions. Note that the latter question only makes
sense away from the optimum, since it was shown above that the two valuations must be equal
at the optimum.
$IBA
104
To the extent that environmental services can be discretely compartmentalized as in the
preceding model, then the standard methods of measuring willingness to pay in environmental
economics apply (e.g., hedonic pricing, household production functions, contingent valuation).
However, it should be noted that willingness to pay will likely vary from location to location
within a country, thereby complicating the measurement problem considerably. The biggest
problem is one of aggregation: how to aggregate across the myriad services provided by the
environment, for the whole population of a country, without under- or over-counting.
Turning to the valuation of the costs of pollution, the question of measurement away from the
optimum is an interesting one, given that most real economies would not be expected to be
operating at the environmental optimum. Figure 10.1 provides a way to think about this issue.
c	 *	 d	 Emission reduction
Figure 10.1 Marginal Costs
This is the canonical diagram used to derive the notion of optimal pollution. In this figure the
horizontal axis refers to reductions in pollution emissions. 'MCA' is the curve for marginal
cost of abatement. 'MSC' is the marginal social cost curve, which is equal to the marginal
benefit of abatement (MBA). The optimal emission reduction occurs at level '*', while level
'c' represents over-polluting and 'd' under-polluting.
If we assume that the current state of the economy is one of over-polluting, then marginal
social costs at level 'a' will provide an upper bound on the value of optimal pollution
emissions; if the current state is one of under-polluting then marginal social costs at level 'b'
will provide a lower bound on the optimal emission value. As long as one is reasonably certain
that the economy is over-polluting, therefore, using marginal social costs to value emissions
should be viewed as an upper limit estimate and interpreted accordingly in the results of the
green accounting exercise. This implies in addition that the deduction for pollution emissions
in the welfare measure will decrease as the optimum is approached, which is a desirable
property.
Figure 10.1 also makes it clear that using marginal abatement costs to value emissions will not
lead to an unequivocal direction of bias in the estimates of the value of pollution. lithe
economy is over-polluting then marginal abatement costs will be below the optimum, while
105
emissions are above their optimal level; the opposite applies to an economy that is under-
polluting.
As shown in the empirical part of this study, data on the marginal social costs of air pollution
emissions, based on willingness to pay concepts, are increasingly available for developed
economies, as are data on the levels of air pollution emissions. One of the challenges for
practitioners will be to adapt these marginal social cost figures for use in developing countries,
or better, to begin to measure willingness to pay for pollution reductions in these countries3.
Data on marginal abatement costs are generally not collected, but models embodying the
appropriate technological and economic information to estimate marginal costs are becoming
available.
Savings Rules and Sustainable Development
Hamilton (1994) argues that 'green GNP' per se is not particularly useftul for policy
applications, even though it is important to know the true level of income in an economy.
What does have much greater policy salience is the rate of genuine saving, i.e., net savings
adjusted for environmental degradation. While Asheim (1994) and Pezzey (1994) have pointed
out that a positive genuine savings rate at any given point in time does not necessarily indicate
that an economy is on a sustainable path, it can be shown that persistent negative saving
behaviour is not sustainable.
In the context of our model of a cumulative pollutant, the development path that yields
constant utility over all time can be shown to be characterized by an extended Hartwick rule
(after Hartwick 1977; see Chapter 4 as well). This can be stated as follows:
If (i) K = be, so that net investment equals the value of pollution emissions,
and (ii) = (1— be,)Fb - aUB / U defines the time path for abatement expenditures,
then	 U =0, i.e., utility is constant.
This result follows from the proof in Chapter 9. Along the constant utility path we can say
that,
(10.2)
so that consumption is increasing. The intuition behind this is clear: because environmental
services are continually declining as a result of pollution emissions in this model, consumption
must compensate for this decline.
The key point in all of this is to note that if K < be everywhere along the development path,
so that genuine saving is negative, then utility must decline along this path, as was shown in
3 There is a growing literature, reviewed in CSERGE/UNC Chapel Hill (1994), on measuring willingness topsy for
forest functions, ecotourism, sanitation, water supply and land degradation in developing countries, but the studies
valuing the social costs of pollution per se are still quite rare.
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Chapter 9. An economy with negative genuine saving is not sustainable. In the empirical
section that follows, therefore, we will be looking for evidence of genuine savings rates that
are persistently negative or near zero as an indicator of marginal or non-sustainability.
Transboundary Pollution
The models presented have, for the sake of simplicity, ignored geography, but the question of
transboundary pollution is clearly important in the case of air pollution. Without developing a
formal model, the following line of argument is offered.
First, regarding adjustments to income, an extension of the polluter pays principle to the
domain of national accounting seems appropriate. In other words, pollution damage caused in
country B by emissions from country A should appear as a deduction from income in country
A. In practice, this means that the estimates of the unit marginal social costs of pollution in a
given country should include all costs, including those in other nations. These unit marginal
costs should then by multiplied by the total level of emissions in the given country, as given by
expression (10.1).
The argument for this treatment of transboundary pollution in the case of savings rules is, if
anything, even stronger. Some portion of a given country's total savings should, at least
notionally, be set aside in order to compensate the recipients of the pollution emitted and
transferred across international boundaries.
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Empirical Measures of the Value of Air Pollution Emissions
Using the preceding model of multiple pollutants, we wish to estimate the value of air
pollution in Europe caused by carbon dioxide (CO2), sulphur dioxide (SO2), nitrogen oxides
(NOx) and particulate matter (PM10). Data on the physical quantity of emissions of key
pollutants are relatively easy to obtain in developed countries (see OECD 1994). However,
these data alone can tell us little about what is economic, in the sense of optimally balancing
the costs and benefits of pollution abatement. As the model implies, to achieve this we need to
value units of emissions using marginal social costs. Some estimates of the marginal social
costs per tonne emitted are shown in Table 10.1. These are drawn from an evaluation of the
social cost of fijel cycles within Europe (CEC/tJS 1993). The CO2 estimate is from Fankhauser
(1994).
Table 10.1 Marginal Social Costs Per Tonne of Air Pollutant Emitted ($)
CO2	 SO2	 NOx	 PM10
Health
	
1530	 470
	
10350
Forestry	 1760	 1220
Materialsl buildings
	
480	 320
	
320
Climate Change	 7
Total
	
7	 3770	 2010	 10670
Notes: values refer to damage caused by a unit of UK emissions across Europe.
Source: CEC/US (1993), converted to dollars per tonne.
The rows of Table 10.1 are the receptors (i.e., receiving agents). These represent the ultimate
effects of polluting activities on human health (respiratory problems), forestry (forest death),
material and buildings damage (general soiling and corrosion). The corresponding prices
indicate the marginal social cost of a tonne of pollutant vis-à-vis its impact on each receptor4.
Note that the figures refer to damages both inside and outside the polluting country.
Before combining these data with information on emissions, the methodology used in the
CEC/US (1993) study will be described. The first issue is how emissions of pollutants are
traced through to their impacts on receptors, and second, how these impacts are valued. The
estimates in Table 1 are, insofar as is possible, approximations of marginal social costs and not
simply the derivation of average damage costs caused by current emissions. The first point of
discussion relates to the scientific part of CECIUS's work, analysing the incremental emissions
from two hypothetical representative power stations in specific locations in Germany and in
the United Kingdom. Incremental emissions are linked to impacts via dose-response functions.
Although problems with this approach persist (see Pearce and ApSimon 1995), with the aid of
dispersion modelling techniques the transboundary effects of emissions in particular regions
can be accounted for, when combined with data on the relevant population densities and
4 The absence of an ently indicates either no effect or no quantifiable effect
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characteristics in the areas where pollutants are deposited. The result is that the dose-response
function expresses damage to receptors as a function of emissions: e.g., an x°h increase in
emissions of PM10 causes y deaths.
The role of economic valuation techniques is to derive an appropriate value of these impacts,
which can in turn be used to derive per unit social costs. This aspect of the CECItJS study will
be described by receptor. Since the value of human health effects is derived solely with
reference to studies using non-market valuation techniques we discuss this in more detail.
Human health. The basis of estimation for health effects is the value of a statistical life (VSL).
What is estimated is the willingness of individuals to pay to obtain a reduction in the
probability of mortality. For example, if a person is willing to pay $1000 to secure a reduction
in the risk of dying by 1/1000 we would conclude that the VSL in this instance is $1 million,
i.e., the willingness to pay (WTP) multiplied by the change in risk. It should be noted that such
estimates do not attempt to take account of the likely presence of altruistic motives. VSL can
be estimated by any of three main methodologies: (i) contingent valuation; (ii) wage-risk
studies; and (iii) avertive behaviour (see Jones-Lee, 1976 and 1989). The first method asks
individuals to state their WTP using a range of survey techniques, while the latter two
methods infer WTP from actual market behaviour. From an appraisal of available estimates
CECItJS (1993) choose a central estimate of the value of a statistical life of approximately
US$ 3 .2 million (in 1991 prices). For a critique of this approach see Broome (1978).
Morbidity impacts were not valued; it should be borne in mind, however, that these may be
significant (Pearce and Crowards 1995).
Forestry. The most obvious economic damage is forgone timber harvest. In addition, carbon
sequestration services derived from the growing stock of timber are also lost. Both of these
effects are accounted for here. The basis of the assessment of timber losses is the international
timber price. The estimation behind the latter forgone benefit is explained below in the
description of damage caused by emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2).
Materials and buildings damage. Estimation of these effects compares the costs of repair or
replacement of building materials with and without the corrosion or soiling caused by air
pollution emissions. Effects on welfare caused by damage to buildings that form the cultural
heritage of a region are not considered.
Climate Change. Climate change will have an impact on receptors such as human health and
biodiversity. Using an estimate from Fankhauser (1994) we have accounted for global
warming damage in the form of the social costs of carbon dioxide (CO 2) emissions. The
absence of adequate time series data on other greenhouse gases precluded their consideration.
Although the mix of greenhouse gases varies from country to country, as a general rule carbon
dioxide is the most important in terms of its total contribution to global warming.
Strictly speaking, these estimated damages are specific to emissions from the countries doing
the polluting (in the case of Table 10.1, the UK). However, willingness to pay is closely linked
to ability to pay. In order to value social costs in additional European countries, the unit
marginal values in Table 10.1 are scaled across countries using the simple assumption that
marginal valuations depend linearly on differences in income per capita. In reality the
valuations in different countries will also depend on factors such as baseline pollution levels,
the typical pollution content of a country's emissions and the population density in affected
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areas. There is ample scope, therefore, to improve these estimates as new data become
available. In the case of the climate change problem, Fankhauser's estimate refers to the
globalised social costs of CO2 emissions and hence we do not adjust this estimate for different
countries.
In addition, while it would have been possible to adopt other receptor damage estimates
presented in CE/tJS (1993), these would not have been relevant for present purposes. We
are interested in those costs which affect future welfare, i.e., the effects of air pollution
emissions on assets. This is one rationale for excluding damage to crops from the analysis,
since this is a loss of current output and does not directly affect future welfare 5 . Within the
receptors chosen, damages can legitimately refer to either marketed or non-marketed
damages. This is worth stressing because, in the case of damage to marketed assets, it is
extremely unlikely that any account has already been taken for these losses in conventional
estimates of capital consumption allowances.
Using these prices for pollution emissions, we estimate both the value of the loss of
environmental services as a proportion of total output and the measure of genuine saving.
Genuine Saving and Air Pollution Emissions
We wish to extend the concept of 'genuine' saving appearing in Hamilton (1994) to include
the value of pollution emissions, as suggested in the earlier section on 'Savings Rules and
Sustainable Development.' Conventionally defined net savings deducts the value of
depreciation of reproducible capital (dK) from gross saving GS. From this traditional net
saving two further deductions are made: the depletion of commercial natural resources, valued
as the unit resource rent n (net of the level of the effective emission tax rate on output - see
Chapter 9) times the amount of resource extraction R and the degradation of the environment
valued as the unit marginal social cost cr times the amount of pollution emissions e.
Genuine savings are therefore defined as,
Sq =GS-dK-nR- oe.
In the following we express GS as a proportion of gross output (GDP).
The period of analysis is the decade of the 1980's. The values in Table 10.1 are in 1990 prices,
so in order translate these to previous years a deflator is required. Since CECIUS (1993)
present prices in ECUs, the deflator chosen is an index of European Union (EU) GDP
deflators weighted by the ratio of each member's GDP to the EU total. Not surprisingly, this
index is dominated by price changes occurring in France, Germany, Italy and the UK. This
adjustment does not account for a possibility suggested by Figure 10.1 - since countries
typically over-polluted even more in the past, the marginal social costs were likely higher than
the simple deflation of a 1990 price would suggest. As noted previously, these deflated unit
values are scaled by the individual countries' per capita GDP in order to account for differing
ability (and willingness) to pay.
5 llowever, the position may be more complicated if the damage is a result of soil acidification that affects output in
future periods.
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Genuine Saving in the United Kingdom
Savings ratios for the UK are plotted in Figure 10.2 for the period 1980 to 1990. Shown as a
proportion of GDP, these display the successive deductions from gross saving proposed
above, with 'Res. Net Saving' indicating traditional net saving less the value of resource
depletion6.
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Figure 10.2
On this measure the UK appears to have persistently under-saved during much of the 1980s.
In the period 1980 to 1986 genuine savings rates were between -1.6% and -3.1% of GDP.
This is a striking result and shows that, by simply beginning the process of redefining a nation's
savings rates to be net of the depletion of non-renewable resources and the value of air
pollution, inadequate provision to offset asset loss was made during the 1980s in the UK. Of
course, the caveat should be added that these numbers could be refined and that marginal
social costs give an upwardly-biased estimate of the value of pollution emissions.
However, there are recent indications that the marginal social costs of PM 10 emissions could
be in excess of the levels used here (see Pearce and Crowards 1995). These estimates also
exclude the value of water pollution - the physical indications are that UK water quality
declined somewhat during the latter part of the 1980s. Figure 2 also indicates that the gross
savings ratio in the UK is below 20% of GDP for the entire period. This is low relative to the
ratios prevailing in other European countries.
The measure of genuine saving indicates that the UK stopped dissaving towards the end of the
period. Some of this increase is attributable to a reduction in the value of resource depletion
'ROU estimates of the value of resource depletion, using current unit rents, are based on the data reported in Chapter
11.
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which in turn is in large part due to the reduction in world oil prices after 1986. Paradoxically,
this conveys the impression that, other things being equal, a decrease in the price of oil raises
genuine saving. Offsetting this is the fact that the remaining oil reserves are now a less
valuable form of wealth, which could conceivably result in a lower level of future welfare. It
can be shown that the capitalized value of these increased savings exactly equals the decrease
in resource wealth associated with the fall in resource price.
Figure 3 displays in more detail the degree to which the value of air pollution damage has
changed over the period (note that the curves are not cumulative). While damage caused by
NO and CO2 damages are a slightly declining proportion of GD?, PM 10 and SO2 damages fail
more dramatically. In the latter case, these costs decrease from 2.6% of GD? in 1980 to 1.5%
in 1990. This trend is largely attributable to a 23% fall in the quantity of emissions over that
time. In the next section we investigate the extent to which these trends were experienced in
other European countries.
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Figure 10.3
Saving Experience in the rest of OECD Europe
The calculations in this section are based on the crude scaling, from the UK base of Table
10.1, of marginal social costs by per capita income in the countries of OECD Europe. The
earlier caveats about these figures should therefore be recalled.
Table 10.2 shows genuine savings rates for sixteen European countries 7. These rates have
been increasing in most of these countries, although the experience of Norway is one of a fall
between the years 1980 and 1985 and a subsequent increase to 1990. Exceptions to this broad
7 Gross savings rates are taken from World Bank (1993), while depreciation is from United Nations (1992).
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trend are (in addition to Norway) France and Greece, while Finland remains largely
unchanged. Some of the reasons for increasing genuine saving rates are obvious. For those
countries with relatively abundant oil (and gas) resources - the Netherlands, Norway and the
UK - the fall in the oil price in the latter half of the 1980s is a significant factor. The key factor
in most countries, however, was the decline in the value of emissions, as seen in Table 10.3.
Table 10.2 Genuine Saving as percent of GDP in Europe
Country	 1980	 1985	 1990
Austria	 11.4	 8.8	 13.1
Belgium	 7.2	 5.7	 11.9
Luxembourg	 8.4	 10.3	 15.6
Denmark	 4.7	 7.7	 11.5
Finland	 8.4	 7.3	 8.2
France	 11.4	 5.2	 7.9
Germany	 8.1	 7.5	 13.8
Greece	 4.1	 -3.4	 -2.8
Ireland	 -3.3	 6.3	 14.2
Italy	 7.5	 6.8	 7.4
Netherlands	 6.0	 5.4	 13.3
Norway	 13.4	 5.0	 8.5
Portugal	 -4.2	 3.0	 4.4
Spain	 4.8	 3.4	 9.2
Switzerland	 2.5	 7.3	 8.3
UK	 -1.6	 -1.7	 1 4
Table 10.3 expresses the value of air pollution emissions as a proportion of GDP, thus giving
an indication of the size of these losses across OECD Europe. As in the case of the UK, the
picture is one of a declining value of pollution relative to output across the region, owing to
decreasing emissions of air pollutants during the period. In terms of marginal impacts per unit
emitted, Table 10.1 indicated that PM 10 is the most damaging pollutant. However, the
magnitude of the total values of pollution emissions will obviously also depend on the quantity
of each pollutant emitted. In this respect, although not shown in Table 10.3, So 2 is the most
significant pollutant over the period. Emissions of this pollutant fall quite steeply in all
countries between 1980 and 1990 (as is obvious for the UK from Figure 10.3), probably
owing to country commitments with respect to the First Sulphur Protocol.
Returning to the estimates of net saving in Table 10.2, the large negative net savings ratio
indicated for Portugal in 1980 largely reflects the high value of PM 10 emissions relative to
GDP in that year - the return to positive net savings in subsequent periods is owing to the
absence of data for emissions of PM10 in the years 1985 and 1990. (These data are also lacking
for Denmark [1980] and Spain [1980 and 1990].) Table 10.3 shows Portuguese air pollution
damages at some 8.7% of GDP. This seems high, with the probable cause lying in our
adoption of the estimates of marginal social costs based on UK emissions (weighted for
differences in per capita income). We would also expect differences in population densities to
play a significant role in explaining differences in these costs; the population density in the UK
is about double that in Portugal. Furthermore, the dispersion of pollutants is also a key factor.
The consideration of similar additional factors would go some way to correct this apparent
anomaly. Similar comments apply to Ireland and Greece.
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Table 10.3 Air Pollution Damage as percent of GDP in Europe
Country	 1980	 1985	 1990
Austria	 2.7	 1.9	 1.2
Belgium	 3.1	 2.0	 1.8
Luxembourg	 4.1	 3.8	 2.0
Denmark	 3.7	 2.7	 1.8
Finland	 4.6	 2.7	 1.8
France	 3.3	 1.6	 1.3
Germany	 2.5	 2.4	 1.6
Greece	 7.0	 3.7	 2.5
Ireland	 5.9	 4.3	 4.0
Italy	 4.7	 2.6	 2.3
Netherlands	 2.1	 1.6	 1.5
Norway	 2.5	 1.7	 1.5
Portugal	 8.7	 1.9	 1.3
Spain	 5.1	 4.8	 2.0
Switzerland	 4.9	 1.6	 1.0
UK	 4.7	 3.7	 3.0
Greece exhibits negative genuine savings in 1985 and 1990. In contrast, Ireland shows an
apparent increase in genuine savings of 17.5% from 1980 to 1990. This latter finding is largely
due to a transition from a relatively low gross savings ratio of 14% in 1980 to 28% in 1990.
The former West Germany increases its genuine savings rate owing to a large fall in emissions
of SO2 and PM10. While not part of this analysis, it is noteworthy that the former East
Germany emitted PM10 at about three to four times West German levels.
Conclusions
In this chapter we have developed a simple model of green national accounting and then
applied the results to the valuation of pollution emissions in European OECD countries. A
number of strong conclusions follow.
First, the model suggests that attempts to account for pollution result in a welfare measure
rather than green GNP per Se. An important element of this welfare measure, the value that
consumers place on the current level of all non-market services provided by the environment,
presents severe measurement difficulties. Marginal social costs or marginal abatement costs,
rather than maintenance costs, represent the correct price to place on pollution emissions.
Estimates of marginal social costs (based for the most part on the measure required by theory,
the willingness to pay) are increasingly available for developed countries, and the estimates are
becoming more refined.
Second, this treatment of pollution emissions in expanded national accounts fits well with
'savings rules' as policy prescriptions for sustainable development. If net investment in
produced assets is persistently less than the value of pollution emissions then welfare will
decline. The opposite is not necessarily true: positive genuine savings rates at a given point in
time do not provide unequivocal evidence for sustainability.
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The empirical application of the model suggests that the value of air pollution emissions is a
significant percentage of GDP for the countries of OECD Europe. While the use of marginal
social costs to value pollution leads to upward bias in the estimates for recent years (assuming
countries are over-polluting), there is reason to believe that this is offset at least partially in the
estimates for the early 1980's by the higher marginal social costs associated with higher
pollution emissions.
Finally, when these pollution value estimates are combined with the value of resource
depletion, the resulting genuine savings rates are negative for several European OECD
countries and years. This suggests that concerns about the sustainabiity of development
should be taken seriously for developed, as well as developing, countries. The good news is
that pollution emissions are falling. An important question, therefore, is how close these
countries are to the optimum level of pollution.
In terms of next steps there are obvious refinements that can be envisioned, including
expanding the country coverage of data on willingness to pay for pollution reductions. This is
particularly important for developing countries. In many of these countries rapid urbanization,
industrialization and motor vehicle usage is leading to severe pollution problems. Placing a
value on these emissions will help to provide the information and the motivation for
governments to act.
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11. Cross-Country Estimates of Genuine Saving
Given the centrality of savings and investment in economic theory, it is perhaps surprising that
the effects of depleting natural resources and degrading the environment have not, until
recently, been considered in the measurement of national savings. This omission may be
explained both by the tools economists use, which emphasize gross measures, and the fact that
the System of National Accounts (SNA) ignores depletion and degradation of the natural
environment. This is not intended to be excessively critical of the SNA - it measures market
activity very well, which is its intent. It is nonetheless true that the tools economists use tend
to colour or restrict the view of the problems to be faced.
Valuing depletion and degradation within a national accounting framework is an increasingly
viable proposition, both as a result of the significant progress made in the techniques of
valuation of environmental resources (see, for a recent example, Freeman 1994) and as a result
of the expanding foundation that theoretical developments are placing under the methods of
'green' national accounting (Hartwick 1990; Maler 1991; Hamilton 1994). The first
application of these accounting methods to the measurement of net savings appeared in Pearce
and Atkinson (1993) - this study combined published estimates of depletion and degradation
for 20 countries with standard national accounting data to examine true savings behaviour. By
this measure many countries appear to be unsustainable, since their savings rates were less
than the sum of conventional capital depreciation and natural resource depletion.
Enlarging the concept of net saving to include the depletion of natural resources is in many
ways the most natural alteration of traditional savings concepts. This is because the depletion
of a natural resource is, in effect, the liquidation of an asset and so should not appear as a
positive contribution to net national product or, by extension, net savings. While minor
technical issues remain, the methods of valuing the depletion, discovery and growth of
commercial natural resources in the context of the SNA are by now well developed (Hamilton
1994; HIll and Harrison 1994).
More problematic is the valuation of environmental degradation. While TiN guidelines for
environmental accounting (United Nations 1993b) favour valuing this degradation in terms of
maintenance costs (the cost of restoring the environment to its state at the beginning of the
accounting period), the latest theoretical approaches, from Chapters 8 and 10, suggest that the
marginal social costs of pollution are the correct basis for valuing waste emissions to the
environment.
The Savings Rule
To give the flavour of what results from the formal approach to green national accounting, the
following equation adapts the expression for economic welfare from Chapter 9:
MEW= C^I_n(R_g)_cr(e—d)+pBB.
Here C is consumption, I net investment, n the unit resource rental rate less the value of the
implicit pollution tax on production, R resource extraction, g resource growth, o the marginal
social costs of pollution emissions e, the natural dissipation of pollution d, and PB the
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willingness of consumers to pay for environmental services B. For non-living natural resources
the term in g is zero, while d is zero for pollutants with cumulative effects.
The measure of net national product simply drops the last welfare term from this expression.
The intuition behind this is clear: I - n(R - g) - a(e - d) is the value of investment when
changes in natural resource stocks and stocks of pollutants, appropriately shadow priced, are
included in addition to increments to the stock of produced assets.
However, while it is important to know what constitutes the sustainable level of national
income, this measure is not particularly relevant for policy purposes. A shift in the level of
national income does not carry a policy signal with regard to sustainable development, while
the relative growth rates of sustainable income and GNP, for instance, are liable to give
equivocal signals. Given that concerns about sustainable development are fundamentally
concerns about the future, this suggests that adjusted measures of savings and wealth are more
fertile territory for policy purposes.
The expression for genuine saving follows directly from the preceding:
S, =GI1P—C—dK—n(R—g)—o(e—d).
Here GNP - C is gross saving as traditionally defined, with C being the sum of public and
private consumption; gross saving includes the level of foreign saving as well. dTCis the value
of depreciation of produced assets, so that GNP - C - dtCis conventional net saving. The last
two terms represent the value of net depletion of natural resources and net accumulation of
pollutants.
The importance of this measure of genuine saving is that it is a one-sided indicator of
sustainability, in that persistent negative genuine savings are not sustainable, as shown in
Chapter 9. Note that it is possible to have apparently robust gross saving and negative genuine
saving. So while it is easy to calculate gross savings rates from published national accounts
data, this may give little indication of whether the economy is on a sustainable path. This
reinforces the point made earlier that the tools economists use may bias their conclusions with
regard to economic performance.
In what follows we present a set of estimates of the value of resource depletion and
environmental degradation for a range of developing countries, expressed in terms of genuine
savings rates. What is presented is necessarily limited by the available data. The natural
resource estimates span crude oil, the major metallic minerals, phosphate rock and tropical
forests. The only environmental pollutant considered is carbon dioxide, the principal
contributor to the greenhouse effect. While it would be highly desirable to expand the
coverage of other pollutants, data on both the level of pollution emissions and their marginal
social costs are lacking in many developing countries.
Measurement Issues
The problems in the measurement of depletion and degradation of the environment break
down into several distinct pieces: (i) the valuation of resource rents for non-renewable
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resources; (ii) valuing depletion of tropical forests; and (iii) valuing the marginal social costs of
CO2 emissions. These will be described in turn.
The basic approach to calculating resource rents for non-renewable resources is to subtract
country- or region-specific average costs of extraction from the world price for the resource in
question, all expressed in current US dollars. World prices were derived from World Bank
(1993) - where multiple markets, e.g., London and New York, are reported, a simple average
of these market prices serves as the world price. For minerals the levels of resource rents are
thus calculated as:
Rent = World price - mining cost - milling and beneficiation costs
- smelting costs - transport to port
- 'normal' return to capital.
Rents on crude petroleum are calculated as world price minus lifting costs. There are several
things to note about this methodology:
• From a theoretical viewpoint, resource rents should be measured as price minus marginal
cost of extraction (including a normal return to capital). In practice, marginal production
costs are almost never available and practitioners (as evidenced by the 'green national
accounting' literature) fall back on using average extraction costs. This will tend to
overstate calculated resource rents.
• Countries may or may not be selling their natural resources (for internal consumption or
export) at the world market price, although one would expect that they have every
incentive to do so. This methodology therefore can be viewed as shadow pricing of natural
resources.
• Extraction costs are measured at a fixed point in time, 1985 for minerals (Bureau of Mines
1987) and 1990 for crude oil (Dept. of Energy 1994), and held constant over the period
1980-1990. World prices vary overtime, leading to corresponding variations in calculated
rental rates.
• Where the extraction cost data were region- rather than country-specific, the regional cost
structure was applied to all of the producing countries in the region.
• Rents are generally viewed as accruing to the resource owner for the production of the
crude form of the material in question, typically an ore. In practice, most mineral
operations are vertically integrated to a considerable extent and so the only price and cost
data are for refined forms of the materials. Measuring resource rents as described above
for these vertically integrated mineral operations therefore implicitly ascribes any excess
returns to capital for the milling and refining stages to the resource rent.
• In some cases, such as for lateritic nickel deposits, the rental rates are negative for at least
part of the time. This may represent, of course, a situation in which producers actually
managed to decrease average extraction costs in line with price movements, so that rents
'in reality' are not negative, a phenomenon that is masked by the above methodology; it
may also simply be the case that firms continued to operate, in spite of reduced or negative
rates of return on capital, while they were meeting their variable costs and in the
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expectation of improved market conditions. Negative unit rents are set to zero in the
calculations below.
Table 11.1 presents the calculated average rental rates for minerals and crude oil. The
coefficients of variation are high for zinc and nickel. The table also shows which cost
components, subject to data availability, went into the calculation of rental rates. In most (but
not all) cases an explicit rate of return on capital appears as a cost component. Missing cost
components lead, of course, to over-estimates of resource rents.
Table 11.1 Rental rates for minerals and crude oil.
Unweighted poced data, 1980-1990. excludIng negative velues.
	Mean	 Standard Cost components
	
rate	 deviation
Zinc	 0.49	 0.32 Mining, milling, smelting, transport, 15% ROC
Iron ore	 0.56	 0.20 Mining, beneficiation, transport
Phosphate rock	 0.33	 0.14 Mining, milling, transport, 15% ROC
Bauxite	 0.59	 0.18 Mining, milling
Copper	 0.43	 0.16 Mining, milling, smelting, 15% ROC
Tin	 0.30	 0.13 Mining, milling, 15% ROC
Lead	 0.56	 0.27 Mining, milling, smelting, transport, 15% ROC
Nickel	 0.34	 0.23 Mining, refining, smelting
Crude oil
	
0.74	 0.14 Lifting costs
ROC: return on capital.
In line with the theoretical models, the country-specific unit resource rents in each year are
multiplied by the quantities of resource extraction for each of the minerals in Table 11.1, to
arrive at the total value of resource depletion.
For tropical forest resources the situation is much more complicated with regard to the
valuation of depletion. The issue is essentially one of land use, with standing forests being one
use among many for a particular land area. This suggests that the correct way to value
deforestation is to measure the change in land value (which should represent the present value
of the net returns under the chosen land use) - this is essentially the result in Hartwick (1992).
The formal models of the preceding chapter suggest that, where deforestation is not occurring
but harvest exceeds growth, it is the net depletion of the resource that should be valued.
Because there are few data on rates of harvest and natural growth, the estimates presented
below are confined to the valuation of deforestation, based on the latest decadal FAO forestry
assessment (FAO 1993). Since there are virtually no data on the value of forested land before
and after clearance, the deforestation is simply valued as the stunpage value of the volume of
commercial timber on each hectare cleared. Stocking rates (the volume of commercial timber
per hectare) by country are as given in FAO (1993). The stumpage rate is assumed to be 50%
of the market price, a crude assumption but consistent with studies such as Sadoff (1992) and
Repetto et a!. (1989); market prices are from World Bank (1993). Deforestation rates are
linearly interpolated from the decadal estimates of forest cover given in FAO (1993).
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The foregoing description of the valuation of forest depletion suggests that the estimates are
quite rough. It should also be obvious that the only values being calculated are commercial, so
that the values of biodiversity, carbon sequestration and other losses are not captured.
Turning to the value of carbon emissions, the basic emissions data employed are from the
Carbon Dioxide Information and Analysis Center (Marland et aL 1989), covering fossil fuel
combustion and cement manufacture. The global marginal social cost of a metric ton of CO 2 is
assumed to be $20 US in 1990, taken from Fankhauser (1993). Global costs are assigned to
emitting countries as an extension of the 'polluter pays principle' into the domain of
environmental accounting - this seems consistent with the notion of genuine saving, in that the
value of the external costs of emissions imposed on other countries should be, at least
notionally, set aside in a fund to compensate those countries negatively affected.
The formal model of carbon emissions from fossil fuels in Chapter 8 suggests that the value of
an optimal carbon tax should be deducted from fossil fuel rents, to account for the pollution
externality, and that the value of natural dissipation of the carbon stock in the atmosphere
should be deducted from emissions. Given that the carbon tax, based on marginal social costs,
would be less than $5.50 US per metric ton of carbon in fuel, and that the mean residency time
of carbon in the atmosphere is roughly 120 years, these effects have been ignored in the
calculations.
A key missing element in the estimates is any valuation of soil erosion, owing to the lack of
comprehensive data sets on either physical erosion or its value. This is an important gap
considering the importance of agriculture in most developing countries - erosion is considered
to be a major problem in Subsaharan African countries in particular.
Measures of Depletion and Genuine Saving
The basic national accounts data used to arrive at genuine savings rates are as given in the
World Bank's World Tables (World Bank 1994). However, these data do not include the
value of depreciation of produced assets. Accordingly, unofficial World Bank estimates of
depreciation, as calculated from perpetual inventory models, are taken from Nehru and
Dhareshwar (1993). Each of the data sets employed in this chapter, the World Tables data, the
depreciation estimates, and the resource depletion and degradation estimates have various
gaps in their coverage 1. The result is that there are 56 developing countries for which
complete times series of the basic data exist over the period 1980 to 1990.
The first question to be answered is whether the calculation of depletion and degradation adds
substantially to the picture of whether countries are on a sustainable path. This reduces to the
question of whether there are countries whose net savings rates (as conventionally defined,
gross saving minus the value of depreciation of produced assets) are positive but whose
genuine savings rates are negative. This is examined in Figure 11.1.
'Note that resource extraction data in physical quantity are taken from the World Bank's Economic and
Social Data Base (BESD).
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In this figure2 the net saving rate (for developed and developing countries) is scatter-plotted
against the value of depletion (and CO2 emissions) as a percentage of GNP, using average
figures for the period 1986-1990. The line labelled 'Marginal Sustainability' is the 450 line -
countries falling above this line have genuine savings rates that are positive (since genuine
saving is just net saving less the value of depletion and degradation), while those falling below
have negative genuine savings rates. While there are several countries that have negative net
savings rates, and so are unsustainable even by conventional national accounts measures, there
are clearly a considerable number of countries with positive net savings but negative genuine
savings. Measuring genuine saving provides useful new information therefore.
Figures 11.2 and 11.3 summarize the genuine savings rates for countries aggregated into
regions. Note that the calculated regional savings rates are the net savings for the countries in
the sample - they are therefore weighted towards the largest countries (which tend to have the
largest absolute amounts of saving or dissaving) and do not estimate or 'gap-fill' for countries
in the region but not in the sample. The countries in the sample are presented below in Table
11.2.
The first thing to note from these figures is that OECD countries and South Asian countries
had broadly similar rates of genuine saving through the 1980's - in the neighbourhood of 10%
of GNP. To match this, growth in per capita GNP was slightly higher in South Asian countries
over this decade, 3.1% compared with 2.3% in OECD countries (World Bank 1994). So the
savings figures and the growth figures tell a basically consistent story for these groups of
countries.
2 For presentational purposes, a few countries that had net savings rates less than -10% and/or depletion
greater than 40% of GNP have been excluded from this figure.
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G.nuun. Saving Rates by Region
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Figure 11.2 Abbreviations: Middle East and North Africa (MENA). South Asia (SAsia)
Genuine Saving Rates by Region
1-EASa ..... . LAC---SSAI
Figure 11.3 Abbreviations: East Asia (Easia). L.atin America and the Caribbean (LAC), Subsaharan Africa (SSA)
The next point to note is that the countries of the Middle East and North Africa, basically the
oil exporters, were marginal and sometimes substantial dissavers. However, this is a result
both of oil constituting a substantial portion of economic activity in these countries and the
fact that resource rents are not discounted in the calculation of depletion. While the theoretical
122
models suggest that this is the correct valuation of depletion, the results of the models are the
product of optimization, so that unit resource rents are assumed to increase at the rate of
interest (i.e., the Hotelling rule). The effects of relaxing the Hotelling assumption in calculating
the value of crude oil depletion are presented below.
The sampled countries of Latin America and the Caribbean were marginal dissavers during the
years of the debt crisis (1982-1986). This largely reflects a dip in the gross saving rate over
these years, so there is no strong evidence that these countries stripped resource assets in
order to pay off debts (although the linear interpolation of the deforestation estimates would
mask this effect in the case of forest depletion). From 1987 onwards there is a marked
improvement in savings behaviour.
The most striking contrast in genuine saving rates is between East Asia and Subsaharan Africa,
a contrast that is also vividly reflected in growth rates in per capita GNP. East Asia was
consistently the strongest region in terms of any measure of saving: gross, net or genuine.
Subsaharan Africa shows a near-steady decline in genuine saving over the course of the
decade. The steep drop in genuine saving from 1980 to 1981 reflects Nigeria's transition from
a sizable positive to sizable negative current account balance. The composition of savings and
investment in these two regions is shown in Figures 11.4 and 11.5.
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Figure 11.4
In these charts the difference between gross investment and gross saving rates is the ratio of
net foreign borrowing (NFB) to GNP. If net borrowing is positive then, obviously, gross
investment is greater than gross saving.
In East Asia the declining ratio of depletion (and degradation - recall that this includes the
value CO2 emissions) to GNP is mirrored by an increase in the share of depreciation of
produced assets in GNP. The latter reflects the effects of industrialization. The faffing ratio for
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depletion reflects a near-constant total value of depletion. This may, again, be an artefact of
the linear interpolation of deforestation, an important component of depletion for this region.
There is little doubt, however, that the growth in industrial (and service) output in this region
is leading to a decline in the relative importance of natural resources.
nv.atm.nt ad Saving in Subsaharan Africa
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As noted above, there was a steep drop in all savings rates in Subsaharan Africa from 1980 to
1981, reflecting the dominance of Nigeria in the regional aggregate. Net  foreign borrowing
was significant in the early 1980's. From a net savings perspective, the sampled countries in
this region were unsustainable from 1986 to 1989. The effect of including depletion in the
genuine savings measure is to sharply accentuate this effect, and to show that the region was
not on a sustainable path right through the decade3.
The 'bottom line' in these two figures is clear: there was strong growth in genuine saving in
East Asia over the 1980's, while there was strong growth in dissaving in Subsaharan Africa.
The Subsaharan African Experience
The results for Subsaharan Africa (SSA) are so striking that they merit a closer examination.
Country-level estimates of genuine savings rates for the 1980's are given the Appendix to this
chapter, in Table Al 1.1.
In a paper reviewing the literature on long term development and growth in SSA, Ndulu and
Elbadawi (1994) cite a number of broad conclusions: (i) SSA has grown more slowly than
other developing countries since the mid-1970's; (ii) lower savings rates and levels of human
Regional aggregates are a convenient way to summarize the behaviour of countries that are, to a degree,
similar in their endowments. It is up to individual countries, however, to design and implement policies for the
achievement of sustainable development.
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capital have helped prevent it from catching up with other developing countries; (iii) the policy
climate in SSA has not been conducive to sustained growth, characterized as it has been by
disincentives to save, over-valued and variable exchange rates, high public consumption, and
under-developed financial systems; and (iv) the economies of SSA have been subject to
elevated levels of external shocks, both economic and physical (in the form of drought and
other severe weather patterns), and political instability.
The pattern presented in Table Al 1.1 appears to be 'the curse of the mineral-rich' (cf. Geib
1988). Countries such as Kenya, Rwanda, Burundi and Niger, with relatively few exports of
oil and minerals, have the most promising saving performance. On the other hand, resource-
rich Zimbabwe exhibited positive genuine savings. As noted earlier, the figures for Nigeria
(and the Congo) are probably skewed by the substantial size of the deposits of crude oil.
Zambia is the other anomalously large dissaver - while these effects may again be overstated
for technical reasons having to do with the valuation of resource depletion, it is also true that
the economic policy climate was particularly unfavourable in Zambia for many years.
The sorts of issues raised by GeIb (1988) about the nature and effects of oil windfalls in
developing countries are particularly relevant in dealing with this question. Without sound
policies, both macroeconomic and with regard to economic development, and prudent
allocation of public resources, the effects of reliance upon large resource endowments can be
negative for many countries.
It would of course be incorrect to conclude from Table All. 1 that mineral wealth is
necessarily a curse. Growth theory tells us that a windfall increment in wealth leads to a
permanent increase in sustainable income (see Weitzman 1976). However, growth theory
assumes that resources are efficiently priced and that an optimal extraction programme will be
combined with an optimal investment strategy. Good policy, therefore, turns resource wealth
into sustained increases in income.
The striking result from accounting for resource depletion is the extent of dissaving in most
Sub-Saharan Afi-ican countries. The traditional macroeconomic data and indicators for SSA
countries have been uniformly disappointing for two decades, with decline and stagnation
being the general picture that results. What a bit of 'green' accounting tells us is that the
situation with regard to future well-being is worse than we thought. Not only has SSA
performed badly by conventional measures, it is clear that the wealth inherent in the resource
stocks of these countries is simply being liquidated and dissipated. Not only have the trends in
current indicators been downward, but total wealth, especially on a per-capita basis, has been
declining as well.
User Cost vs. Net Price
As noted above, there is a potentially important divergence between theory and practice in the
valuation of resource depletion. Because the models of the preceding chapter require an
efficient time path for resource rents (the Hotelling rule), the change in the present value of a
resource deposit as a result of current production - i.e., the user cost - is precisely equal to the
value of rents on this production - i.e., resource depletion valued at its 'net price', the market
price less the (marginal) cost of extraction (see Repetto etaL 1989). If efficient resource
pricing is not assumed then some non-zero rate of discount should be used in valuing
depletion; the formula for the user cost (UC) of resource extraction becomes:
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where n is the unit resource rent (the net price), Q is the quantity of resource extracted, i is the
rate of discount and Nis the reserve life4.
This distinction between net price and user cost methods is not just of theoretical interest: for
countries with very long-lived deposits, even small discount rates will yield user costs that are
much smaller than current rents. Since it is the user cost that must be re-invested in order to
maintain a constant value of capital, this has important consequences for countries' incentives
to consume or invest resource rents. Examples of these effects are shown in Table 11.2 for
some of the oil producers appearing in this chapter.
Table 11.2 Selected Oil Producers:
Depletion adjusted for reserve life, 3% discount rate, 1990
	Avg. production	 Reserves	 RIP	 Depletion:	 Depletion:	 Ratio
	
1980-90	 mmt	 ratio	 Net Price	 User Cost	 UC/NP
mmt
Algeria	 48.6	 1800	 37	 6051	 2024	 33%
Congo	 5.9	 110	 19	 6051	 3478	 57%
Indonesia	 70.2	 726	 10	 6051	 4458	 74%
Iran	 110.9	 12700	 115	 17617	 596	 3%
Mexico	 130.3	 6079	 47	 13451	 3388	 25%
Nigeria	 74.9	 2400	 32	 9861	 3825	 39%
U. Arab Emirates	 72.5	 1300	 18	 11668	 6868	 59%
United Kingdom	 104.0	 535	 5	 5727	 4919	 86%
Venezuela	 100.2	 8604	 86	 11142	 881	 8%
Abbreviations: Reserves/Production (RIP) ratio, User Cost (UC), Net Price (NP)
For this 3% rate of discount the difference between current rents and the user cost is small for
R/P ratios (Nin the above formula) less than 10 years. For very large resource endowments,
however, such as for Iran and Venezuela in the above table, the user cost of resource
extraction is almost negligible.
The choice of discount rate is clearly key in this calculation. While a range of discount rates is
possible, growth theory suggests that the social rate of return on investment (SRR1) (or
consumption rate of interest, as it is sometimes called) is the fundamental discount rate. It is
the maximum amount of extra consumption made possible by foregoing a unit of consumption
in the current period, and is expressed by the following formula5:
SRRI=r+i7—.
C
Note that we have shifted to discrete time, rather than continuous time as in the previous chapter, for this
fonnula. The formula is an adaptation of one in El Serafy (1989) and, as in that paper, implicitly assumes that
the product of n and Q is constant over the life of the resource deposit.
This is, of course, the Ramsey rule, derived in Chapter 3.
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Here r is the pure rate of time preference (or rate of impatience, the rate at which future utility
is discounted), i the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption, and CI C the
percentage rate of growth in per capita consumption. The social rate of return on investment is
thus the sum of the rate of impatience and the rate of decline in the marginal utility of
consumption associated with an extra unit of consumption. Estimates of the various
components of this formula for the UK, reported in Pearce and Ulph (1995), show r to lie
between 0 and 1.7%, and i to lie between 0.7 and 1.5. With a long-run growth rate in per
capita consumption of 1.3%, Pearce and Ulph estimate a 'best' value of the SRRJ of 2.4% for
the UK, and a likely range of 2-4%. The 3% figure used in Table 11.2 is solidly within this
range.
Another important consideration in the choice of discount rate for valuing the user cost of
resource depletion is the thct that the optimal growth path of an economy with an exhaustble
resource is not sustainable if the rate of impatience r is positive (as shown in Chapter 2) - that
is, any positive rate of discounting of utility leads to an optimal path along which utility
eventually declines. If sustainability is a goal, this argues for low rates of discounting.
The practical consequence of these calculations is that there is at least some argument for
adjusting the value of depletion to reflect the size of the resource deposits. This would have
obvious consequences for most of the oil-producing states and countries such as Guyana (with
its bauxite) that have long-lived mineral deposits.
Such divergences between theory and practice represent difficult issues for the practitioner.
Given the lack of empirical evidence for efficient resource rents (see, for instance, Adelman
1990), a low rate of discount in the calculation of resource rents may be preferable to the net
price based calculations presented above. However, the choice of discount rate and the
uncertainty of the size of resource deposits (to say nothing about varying resource grades -
Chapter 7) present new difficulties in practical measurement.
The empirical estimates of this chapter are best viewed, therefore, as a rapid assessment of
where the combination of resource depletion and deficient saving may be a significant policy
concern.
Human Capital and Genuine Saving
The basic notion behind 'genuine' saving is to measure the change in value of the underlying
assets (and liabilities, in the case of stocks of pollutants) upon which welfare depends. The
basic contribution of the recent work on environmental accounting, upon which the foregoing
estimates depend, has been to establish the proper measurement of natural assets. It is natural,
therefore, to consider what other assets could be brought into this framework, and it is
obvious that human capital is the missing element. This is the motivation in Hamilton (1994)
for including current expenditures on education in the genuine savings measure.
It may be argued that this is superfluous, given that the returns to human capital are already
measured implicitly in GNP. This misses the point, however. The goal of the genuine savings
measure is to make explicit the true level of output that is not consumed and is therefore
available to provide welfare in the future.
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One problem with the standard national accounts from the human capital perspective is that,
while capital expenditures on education (for buildings and equipment for instance) are treated
as investment, current expenditures, both public and private, are not. From the viewpoint of
the creation of human capital it seems clear that these current expenditures should also be
considered to be investment.
The question of valuing human capital is complex. The literature on this topic (see, for
instance, Jorgenson and Fraumeni 1992) has typically been concerned with valuing the returns
to human effort beyond those provided by unskilled labour, and so questions of the
measurement of the output of the education sector have predominated. This can be simplified
in the context of measures of genuine saving by considering the goal just stipulated, to
measure the true level of unconsumed output. From this standpoint it is sufficient to include
current expenditures on education E as an addition to genuine saving, so that the expression
for genuine saving becomes,
S =GNP_C_dJC_n(R_g)_cr(e—d)+E.
International data on educational expenditures are fragmentary, presumably owing to the
problem of consolidating expenditures by different levels of government. There is also some
risk of double-counting because expenditures data typically do not distinguish between current
and capital expenditures. Because of this poor coverage, a complete set of genuine savings
measures adjusted for education expenditures will not be presented here. As an example of the
difference this could make, Figure 11.6 presents the adjusted savings rates for Chile from 1980
to 19906.
Savings Rates in Chile
Adjusted for Education Expenditures
6 The data are from the World Bank's Economic and Social Database (BESD).
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This figure requires careful interpretation. The curve for Gross saving measures the ratio of
traditional gross saving to GNP. The 'Adj.Gross' curve adds the share of educational
expenditures to the Gross measure. The 'Adj.Net' curve then subtracts the depreciation of
produced assets share from the adjusted gross curve. Finally, the Genuine saving curve
subtracts the share of depletion of resources and the social costs of carbon emissions from the
adjusted net curve.
The effect of including educational expenditures in the genuine saving measure is therefore to
improve the picture of saving in each country - in the case of Chile, this amounts to a little less
than 5% of GNP, and in most countries it would fall between 2% and 8% of national product.
As was noted when savings measures were introduced above, however, the effectiveness of
these expenditures in fostering economic growth will vary widely. For many developing
countries investments in primary education will pay higher dividends than those in higher-
profile sectors such as universities.
Conclusions
We have argued that the most policy-relevant measure of progress towards sustainable
development is the level of genuine savings. As the next chapter will show, the concomitant
range of policy issues is wide-ranging, as befits a concept as all-embracing as sustainable
development.
Given the complexity of the real world, as opposed to the models we lend to use as
economists, it is often difficult to say what is the optimal savings rate for a given country. And
all the caveats about the efficiency and effectiveness of investment bear repeating. That said, it
remains true that savings rules provide useful one-sided tests of sustainability, in the sense that
persistent negative genuine savings must lead to eventual declines in welfare.
The omissions in this empirical analysis are many: soils, gold, diamonds, natural gas, and
pollution, to name a few. Notwithstanding these omissions, the empirical evidence is that
genuine levels of saving are negative in a wide range of developing countries when the
environment and natural resources are included in the savings measure. Negative genuine
saving is more than a theoretical possibility, therefore, and the evidence is that many countries
are being progressively impoverished as a result of poor government policies.
As countries develop we have seen an increasing tendency towards urbanization and the
development of problem levels of pollution in these urban areas. The extension of this
empirical work into the realm of air and water pollution will be increasingly important. There
is some evidence from panel data7 that there is an 'environmental Kuznets curve,' that
historically there has been a rise and fall in pollution levels as per capita income has increased.
However, there is absolutely no evidence that this was the optimal development path, in the
sense that good policies could have increased overall welfare by 'flattening' the Kuznets
curve. Valuing pollution emissions and including them in measures of genuine saving will have
an important role to play in ensuring that past policy mistakes are not repeated.
' See, for instance, Shafik (1994) and Seldon and Song (1994).
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Appendix to Chapter 11
This table presents the country-level estimates of genuine saving rates over the decade of the
1980's.
Table A11.1 Genuine Saving Rates by Country
Average
1980-85	 1986	 1987	 1988	 1989	 1990
East Asia
China	 11.9%	 12.1%	 11.5%	 12.1%	 15.2%	 17.0%
Indonesia	 -2.3%	 -6.0%	 -0.7%	 1.8%	 8.1%	 3.4%
South Korea	 18.6%	 25.2%	 32.1%	 38.8%	 34.6%	 32.7%
Malaysia	 6.7%	 -1.1%	 13.0%	 13.6%	 11.1%	 11.5%
P. New Guinea	 -7.9%	 -4.7%	 -10.9%	 -4.0%	 -9.3%	 -0.2%
Philippines	 9.7%	 5.6%	 3.5%	 5.6%	 7.0%	 6.2%
Thailand	 11.6%	 13.6%	 15.8%	 19.7%	 21.8%	 23.7%
Latin America and the Caribbean
Argentina	 2.5%
Belize	 9.6%
Bolivia	 -46.2%
Brazil	 4.4%
Chile	 -2.9%
Colombia	 2.1%
Costa Rica	 4.9%
Dominican	 8.6%
Republic
Ecuador	 -14.8%
Guatemala	 0.7%
Guyana	 -26.1%
Haiti	 1.9%
Honduras	 -4.8%
Jamaica	 -22.4%
Mexico	 -1.1%
Panama	 13.2%
Paraguay	 5.5%
Peru	 -1.1%
Suriname	 -2.7%
Trinidad and	 -9.7%
Tobago
Venezuela	 -13.9%
Middle East and North Africa
Algeria	 0.4%
Egypt	 -11.1%
Iran	 -3.9%
Morocco	 4.5%
Oman	 -24.7%
Syria	 0.2%
Tunisia	 0.4%
U. Arab Emirates	 3.6%
South Asia
Bangladesh	 1.1%	 0.3%	 2.8%
	
2.8%
	
1.5%
	
1.7%
India	 7.4%	 8.3%	 9.5%
	
9.7%
	
8.8%
	
9.8%
Pakistan	 7.7%	 6.3%	 8.1%
	
6.1%
	
6.3%
	
5.2%
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Table A11.1 Genuine Saving Rates by Country
Average
1980-85	 1986	 1987	 1988	 1989	 1990
Sub-Saharan Africa
Burundi	 -2.9%	 -1.5%	 3.4%	 -1.4%	 4.8%	 1.3%
Cameroon	 6.1%	 -3.2%	 -0.5%	 -4.3%	 -9.4%	 -10.2%
Congo	 -28.5%	 -68.7%	 -36.2%	 -51.0%	 -41.6%	 -44.9%
Cote d'lvoire	 -5.8%	 -9.7%	 -13.7%	 -12.9%	 -16.8%	 -20.8%
Ethiopia	 3.0%	 7.8%	 6.4%	 7.4%	 2.6%	 1.4%
Ghana	 -12.4%	 -3.9%	 -3.3%	 -2.3%	 -2.2%	 -4.7%
Kenya	 4.6%	 6.9%	 4.5%	 6.1%	 3.1%	 3.3%
Madagascar	 -13.3%	 -14.3%	 -19.0%	 -19.0%	 -17.3%	 -20.2%
Mali	 -8.9%	 -4.6%	 1.4%	 1.3%	 2.2%	 3.8%
Mauritania	 -13.3%	 -17.7%	 -9.5%	 -2.9%	 -8.3%	 -7.7%
Niger	 2.4%	 4.6%	 -5.3%	 6.0%	 -3.5%	 -5.7%
Nigeria	 -12.8%	 -23.8%	 -31.3%	 -38.0%	 -41.2%	 -28.7%
Rwanda	 7.7%	 8.3%	 5.3%	 5.1%	 4.2%	 4.1%
Senegal	 -12.4%	 -7.1%	 -2.8%	 -0.5%	 -1.6%	 3.0%
Sierra Leone	 -1.5%	 -6.8%	 -10.7%	 -7.6%	 -9.1%	 -10.4%
Zambia	 -36.6%	 -70.4%	 -84.5%	 -96.3%	 -65.8%	 -65.1%
Zimbabwe	 1.8%	 3.6%	 3.7%	 9.7%	 5.5%	 4.4%
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12. The Policy Implications of Green National Accounting
Governments are increasingly concerned with the extent to which the current path of
economic development, including the exploitation of the natural environment, affects the
potential for the future welfare of their country. Moreover, governments have been charged
with considering and promoting the sustainabiity of development, in response both to the
Brundtland Commission and to the United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development's Agenda 21.
The variety of forms that resource and environmental accounting can take, as outlined in the
United Nations' (1993b) SEEA, leads to a range of potential policy applications. These can
range from sectoral concerns (e.g., the measurement of productivity in the extractive sectors),
to broader questions of the relationship between pollution emissions, economic activity and
the design of efficient policies to reduce emissions. As was argued in the introduction,
however, there is a fundamental question that green accounting must be able to answer: are
development and growth sustainable? The policy implications follow from the answer to this
question.
Many would argue that obtaining measures of Hicksian or sustainable income is intrinsically
important. However, this is not the same thing as saying that green measures of income have
policy relevance with regard to sustainable development.
Part of the problem is that producing a new figure for the level of national income does not
readily translate into a policy signal about the sustainability of development. The fact that a
green national income series is, say, 10% lower than the traditional measure does not, in itself
tell you what policy prescriptions should follow, particularly since green income is necessarily
lower than the standard income measure where exhaustible resources and pollution emissions
are concerned. Most finance (or treasury) departments and development planners use rates of
change to indicate where the economy is going and whether it is responding to policy stimuli.
Whether the growth rate of green national income can provide a useful policy signal is open to
question. For example, if we imagine a country with a fixed growth rate of standard gross
domestic product' and no depreciation of produced assets, then for the growth rate of green
national income it follows that: (i) if the value of resource and environmental depletion is
constant each year, green national income will grow faster than GDP; and (ii) if the value of
resource and environmental depletion is a constant proportion of GDP, the growth rate of
green national income is necessarily the same as that of GDP. So a comparison of the growth
rates in the two income measures does not automatically translate into a message about
sustainability.
Green NNP measures potentially sustainable income. It does not in itself answer the question
of whether the rate of saving is sufficient to maintain this income indefinitely. There is the
additional difficulty, discussed in Chapter 9, that green NNP represents the amount that could
be consumed while leaving the rate of change of utility instantaneously constant. As a
1 The national accounting identity implies that income equals expenditure equals product, so it is common to refer to
GDP rather loosely as 'income'. We have followed this convention here, but it should be noted that the strict
definition of National Income in the accounts is as a net concept, GDP plus net factor flows from abroad, less
depreciation of produced assets, all valued at factor cost
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sustainability indicator, therefore, green NNP is unsatisfactory because it typically does not
measure the amount that could be consumed if the economy were actually on a constant-utility
path.
One of the key conlusions from Chapter 9 is that genuine savings is a one-sided indicator of
sustainability, in the sense that persistent negative genuine savings must lead to declines in
utility. If genuine savings is a superior sustainable development indicator, what policy
implications follow from its measurement? To answer this question we will concentrate on the
situation of developing countries because, on the empirical evidence, this is where issues of
sustainability are most urgent.
The standard model of economic development2 is a so-called 'two-gap' model: developing
countries typically have a savings-investment gap, with investment exceeding savings, that is
matched by an export-import gap, with imports exceeding exports. The role of development
lending and grants as provided bilaterally and by agencies such as the World Bank has been to
finance levels of investment that exceed the limited savings of developing countries.
At the heart of this model is a concern with gross levels of saving and investment, since it is
the gap between the gross levels that must be financed. The effect of calculating genuine
savings levels for developing countries is therefore not to deflect attention from this
fundamental issue in development finance, but rather to give a new focus to the question of
how much net wealth is being created and, critically, how domestic savings levels compare to
the depreciation, depletion and degradation of a country's assets.
As Hamilton and O'Connor (1994) point out, Figures 11.4 and 11.5 can be interpreted in
terms of how investment is financed. Starting with gross investment in East Asia in, say, 1981
as a benchmark, we see that the 29% of GNP that was invested was financed by a small
amount of foreign borrowing, by a larger depreciation allowance, by a still larger depletion
allowance (including, as argued previously, the amount that should be set aside to compensate
other countries for East Asia's contribution to global warming damages), and by a substantial
amount of genuine savings, nearly 11% of GNP. By analogy with a private firm, the
depreciation and depletion allowances represent funds that a firm that wished to be sustainable
would set against the erosion of its capital base. Thinldng of the development problem in this
manner clarifies exactly in what sense genuine savings are 'genuine.'
An important determinant of genuine savings rates for developing countries is the value of
resource depletion. However, it would be wrong to conclude that the policy response
regarding savings and natural resources is to boost genuine savings by restricting resource
exploitation - this is clearly incorrect since it ignores the lessons from growth theory alluded to
earlier, that the discovery of a natural resource, properly managed, leads to a permanent
increase in the sustainable stream of income for a country. The question with regard to natural
resources is therefore one of what constitutes 'proper management.' Part of this concerns the
investment of resource rents and is therefore an element of the broader question of saving
discussed below. But an important policy concern is the achievement of efficient levels of
resource exploitation.
2 The standard example is the World Bank's RMS]M model.
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The basic components of natural resources policy, royalty regimes and tenurial arrangements,
are therefore relevant to the genuine savings issue. If government royalties on natural
resources are set too high, then this will be a significant disincentive to resource exploitation,
with less than optimal extraction/harvest rates; if royalties are set too low then natural
resource firms will have an incentive to over-exploit resources in order to capture rents. With
regard to tenure and property rights, the issues are well-known: open access to a resource
such as a fishery where property rights are not established will lead to over-exploitation,
generally leading to the requirement for second-best policies regarding restrictions on
exploitation effort; similarly, resource leases that are too short will lead to over-exploitation
because extracting firms will either have an incentive to exhaust more quickly than the efficient
level, in the case of an exhaustible resource, or will lack an incentive to manage a resource for
its efficient sustainable yield in the case of forest resources.
Consideration of environmental depletion within the genuine saving framework also casts a
somewhat different light on resource exports. When a natural resource is sold at the border
price in international markets, the full value of this sale shows up in the conventionally
measured national income of the exporting country. However, a part of this income is in fact
the liquidation of an asset, as measured by the value of depletion. This suggests that
investment policies (in terms of investing resource rents) should also form a component of
policies aimed at trade expansion and that the foregoing concerns about efficient exploitation
rates for resources need to be considered as well. The bottom line is that the net benefit of
exporting a natural resource commodity is not as great as conventional accounting implies.
The treatment of pollution in the genuine savings calculation raises issues that are similar to
the exploitation of natural resources. First, because increments to pollution stocks have some
analogues with depletion of natural resources, there is the need to see that investments in
produced assets offset these increments. Secondly, there is the issue of achieving efficient
levels of pollution emissions. Part of this involves the design of policies that attempt to equate
pollution damages and abatement costs at the margin, and part of it is the cost-effectiveness of
the policies themselves, with market-based approaches being the instruments of choice.
The generation of royalties from natural resources raises the question of public investment,
since the 'rule of thumb' for sustainable development is to invest resource rents. Prudent
government policies would aim to ensure that public investment, in education, infrastructure
or other assets, at least matches the value of depletion of natural resources (assuming, of
course, that the usual situation of resource ownership lying with the government, with the
government then leasing resource lands for exploitation). If the arguments in Chapter 11 about
the treatment of current educational expenditures are accepted, then these expenditures should
be considered to be investment. These sorts of considerations reinforce the notion that it is
important to distinguish between current and capital expenditures by governments when
judging their fiscal stance and role in the economy. Questions of the appropriate scale of
public versus private investment in the economy, and the effectiveness of public investments,
are difficult to deal with, but necessarily part of the considerations in this domain.
Thinking about government expenditures raises the broader issue of consumption levels.
Negative genuine savings rates imply, by definition, excessive consumption whether by
governments or households. Extreme poverty plays a role in this picture, because at the
margin the poor have little option but to consume all their income and, often, to run down
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their assets. So policies that promote growth and the alleviation of poverty will, in general,
lead to a more favourable climate for generating private savings.
Reducing consumption expenditure by governments is one policy approach to boosting
genuine savings. The government's fiscal stance is therefore a legitimate concern in this regard
- deficit financing of public consumption, for instance, has the effect of both boosting overall
consumption and crowding out private investment. But the lessons from the structural
adjustment literature suggest that indiscriminate cutting of government expenditures, e.g. on
primary health care and education, is likely to be harmful. The question, as always, is one of
the appropriate role for the public sector and its appropriate scale. The situation with respect
to the redistributive effects of government taxation is more complex. If redistribution is based
on a progressive income tax system then it necessarily involves transferring income from
households with high marginal propensities to save to ones with low propensities, reducing
savings in the aggregate. However, redistribution may contribute to the social aspects of
sustainable development, not discussed here, in that equity is increased; redistribution may also
aid in the alleviation of poverty, with positive effects on saving in the longer run.
Promoting private savings is a complex affair, involving both the creation of a viable financial
sector that can attract savings and mediate between savers and investors, and the
establishment of a macro-policy climate that encourages savings. One essential feature of this
macro climate must be positive real interest rates, which governments can set through their
monetary policies.
Investment in new assets is not the only way to increase production in the short run -
increasing X-efficiency, for example, can lead to significant gains - but it is the only way in the
limit. More important is the effectiveness of investment. While each unit of savings should be
put to its most productive use in principle, in practice many investments, especially in
developing countries, have been wasteful. So while the analysis of genuine savings has an
importarit role to play in focusing governments' attention on the net creation of wealth, it
should also encourage increased concentration on the return to investment.
Thinking about sustainable development and its measurement inevitably leads to a conception
of the process of development as one of portfolio management. Prudent governments will not
only consider natural resources as assets, and pollution stocks as liabilities, in the national
balance sheet, they will be concerned with the appropriate mix of produced assets and human
capital as well.
Questions of the 'appropriate mix' of assets are inherently questions about returns on the
marginal investment. This marginal investment may be in better resource management,
boosting the value of natural resources in the national balance sheet; it may be in pollution
control, decreasing the size of the pollution liability to its efficient level; it may be in
infrastructure, as has traditionally been the case; and it may be in primary education, as an
essential building block in increasing human capital.
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13. Conclusions
Exhaustible resources are in many ways the cornerstone of the problem of sustainable
development. If the pure rate of time preference is positive then the optimal development path
is not sustainable. And while the 'solution' to this problem is the application of the Hartwick
rule, to invest resource rents, the elasticity of substitution between capital and resources limits
what can be achieved: constant consumption is not feasible if the elasticity is less than 1, and it
is not maximal if the elasticity is greater than 1. If produced capital dpreciates and the pure
rate of time preference is constant then even the 'solution' of the Hartwick rule is not available
- only technological change can ensure sustainability.
The optimal path for an economy with a pollutant with cumulative effects is also not
sustainable, largely because consumers' valuation of environmental services increases without
bound. For a stock pollutant that dissipates naturally, the marginal rales of dissipation (per unit
of pollutant stock) and of pollution emission (i,er unit of production) limit the feasible range of
pure rates of time preference and consumers' valuation of environmental services that will lead
to a long run steady state. Acid rain limits the feasible range of stock sizes for a long run
steady state with a living resource.
For fossil fuels and CO2, the extended Hartwick rule is that investment must equal the sum of
resource depletion, valued at the net rental rate after subtracting the value of a carbon tax, and
the net change in the stock of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, valued at the marginal social
cost of carbon emissions. This result holds even if catastrophic effects are associated with a
given level of carbon in the atmosphere.
Expanding the asset boundary of the system of national accounts to include natural resources
and pollutants is the key to producing indicators of sustainable development. The value of
genuine savings, defined as traditional net savings less the value of tresource depletion and the
value of pollution emissions, is a critical indicator of sustainability, n that persistent negative
genuine savings must eventually lead to declines in welfare.
Formal approaches to green national accounts with such an expanthon of the asset base lead to
a range of conclusions about the measurement of welfare and net product. For exhaustible
resources, green NNP should deduct resource depletion at its rental value. It should also
include resource discoveries valued at their marginal discovery cost, so the treatment of
discoveries in the standard SNA is roughly conect. Where there are heterogeneous resource
deposits, the deduction for resource depletion should value each quantity extracted at the
rental rate specific to its deposit of origin.
A number of conclusions for green national accounting follow from treating the environment
as a source of welfare. First, pollution emissions should be subtracted from, and dissipation of
pollution stocks should be added to, the measure of net product, with both valued either at
marginal social costs or marginal abatement costs. Second, because fossil fuels are also the
source of carbon emissions that decrease welfare, their depletion should be valued at the rental
rate less the rate of carbon taxation required to maximize welfare. Third, where living
resources are concerned, resource harvest minus growth should be deducted, as well as any
damage to the resource as a result of pollution emissions, valued at the unit rental rate. Fourth,
while capital investments in pollution abatement should be included in net product, current
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expenditures should not. Fifth, household defensive expenditures should not be deducted from
green NNP and in fact typically understate their welfare effect. Finally, by including the value
that households place on the flow of environmental services, a measure of welfare rather than
simply net product results.
Green NNP per se has limited implications for sustainability because it measures only the level
of consumption that is consistent with holding utility instantaneously constant. Actually
moving the economy to a sustainable (i.e., constant utility) path will typically result in a
different level of measured NNP, which may be higher or lower. Green NNP can be an
indicator to guide optimal growth policies in that, at least for exhaustible resources, its rate of
change has the same sign as the Hamiltonian function that the social planner is aiming to
maximize.
While constant welfare is not synonymous with constant national wealth, the level of genuine
savings is an important indicator of the sustainabiity of development. This idea, as well as the
results just noted regarding the treatment of pollution and pollution abatement in the national
accounts, was applied in several empirical tests of the sustainability of national economies.
Among the conclusions of this work is the fact that the value of pollution emissions represents
a significant proportion of GDP in most European countries, and that the UK economy is
marginally unsustainable based on figures for the 1980's. Genuine savings estimates including
the value of resource depletion for a sample of over 100 countries during the 1980's reveal
wide regional variations, with East Asian countries exhibiting exceptionally strong saving
performance while Subsaharan African countries were, for the most part, persistent and
significant dissavers. This sheds new light on the economic circumstances of Aflican nations.
Genuine savings, rather than green NNP, is the national accounting aggregate with the clearest
policy implications for sustainable development. For governments concerned with
sustainability, virtually all of natural resource policy, the targets for environmental quality,
public investment programmes (particularly for.the development of human capital), and large
elements of monetary and fiscal policy, are all germane to the question of avoiding negative
genuine savings. By expanding the asset base under consideration, green national accounting
leads to a conception of economic development as a process of portfolio management. The
efficient exploitation of resource assets, the shrinking of pollution liabilities to efficient levels,
and changing the mix of produced and human capital in line with the highest rates of return on
the marginal investment, all should become components of development policy.
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